Re: [Doh] [dns-privacy] [DNSOP] New: draft-bertola-bcp-doh-clients

nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com> Mon, 11 March 2019 17:26 UTC

Return-Path: <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
X-Original-To: doh@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: doh@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9B7BD1311F7 for <doh@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 11 Mar 2019 10:26:32 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.899
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.899 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_MED=-0.001, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=e-dco-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 5jfBLL-0S47h for <doh@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 11 Mar 2019 10:26:29 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-lj1-x230.google.com (mail-lj1-x230.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::230]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 441401311D4 for <doh@ietf.org>; Mon, 11 Mar 2019 10:26:27 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by mail-lj1-x230.google.com with SMTP id l5so4835917lje.1 for <doh@ietf.org>; Mon, 11 Mar 2019 10:26:27 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=e-dco-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=sbWgaFPI1pXEidCx2FRBhXM7a4sOgGvVd19I9XFuPyM=; b=e/aA7HuTDK6WnGezDkgLG/JeOSgOHg9zMxZZ98qdKbTNvLb3GXS8MfLaltJq50JQvl 0dwc1hVxfhthqkFZXjZHZT4m+BTmystMJjyw4lpprS35dRaV6Kxk90kEAzYCI2LPNQQx D95jO9ytS5bPgVkyXjKofWOMTU8Yi0nu51IIM6lYgLV/Qc52xpfOYq5Opt09AM/b3bnE scdSkkctiuUcjiFEG4imIHYyuCJT/b2PzoJSEy6cgNMqS2uaMSkr0GQIO6WHRRGtGXEd DCc3qS6NYQeZaxSlo0NrTRserE/FGAdewqOion9gMIGp5RbV+CX5roS8RiMJhqENZbW5 Bpjg==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=sbWgaFPI1pXEidCx2FRBhXM7a4sOgGvVd19I9XFuPyM=; b=Td2V/j9UDpJWLzrAYIgtnIZqLNNbj1ipkuTB4uHCMusiWOAalMU9QyNhydGOHlt5kr DiSeZmZiLiw3jU8pgSWv2D2kPdyjznb86oKoYqazid1GMGbwgEAzzWeGJeCXq7yVWLoM oP5doPSHpEw++S/EdeIqdAtVa6wUqU+D624+/JZdfBBC54YTGbzUwDM79Anp1YuCHrBT 26Q26aXAqX6fMGEdrOpIvhAzcG2zQK+zYjymh/XwMfGIUtzlxlUM1TAqNmIV8tARkZRW xkVunDsGL7qjr6yijgE1cFYcuRDxQ0KPhMYTycbsX3l9/NODFlb8FVI8vPXuFvP7GCMe rncw==
X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAUvGKDp+mHAZ/EWY0NbDJjBlHnz2GaBi0kugnQgftAKxBH/YrUy 9lTe+RZJXCIhUHLtuXxw5ZCpguNch63IJh5lRkUwtQ==
X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqyXevmlgaG8ZaSgJcQg/XPeDXldnwLMOlMJTf7ZV9e8eS4Xn9h98FcBcANPbK9UPkiQqkP3q8xRhqCR7eAH4XE=
X-Received: by 2002:a2e:7a03:: with SMTP id v3mr17364097ljc.22.1552325185205; Mon, 11 Mar 2019 10:26:25 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
References: <1700920918.12557.1552229700654@appsuite.open-xchange.com> <7667c4d7-2e78-0a27-84af-cf1c00fd4897@cs.tcd.ie> <1991054337.12802.1552259263075@appsuite.open-xchange.com> <eea64b30-aad0-a030-5360-1b1484f1d0e3@huitema.net> <CAPsNn2WhjHSEHJUEL8GB6X0d24fkajgPnY4YgkOQbXjyxb5q8Q@mail.gmail.com> <e62efaf3-4a35-4a52-5ed4-dee2e7fafe72@huitema.net> <69f989ba-0939-b917-b586-9e3af3fb8b74@redbarn.org> <CAPsNn2XNCzgAdfJtxBVboAe+d6sbCiV2fZv9185wm+HN+3zRdg@mail.gmail.com> <BYAPR16MB279065EE519680E7FC9A637CEA480@BYAPR16MB2790.namprd16.prod.outlook.com>
In-Reply-To: <BYAPR16MB279065EE519680E7FC9A637CEA480@BYAPR16MB2790.namprd16.prod.outlook.com>
From: nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2019 22:56:14 +0530
Message-ID: <CAPsNn2Up1AtJJCdmu_9NC4jfzc-8dtE+QjUzRxMBUwaN44gvOg@mail.gmail.com>
To: "Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy" <TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@mcafee.com>
Cc: Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org>, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, "doh@ietf.org" <doh@ietf.org>, "dnsop@ietf.org" <dnsop@ietf.org>, Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>, "dns-privacy@ietf.org" <dns-privacy@ietf.org>, Vittorio Bertola <vittorio.bertola=40open-xchange.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, "Ackermann, Michael" <mackermann@bcbsm.com>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="0000000000003d9edd0583d4df90"
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/doh/yy3ziFdSkT56dwdrCt_Np6kBShw>
Subject: Re: [Doh] [dns-privacy] [DNSOP] New: draft-bertola-bcp-doh-clients
X-BeenThere: doh@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: DNS Over HTTPS <doh.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/doh>, <mailto:doh-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/doh/>
List-Post: <mailto:doh@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:doh-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/doh>, <mailto:doh-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2019 17:26:37 -0000

Tiru,

Thanks for your comments.

> Enterprise networks are already able to block DoH services,

We are also concerned about getting threat intelligence so that would
impact DoH on the Internet.   We are also concerned about being able to
block malware, etc. inside the enterprise.

Thank you for doing your draft.  I look forward to understanding it
better.  I believe it is a good start to address some of our potential
problems.  I am thinking over what the deployment and roll out strategies
might be in various topologies.  I will say more once I have thought it out.

Nalini

On Mon, Mar 11, 2019 at 8:37 PM Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy <
TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@mcafee.com> wrote:

> Please see inline [TR]
>
>
>
> *From:* dns-privacy <dns-privacy-bounces@ietf.org> *On Behalf Of *nalini
> elkins
> *Sent:* Monday, March 11, 2019 11:05 AM
> *To:* Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org>
> *Cc:* Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>ie>; doh@ietf.org;
> dnsop@ietf.org; Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>et>;
> dns-privacy@ietf.org; Vittorio Bertola <vittorio.bertola=
> 40open-xchange.com@dmarc.ietf.org>gt;; Ackermann, Michael <
> mackermann@bcbsm.com>
> *Subject:* Re: [dns-privacy] [DNSOP] New: draft-bertola-bcp-doh-clients
>
>
>
> *CAUTION*: External email. Do not click links or open attachments unless
> you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.
> ------------------------------
>
> Paul,
>
>
>
> > (yes, i will be part of a major new project to identify and block all
> DoH services, so
>
> > that behavioural security policies can still work, because you may have
> > noticed that the internet has never become MORE secure from new tech,
> > but it occasionally becomes LESS secure more slowly because of policy.)
>
>
>
> I would be very interested, if you are so inclined, to hear more of what
> you are thinking.   Is this something you can (are willing to) talk about?
>
>
>
>
> [TR] Enterprise networks are already able to block DoH services, it is
> causing the DoH client to fallback to clear-text DNS compromising endpoint
> security and privacy. In draft
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-reddy-dprive-bootstrap-dns-server-01 we
> are proposing mechanisms to automatically bootstrap endpoints to discover
> and authenticate privacy-enabling DNS servers provided by the Enterprise
> network.
>
>
>
> The user also gets to know the privacy preserving data policy by the DNS
> server and can decide whether to switch to another network or if the user
> trusts the network and privacy policy, the user can enable strict privacy
> profile with the privacy enabling DNS server discovered in the Enterprise
> network itself instead of downgrading to opportunistic privacy profile.
>
>
>
> Cheers,
>
> -Tiru
>
>
>
> It sounds like a very thought-provoking initiative.
>
>
>
> Thanks,
>
> Nalini
>
>
>
> On Mon, Mar 11, 2019 at 10:55 AM Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org> wrote:
>
>
>
> Christian Huitema wrote on 2019-03-10 21:14:
> ....
> > There are a bunch of conflicting requirements here, and it would be good
> > to tease out the contradictions. Consider the following cases:
> >
> > 1) I am using my phone, and using application-X.
> >
> > 2) I am at home, using application-X on my home computer.
> >
> > 3) I am using Wi-Fi in a hotel, and using application-X.
> >
> > 4) I am using my work laptop on the enterprise network, and using
> > application-X
> >
> > 5) I am using my work laptop in a hotel, and using application-X
> >
> > 6) I am using my work laptop on the network of a customer, and using
> > application-X.
>
> this distinction is not useful.
>
> there are two cases.
>
> a user or app trusts its network.
>
> or not.
>
> in the first case, you'll use an RDNS service which is in the set
> (allowed (preferred)). that is, you'll use the server you desire most
> out of the set that your network operator allows you to reach.
>
> in the second case, you'll use a VPN, for all of your traffic, not just
> for DNS, because if you hide your DNS but not the connections which
> result from such hiding, it will add no measurable privacy.
>
> > Today, plenty of people claim the right to control how I use the DNS: my
> > phone carrier, my ISP at home, the company that got the contract to
> > manage the hotel's Wi-Fi, the IT manager for my company's laptop, the IT
> > manager for the company that I am visiting. Out of those, there is just
> > one scenario for which the claim has some legitimacy: if the company
> > pays for my laptop and own the laptop, yes of course it has a legitimate
> > claim to control how I am using it. Otherwise, I, the user, get to
> > decide. If I like the application's setting better than the network's
> > default, then of course I expect those settings to stick.
>
> this distinction is also false.
>
> if you are using my network, then it makes no difference which of us
> bought you that laptop. you will use the RDNS i allow you to use. RDNS
> is part of the control plane, and i use it for both monitoring and
> control. sometimes that's so that i can see malware beacon to its C&C.
> sometimes that's so that i can institute parental controls.
>
> if you don't like my rules, you should vote with your feet, and not
> visit me. because that is the only choice you will have. (yes, i will be
> part of a major new project to identify and block all DoH services, so
> that behavioural security policies can still work, because you may have
> noticed that the internet has never become MORE secure from new tech,
> but it occasionally becomes LESS secure more slowly because of policy.)
>
> quoting again the salient passage of RFC 8484's self-damning introduction:
>
> > ... Two primary use cases were considered during this protocol's
> > development. These use cases are preventing on-path devices from
> > interfering with DNS operations, ...
>
> let me give you advance notice: "i aim to misbehave."[1] that is, _i am
> on-path, and i intend to interfere._ why on earth the IETF decided to
> equate dissidents (of whom there are tens of thousands, all of which
> need full VPN's not just DoH for actual safety) with bots (of which
> there are tens of millions), and set up a war between end users and
> network operators, i will never understand, or try to. now, we fight.
>
> --
> P Vixie
>
>
>
>
> --
>
> Thanks,
>
> Nalini Elkins
>
> President
>
> Enterprise Data Center Operators
>
> www.e-dco.com
>
>
>


-- 
Thanks,
Nalini Elkins
President
Enterprise Data Center Operators
www.e-dco.com