Re: [Doh] [Ext] Goals of DOH

Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> Tue, 24 April 2018 01:09 UTC

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From: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
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Date: Mon, 23 Apr 2018 21:09:36 -0400
Cc: DoH WG <doh@ietf.org>
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To: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@icann.org>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/doh/nHhMquM1rQETsWVhAQgp8zIT3sg>
Subject: Re: [Doh] [Ext] Goals of DOH
Precedence: list

On Apr 23, 2018, at 8:43 PM, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@icann.org> wrote:
>> Providing confidentiality and connectivity is as well.  Of course, a less provoking way of saying what I said might be "to prevent abuse by network operators," but it's kind of a toss-up.
> 
> It's focusing on a subset of "network operators" and pretending that it is the complete set.

Argh.   No.   When you are examining a threat model, there is no difference between "the network operator could be attacking me in a way I can't detect" and "the network operator _is_ attacking me in a way I can't detect."

The point of what I was saying is not that network operators are evil.  Many of the things that they do to the DNS that DoH would prevent are actually to the benefit of the average end user.

The point also isn't that there is no use for DoH other than subverting the intentions of operators.

But very clearly, that is one of the things that it can do, and it is very clearly stated in the charter as the primary goal.

[Doh] Fallback to untrusted DOH servers Mateusz Jończyk
Re: [Doh] Fallback to untrusted DOH servers Ted Lemon
Re: [Doh] [Ext] Fallback to untrusted DOH servers Paul Hoffman
Re: [Doh] Fallback to untrusted DOH servers Mateusz Jończyk
Re: [Doh] [Ext] Fallback to untrusted DOH servers Mateusz Jończyk
Re: [Doh] [Ext] Fallback to untrusted DOH servers Patrick McManus
Re: [Doh] [Ext] Fallback to untrusted DOH servers Paul Hoffman
Re: [Doh] [Ext] Fallback to untrusted DOH servers Mateusz Jończyk
Re: [Doh] [Ext] Fallback to untrusted DOH servers Mateusz Jończyk
Re: [Doh] [Ext] Fallback to untrusted DOH servers Patrick McManus
Re: [Doh] [Ext] Fallback to untrusted DOH servers Mateusz Jończyk
Re: [Doh] [Ext] Fallback to untrusted DOH servers Paul Hoffman
Re: [Doh] [Ext] Fallback to untrusted DOH servers Ben Schwartz
Re: [Doh] [Ext] Fallback to untrusted DOH servers Ted Lemon
Re: [Doh] [Ext] Fallback to untrusted DOH servers Tom Pusateri
Re: [Doh] [Ext] Fallback to untrusted DOH servers Paul Hoffman
Re: [Doh] [Ext] Fallback to untrusted DOH servers Tom Pusateri
Re: [Doh] [Ext] Fallback to untrusted DOH servers Ted Lemon
Re: [Doh] [Ext] Fallback to untrusted DOH servers Tom Pusateri
[Doh] Goals of DOH Paul Hoffman
Re: [Doh] Goals of DOH Ted Lemon
Re: [Doh] [Ext] Goals of DOH Paul Hoffman
Re: [Doh] [Ext] Goals of DOH Ted Lemon