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Re: [Doh] Suggestion on draft-ietf-doh-dns-over-https-13: Recommend DANE-TLS to authenticate the TLS-certificate

Star Brilliant <m13253@hotmail.com> Thu, 16 August 2018 10:10 UTC

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From: Star Brilliant <m13253@hotmail.com>
To: "doh@ietf.org" <doh@ietf.org>
CC: "Rene 'Renne' Bartsch, B.Sc. Informatics" <ietf=40bartschnet.de@dmarc.ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Doh] Suggestion on draft-ietf-doh-dns-over-https-13: Recommend DANE-TLS to authenticate the TLS-certificate
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Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2018 10:10:27 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Doh] Suggestion on draft-ietf-doh-dns-over-https-13: Recommend DANE-TLS to authenticate the TLS-certificate
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On Thu, Aug 16, 2018 at 7:37 PM Rene 'Renne' Bartsch, B.Sc. Informatics <ietf=40bartschnet.de@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>
> Am 16.08.2018 um 11:01 schrieb Star Brilliant:
> > On Thu, Aug 16, 2018 at 6:13 PM Rene 'Renne' Bartsch, B.Sc. Informatics <ietf=40bartschnet.de@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
> >>
> >> Hi,
> >>
> >> as TLS-certificates forged or obtained by devious means have become common in MITM-attacks by intelligence and criminals
> >> I suggest to RECOMMEND authentication of the DoH-server TLS-certificate via DANE-TLS (RFC 6698) in section 10 (Security considerations).
> >
> > Hi Renne,
> >
> > I am sorry I could not get your point.
> >
> > How could it be possible to forge TLS certificates without being detected through our current PKI systems?

The security level is the same with either PKI and DANE.

Let me explain.

> - Stolen CA keys/hacked CA (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DigiNotar -> Issuance of fraudulent certificates)

Stolen/hacked KSK and ZSK.
And currently it is nearly impossible to revoke and rotate the root-anchor key in case anything bad happens.

> - Malicious CA

Malicious domain registrar that modifies NS records combined with GeoDNS to prevent being detected.

> - CA forced by malicious law

We have certificate transparency records and CAA records to protect them.
But nothing similar in DANE world.

> - Abuse of intermediate certificates (https://security.googleblog.com/2017/09/chromes-plan-to-distrust-symantec.html)

Yes it is detected!
(I said "... forge TLS certificates without being detected ...")

> - Fraudulent certificate requests

I could not get your point. Any examples?

> - Broken revocation system (https://medium.com/@alexeysamoshkin/how-ssl-certificate-revocation-is-broken-in-practice-af3b63b9cb3)

Therefore OCSP-Stapling is necessary.
Not only for security, but also for bootstrap to work.

> What if the client doesn't get the CRL/OCSP informtation?

If unable to get OCSP information, the client will probably query itself in a loop, and may crash finally.
If you run DoH server by yourself you will know this problem.

> Bottom line: Don't trust a CA.

No offence, but do you trust ICANN?
That is single authority, compared with multiple CAs.

Conclusion: I do not think DANE should be preferred than PKI (or "MORE RECOMMENDED" than PKI).
At most they have the same level of security. (Actually DANE is worse, e.g. nearly impossible to rotate the root-anchor.)

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