Re: [Doh] Ben Campbell's Yes on charter-ietf-doh-00-12: (with COMMENT)

Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com> Thu, 28 September 2017 03:31 UTC

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From: Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com>
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Date: Wed, 27 Sep 2017 22:31:09 -0500
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To: Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com>
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Subject: Re: [Doh] Ben Campbell's Yes on charter-ietf-doh-00-12: (with COMMENT)
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> On Sep 27, 2017, at 10:20 PM, Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com> wrote:
> 
> On 9/27/17 22:06, Ben Campbell wrote:
>> I'm balloting "yes", but I have a point of confusion on the following text:
>> 
>> "The primary focus of this working group is to develop a mechanism that
>> provides confidentiality and connectivity between DNS Clients and Iterative
>> Resolvers.  While access to DNS-over-HTTPS servers from JavaScript running in
>> a typical web browser is not the primary use case for this work, precluding
>> the ability to do so would require additional preventative design. The working
>> group will not engage in such preventative design."
>> 
>> I remember someone (Terry, maybe?) stating earlier that the justification for
>> keeping this separate from DPRIVE was that confidentiality was_not_  the
>> primary use case, and connection from JS in browsers_was_.
> 
> I seem to recall that the issue with doing it in DPRIVE was that DPRIVE made it clear that they were not interested. I thought Terry said as much during the last formal telechat, although the narrative minutes don't seem to capture it in a way that matches my memory.

I should let Terry speak for himself, but I thought at some point he mentioned that as the reasoning DPRIVE was not interested. I may misremember.

Don’t get me wrong, I’m happy enough with this going forward. This was a “yes” ballot.  I just wanted to make sure we hadn't changed the basic premise which generated the “not in DPRIVE” decision.

> 
> The conversation about the charter so far -- like the input document -- are based primarily on "getting queries through networks where they might otherwise be blocked, snooped, or tamped with" as the primary use case, and the javascript-in-a-browser use case as secondary. There was one proponent on ietf@ietf.org who was specifically interested in the latter case, but the language above that precludes blocking that ability should serve those purposes fine.
> 
>> I see where people
>> decided otherwise in the (95 entries so far) discussion thread--but does that
>> change the relationship with DPRIVE? Especially since the first sentence comes
>> directly from the DPRIVE charter?
> 
> I took the line from DPRIVE because it was already vetted. :)
> 
> You can find context for that specific addition here: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ietf/2jdAf975gKGRwffgmums27m5-hM>

Yeah, I think that was entry number 86 :-)

> 
> /a
>