Re: [Doh] Use Cases

"Paul Hoffman" <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> Thu, 16 November 2017 10:17 UTC

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From: "Paul Hoffman" <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
To: "Mark Nottingham" <mnot@mnot.net>
Cc: doh@ietf.org
Date: Thu, 16 Nov 2017 18:17:01 +0800
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Subject: Re: [Doh] Use Cases
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On 16 Nov 2017, at 15:53, Mark Nottingham wrote:

> """
> 3. Use Cases
>
> There are two initial use cases for this protocol.
>
> The primary use case is to prevent on-path network devices from 
> interfering with DNS operations. This interference includes, but is 
> not limited to, spoofing DNS responses, blocking DNS requests, and 
> tracking.
>
> In this use, clients -- whether operating systems or individual 
> applications -- will be explicitly configured to use a DOH server as a 
> recursive resolver by its user (or administrator). They might use the 
> DOH server for all queries, or only for a subset of them. The specific 
> configuration mechanism is out of scope for this document.
>
> A secondary use case is allowing web applications to access DNS 
> information, by using existing APIs in browsers to access it over 
> HTTP.
>
> This is technically already possible (since the server controls both 
> the HTTP resources it exposes and the use of browser APIs by its 
> content), but standardisation might make this easier to accomplish.
>
> Note that in this second use, the browser does not consult the DOH 
> server or use its responses for any DNS lookups outside the scope of 
> the application using them; i.e., there is (currently) no API that 
> allows a Web site to poison DNS for others.
> """

This seems like a good replacement.

--Paul Hoffman