Re: [Dots] clarification questions from the hackathon

"Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy" <TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com> Mon, 01 April 2019 13:31 UTC

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From: "Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy" <TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com>
To: "mohamed.boucadair@orange.com" <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>, Jon Shallow <supjps-ietf@jpshallow.com>, kaname nishizuka <kaname@nttv6.jp>, "dots@ietf.org" <dots@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Dots] clarification questions from the hackathon
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dots/-V2uXxYM9vMGr2bDIaaceuSMnG4>
Subject: Re: [Dots] clarification questions from the hackathon
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Update looks good, couple of points to consider:

1> when the mitigation request is successfully applied, the response must include the acl-* attributes conveyed in the request (as per RFC7252 5.9.1.1). 
2> It looks useful to return the activated ACL statistics, for example If the client activates a rate-limit ACL, the ACL could be applied at the PE router 
(because the DMS is not capable of handling the attack volume). The rate-limit ACL will rate-limit both legitimate and attack traffic, and the DMS will scrub the rate-limited traffic and drop the attack traffic. The client may want to know the statistics of the traffic dropped because of the rate-limit ACL.

-Tiru

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Dots <dots-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of
> mohamed.boucadair@orange.com
> Sent: Monday, April 1, 2019 4:43 PM
> To: Jon Shallow <supjps-ietf@jpshallow.com>; kaname nishizuka
> <kaname@nttv6.jp>; dots@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Dots] clarification questions from the hackathon
> 
> This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or
> open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is
> safe.
> 
> Jon, Kaname, all,
> 
> FWIW, a proposal to integrate the interop comments is available at:
> https://github.com/boucadair/filter-control/blob/master/wdiff%20draft-
> nishizuka-dots-signal-control-filtering-05.txt%20draft-nishizuka-dots-signal-
> control-filtering-06.pdf
> 
> Cheers,
> Med
> 
> > > >
> > > > > -----Message d'origine-----
> > > > > De : Dots [mailto:dots-bounces@ietf.org] De la part de kaname
> > > > > nishizuka Envoyé : jeudi 28 mars 2019 11:38 À : dots@ietf.org
> > > > > Objet : [Dots] clarification questions from the hackathon
> > > > >
> > > > > Hi,
> > > > >
> > > > > I'd like to continue discussion of these topics in the ML.
> > > > >
> > > > > #1: Questions about signal-control-filtering
> > > > >   1. Should a mitigation request create a mitigation before
> > > > > doing a PUT
> > +
> > > > > acl-list [{acl-name, activation-type}] against the active
> > > > > mitigation,
> > or
> > > is a
> > > > > ‘PUT + acl-list [{acl-name, activation-type}]’ allowed to create
> > > > > a new mitigation?
> > > >
> > > > [Med] Both are currently allowed in the draft. I don't still a
> > > > valid
> > reason
> > > to
> > > > restrict this.
> > >
> > > [Jon] As per draft
> > >    A DOTS client MUST NOT use the filtering control over DOTS signal
> > >    channel if no attack (mitigation) is active;
> > >
> >
> > [Med] What is meant actually is:
> >
> >    A DOTS client MUST NOT use the filtering control over DOTS signal
> >    channel in 'idle' time;
> >
> > Will update the text.
> >
> > > [Jon] then needs to be reworded as there is no active mitigation
> > > until the PUT is done...
> > > I believe that both cases should be supported.
> > > >
> > > > >   2. Should the response to a GET (or Observed GET) include the
> > > > > acl-
> > list
> > > > > [{acl-name, activation-type}] if the PUT included it?
> > > >
> > > > [Med] The current spec says "no". That's said, what would be the
> > > > value in returning it? Then, why not allowing to return the
> > > > references to all ACLs
> > > that
> > > > are enabled during the mitigation time?
> > > >
> > > [Jon] When observing the mitigation request, if the activation-type
> > > is changed externally, the client will then know about the change.
> > > Assuming
> > the
> > > response got back to the client, this is effectively an ACK to the
> > > fact
> > that
> > > the ACL change got through.
> >
> > [Med] The observe case makes sense, indeed.
> >
> > >
> > > Interesting concept about knowing about all the relevant ACLs as
> > > returned over the signal channel.  More work for the server to do in
> > > determining
> > which
> > > ACLs are valid for, say, a specific IP address that is being mitigated.
> > Not
> > > entirely convinced of the benefit of this as this generally is
> > > available
> > over
> > > the data channel.
> > >
> >
> > [Med] I'm not convinced, either.
> >
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