Re: [Doh] panel discussion on DoH/DoC

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Mon, 11 February 2019 17:36 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 09:35:46 -0800
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To: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
Cc: DoH WG <doh@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Doh] panel discussion on DoH/DoC
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On Mon, Feb 11, 2019 at 9:30 AM Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com> wrote:

> On 11 Feb 2019, at 17:18, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
> >
> >> On Mon, Feb 11, 2019 at 3:40 AM Stephen Farrell <
> stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
> >>
> >> I agree that picking one like that is no worse and likely better than
> >> round robin or similar, when considering how the DoH servers can affect
> >> the browser user's privacy in "normal" scenarios. I'd guess that the
> >> censorship scenario might call for something else though, esp if the
> >> selected DoH server becomes unresponsive. Be interested if you've
> >> thoughts on that. (Not sure myself what browser behaviours might be
> >> best in such failure cases.)
> >
> > Well, as I said, we haven't really sorted this out. But it's also kind
> of out of scope for this WG.
>
> Hmmm. Wouldn't the WG’s charter commitments on privacy and security apply
> to this topic?
>
> Picking your favourite DoH service/server would probably be out of scope
> for the WG. However I think the privacy and security considerations that
> should be part of that selection decision would be in scope for the WG.
>

Well, the WG was chartered to design this protocol and "analyze the
security and privacy issues". I think the main spec has done that.

Resolver selection seems pretty out of scope for that charter.

-Ekr