Re: [Doh] ISP position re. hardcoded DoH servers

Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> Thu, 25 July 2019 19:43 UTC

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From: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
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Date: Thu, 25 Jul 2019 15:43:37 -0400
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To: David Lamparter <equinox@diac24.net>
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Subject: Re: [Doh] ISP position re. hardcoded DoH servers
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I think there is an assumption in the approach you are taking that the threat model is centralized resolvers tracking users in a transparent way. I don’t think it’s really a philosophical question to ask whether this is indeed the threat mode about which users should be concerned. 

Sent from my iPhone

> On Jul 25, 2019, at 2:36 PM, David Lamparter <equinox@diac24.net>; wrote:
> 
> Hi all,
> 
> 
> it happens to be that I run a small ISP in Germany.  Probably one of the
> smallest, but this does give me the advantage that I have no company
> politics blocking me from things like sending this mail.
> 
> First of all, I'm hoping to implement DoH as soon as possible on our
> ISP-side DNS caches.  When that happens depends on the availability of
> an open source DoH cache, or maybe a DoH to "classical" converter that
> we can stack on top of our existing cache.  We'd throw the DNS queries
> into our existing resolver either way, so I'd actually prefer a proxy
> over a full cache.
> 
> At the same time, I will be working to send an all-users bulletin asking
> our users for their opinions regarding blocking any known hardcoded DoH
> servers in any application.  Since I know our userbase reasonably well,
> I can predict that we will indeed be implementing this.  Since we don't
> look at any layer 4 headers, this will take the form of simple IP/Prefix
> blackhole routes.
> 
> Of course you can try and make this as painful as possible by stacking
> the DoH service onto something that users will miss.  Maybe some
> well-visited front page.  I have no way to isolate DoH traffic from
> other HTTPS traffic, and I wouldn't want it any other way.  But I'll
> still block anything you hardcode, on layer 3.
> 
> I'm doing this because you do not have informed consent from the users
> if you ship a general purpose application with some default DoH server.
> 
> (btw: Single-purpose applications (e.g. Video streaming services) are a
> different story, nothing wrong with hardcoding an e.g. Netflix DoH
> server into the Netflix App.  This is about general-purpose things like
> browsers.)
> 
> The only way you can get informed consent is to present the user with a
> dialog box that asks "Do you want to perform all web name queries
> through <Service>?  [Yes] [No]".  If you do that, I'll turn into your
> advocate instead of adversary.
> 
> And while we're at it, I'd like to point out that a hardcoded DoH in an
> application is probably illegal in Germany.  German law prohibits /
> invalidates "surprising" clauses (BGB §305c), and I'm reasonably
> confident a court will agree that sending all unrelated name lookups to
> a DoH server of the browser vendor's choice is surprising.  The only way
> to fix that is to make it, well, not a surprise.  Maybe ask your lawyers
> before you get the GDPR bill.
> 
> (again, Netflix app sending DoH to Netflix: no surprise.  Browser
> sending all name queries to some DoH: big surprise.)
> 
> (I'm not a lawyer, the above is not legal advice, I'm just pointing out
> there might be a legal angle to this too.)
> 
> 
> It is what it is.  Sorry about that.
> 
> 
> -David
> 
> P.S.: I don't believe it is useful to respond to this mail.  There's
> nothing technical to be discussed here, only philosophy.
> 
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