Re: [Doh] panel discussion on DoH/DoC

Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> Thu, 07 February 2019 13:23 UTC

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From: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
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Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2019 08:23:11 -0500
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To: Vittorio Bertola <vittorio.bertola@open-xchange.com>
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Subject: Re: [Doh] panel discussion on DoH/DoC
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On Feb 7, 2019, at 8:17 AM, Vittorio Bertola <vittorio.bertola@open-xchange.com> wrote:
> Which of course depends on a) having a practical possibility of choice among many browsers having many different policies, and b) the browsers letting you configure your resolver freely.

Yes, it does.   UTSL?

> On Feb 7, 2019, at 8:16 AM, Shane Kerr <shane@time-travellers.org> wrote:

> In theory one could send DoH queries to the server where you were getting an HTML page from, for any names that need resolution on that page. This would be a anti-DoC, indeed probably more decentralized than DNS itself is today.
> 
> If this model requires DNSSEC then it's not even that horrible, since web server operators would not be able to spoof or hijack DNS names.

Except that perhaps I want to block, I don’t know, name resolution for various ad bug sites?   And then if the browser has a secure way past my block, suddenly I’m seeing ads again.   Whether you believe that ads are immoral or not, the fact is that this wrests control away from the end user.