Re: [Doh] Ben Campbell's Yes on charter-ietf-doh-00-12: (with COMMENT)

Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com> Thu, 28 September 2017 03:20 UTC

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From: Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com>
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Subject: Re: [Doh] Ben Campbell's Yes on charter-ietf-doh-00-12: (with COMMENT)
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On 9/27/17 22:06, Ben Campbell wrote:
> I'm balloting "yes", but I have a point of confusion on the following text:
>
> "The primary focus of this working group is to develop a mechanism that
> provides confidentiality and connectivity between DNS Clients and Iterative
> Resolvers.  While access to DNS-over-HTTPS servers from JavaScript running in
> a typical web browser is not the primary use case for this work, precluding
> the ability to do so would require additional preventative design. The working
> group will not engage in such preventative design."
>
> I remember someone (Terry, maybe?) stating earlier that the justification for
> keeping this separate from DPRIVE was that confidentiality was_not_  the
> primary use case, and connection from JS in browsers_was_.

I seem to recall that the issue with doing it in DPRIVE was that DPRIVE 
made it clear that they were not interested. I thought Terry said as 
much during the last formal telechat, although the narrative minutes 
don't seem to capture it in a way that matches my memory.

The conversation about the charter so far -- like the input document -- 
are based primarily on "getting queries through networks where they 
might otherwise be blocked, snooped, or tamped with" as the primary use 
case, and the javascript-in-a-browser use case as secondary. There was 
one proponent on ietf@ietf.org who was specifically interested in the 
latter case, but the language above that precludes blocking that ability 
should serve those purposes fine.

> I see where people
> decided otherwise in the (95 entries so far) discussion thread--but does that
> change the relationship with DPRIVE? Especially since the first sentence comes
> directly from the DPRIVE charter?

I took the line from DPRIVE because it was already vetted. :)

You can find context for that specific addition here: 
<https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ietf/2jdAf975gKGRwffgmums27m5-hM>

/a