Re: [Doh] [DNSOP] On today's resolverless DNS meeting

Justin Henck <> Tue, 06 November 2018 14:45 UTC

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From: Justin Henck <>
Date: Tue, 6 Nov 2018 21:44:55 +0700
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Cc: Mukund Sivaraman <>,,,
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Subject: Re: [Doh] [DNSOP] On today's resolverless DNS meeting
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Briefly jumping in to add, which was set up after
the last meeting for discussion of this specific topic.  Direct link:

I also just sent the notes to that mailing list.

Justin Henck
Product Manager

PGP: EA8E 8C27 2D75 974D B357 482B 1039 9F2D 869A 117B

On Tue, Nov 6, 2018 at 9:39 PM Joe Abley <> wrote:

> > On Nov 6, 2018, at 17:27, Mukund Sivaraman <> wrote:
> >
> > We talked about DNSSEC and certificate signing and such. If the host
> > serving this webpage to the browser has control over the webpage's
> > content (e.g., the contents of that src attribute), and the webpage's
> > contents are already authenticated by TLS, then why does an address
> > record have to be separately authenticated?
> I think this is an easy one. It doesn't.
> The names that it is permissible for a server to push information
> about (and the names that a client should be allowed to accept) must
> be constrained such that the names supplied for use in one web
> application can't influence the operation of another.
> (For example, it would be bad if some generic and otherwise benign web
> page could feed the browser high-TTL DNS messages for names under
> online retailer domains that accept credit cards or component APIs
> used within genuine web apps.)
> The obvious analogy to me is the logic that controls what cookies a
> browser should accept. Maybe exactly the same rules are appropriate. I
> realise that managing those rules using mechanisms like the public
> suffix list is not without challenges.
> If we accept that these constraints are necessary, then the presence
> or absence of DNSSEC signatures doesn't matter. The DoH objects are
> within the same security perimeter as the URIs that make use of them
> and don't benefit from additional integrity protection; the transport
> security for all the other objects being sent from server to client
> provides the right coverage.
> Joe
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