Re: [Doh] panel discussion on DoH/DoC

Valentin Gosu <valentin.gosu@gmail.com> Thu, 07 February 2019 14:20 UTC

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From: Valentin Gosu <valentin.gosu@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2019 15:20:32 +0100
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To: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
Cc: Vittorio Bertola <vittorio.bertola@open-xchange.com>, doh@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Doh] panel discussion on DoH/DoC
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On Thu, 7 Feb 2019 at 14:23, Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> wrote:

> On Feb 7, 2019, at 8:17 AM, Vittorio Bertola <
> vittorio.bertola@open-xchange.com> wrote:
>
> Which of course depends on a) having a practical possibility of choice
> among many browsers having many different policies, and b) the browsers
> letting you configure your resolver freely.
>
>
> Yes, it does.   UTSL?
>
> On Feb 7, 2019, at 8:16 AM, Shane Kerr <shane@time-travellers.org> wrote:
>
> In theory one could send DoH queries to the server where you were getting
> an HTML page from, for any names that need resolution on that page. This
> would be a anti-DoC, indeed probably more decentralized than DNS itself is
> today.
>
> If this model requires DNSSEC then it's not even that horrible, since web
> server operators would not be able to spoof or hijack DNS names.
>
>
> Except that perhaps I want to block, I don’t know, name resolution for
> various ad bug sites?   And then if the browser has a secure way past my
> block, suddenly I’m seeing ads again.   Whether you believe that ads are
> immoral or not, the fact is that this wrests control away from the end user.
>

I think a very important point to make is that the existence of the DoH RFC
does not affect these sort of usecases at all. If an ad site wanted to load
ads without being constrained by DNS it could always hardcode IP addresses,
or use their own homegrown variety of DNS over HTTP(S) with the server of
their choice. The same is true for IoT devices. And even for browsers. If
Google wanted to perform all DNS resolutions using "frankenDNS over gQUIC",
there's hardly a way you can stop them.

Where having a DoH RFC is immensely helpful is that you now have lots
compatible server and client implementations. If you want to increase your
privacy in a coffee shop, just point your stub resolver to a DoH server -
be it Cloudflare, Google, or your own pi-hole that you have at home.
And when browsers implement DoH, it's easier to have a choice of DoH
servers, because implementations follow the same RFC.