Re: [Doh] Mozilla's plans re: DoH

[Stephen Farrell <[e-mail]>]

Hiya,

On 27/03/2019 20:08, Brian Dickson wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 27, 2019 at 7:50 PM Stephen Farrell <[e-mail]>
> wrote:
> 
>>
>> Hiya,
>>
>> On 27/03/2019 17:34, Brian Dickson wrote:
>>> dissident mode
>>
> 
> If you are going to quote me, please do me the courtesy of doing so
> correctly.

I did.

> I wrote ' "dissident mode" ', not 'dissident mode' (i.e. it was in quotes,
> to indicate that I recognize its connotations, but that there is no short
> phrase that captures the nuances.)

There are no such quotes in your mail as rendered by my MUA.

> I am open to alternate terms, provided they also capture the nuances.
> 
> (I would also note that the person from the ACLU was specifically referring
> to dissidents, it was not me alone who used the term.)
> 
> What I would like to distinguish is:
> 
>    - Persons whose safety requires that their communications and DNS usage
>    be encrypted to trusted servers; persons who do not have alternative ways
>    of accessing trusted DNS, and who by necessity must take actions (using
>    third party encrypted DNS) which may be in violations of laws, contracts,
>    or terms of service (which may be unconscionable but technically legal);
>    persons who are acting in solidarity with the aforementioned folks, or
>    participating in acts of civil disobedience, and
>    - Persons who are taking advantage of legal, permissible, explicitly
>    allowed, and openly available third party DNS over encrypted channels, and
>    refraining from such usage if access is blocked.

I do not accept the above as a useful distinction for this topic.

Those in the category of your first bullet can only be protected
by technology when (essentially) all those in other categories
use the same technology. (That said, I could quibble with your
text, but won't for now:-)

But, and it's a big but, those whose safety is not at risk (today),
also have valid interests to protect, and mechanisms that we have
to offer for such protection need to be widely deployed to be
effective.

>    - From a technological basis, the desire is to facilitate this
>    distinction at scale. One obvious mechanism would be to use
distinct TCP
>    port numbers, even if the DoH server is the same (and the same IP
address
>    and TLS certificate are used).
> 
> To facilitate the ongoing discussions, we need some suitable label for the
> former.
> If you find the term I originally used objectionable, please provide one
> for the first group, DISTINCT FROM any corresponding label for the second
> group.

I won't, sorry. I don't accept your proposed dichotomy as valid.
IOW, our disagreement isn't about the word, but the concept that
such a (likely small) set of people are a usefully distinct set
for this discussion.

Cheers,
S.

PS: I won't respond to your other text below as I think doing so
would be repetitive with the above or wouldn't further the discussion.


> 
> Making assertions that the two groups are actually one group is much worse
> for the ongoing discussions, and would be materially inaccurate,
> deliberately conflating the two groups, highly counterproductive, and
> inflammatory. I would politely ask that you refrain from doing so. (I am
> not claiming that you have done so, I'm just trying to dissuade such in
> anticipation of the possibility.)
> 
> I welcome any label you prefer for the first group.
> 
> For the second group, any different label from the first group would be
> fine; I'd suggest "privacy-aware". They use privacy by choice, not by
> strict necessity (on threat of violence or death), and are freely able to
> make that choice with no personal consequences.
> 
> What I am interested in pursing is ways to protect the first group, while
> enabling the ability for legitimate enterprise policy enforcement (e.g.
> blocking) to be done scalably.
> E.g. Make the traffic of the second group identifiable, and to encourage
> (or require) that how browsers implement the access to the third-party DNS
> services over encrypted channels, provide a scalable way for networks to
> block usage for the second group.
> 
> Here is why having an easy way to distinguish the two groups, at a network
> level (i.e. TCP port), is important, IMHO:
> The best protection for the first group, is to have them easily
> distinguished from the second group.
> The logic is a bit non-obvious, so let me attempt to explain.
> The typical volume of traffic by all members of the second group, is likely
> to be significantly higher than the first group.
> If enterprise networks have ways of blocking the second group, and if the
> users in the first group only enable their specific "mode" for limited
> intervals, the occasional burst of traffic from the first group won't
> likely result in the enterprise wanting to attempt to block the first
> group. This has the benefit of not having persistent use of the mechanisms
> of the first group, and doesn't create the residual risk (e.g. of malware
> abuse of the first group's DNS traffic).
> On the other hand, if the exact same mechanism is used by both groups, and
> there is no practical/simple method of blocking only the second group, the
> resulting scenario is lose/lose/lose (possibly more "lose" terms).
> The enterprise would need to employ costly (due to not being scalable),
> possibly less reliable/available border enforcement, or risk any of the
> side effects of unconstrained/unblocked DNS carried outside the enterprise
> via encrypted transport. The impact to the users would be uniform; the
> second group would be inconvenienced, while the first group would lose
> their necessary (by definition) DNS privacy.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>>
>> As stated at the side-meeting, I think the above phrase is
>> counterproductive and inaccurate and it'd be a fine thing
>> if we stopped using that kind of wording.
>>
>>
> It may be counterproductive, but it is accurate.
> 
> I am distinguishing two use cases, even when the same underlying technology
> is employed (DNS carried via HTTPS). One is where the user would like to
> use the technology, and where the access may or may not be permitted, and
> the user does not exceed the permissions (and thus either uses a different
> provided DNS service, possibly encrypted, possibly not, or does not user
> the network at all.) The other use case is where the user must use the
> technology without regard to whether this activity is permitted.
> 
> The first group is best categorized as dissidents. From an online
> dictionary:
> 
>>  a person who opposes official policy, especially that of an authoritarian
>> state.
>> "a dissident who had been jailed by a military regime"
>> synonyms: dissenter, objector, protester, disputant; freethinker,
>> nonconformist, independent thinker; rebel, revolutionary, recusant,
>> renegade; subversive, agitator, insurgent, insurrectionist,
>> insurrectionary, mutineer; informal: refusenik
>> "a dissident who had been jailed by the regime"
> 
> 
> If you object to the phrase, please provide a semantically equivalent but
> inoffensive phrase.
> 
> Brian
> 
> P.S. It may not be clear, but I definitely am in favor of providing DoH to
> everyone who requires it, i.e. members of this specific group.
> 
> P.P.S. I disagree with "conscripting" unaware users into using the same
> mechanism using opt-out, always-on resolution via DoH to third party
> providers. Doing so may place them in jeopardy of one form or another, and
> is especially objectionable when it is done without explicit and informed
> consent. The other reason for using technology to block only the second
> group, is to protect any users who accidentally leave an application or
> device in the "privacy" mode, when they are on a network which prohibits
> encrypted access to third party DNS providers. The blockage protects the
> network; the requirement for explicit user consent to break network policy
> (and bypass the blockage) is what protects the wayward, innocent user.
> 
> 
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