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Re: [Dots] clarification questions from the hackathon

Olli Vanhoja <olli@zeit.co> Thu, 28 March 2019 10:47 UTC

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From: Olli Vanhoja <olli@zeit.co>
Date: Thu, 28 Mar 2019 11:47:36 +0100
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To: kaname nishizuka <kaname@nttv6.jp>
Cc: dots@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Dots] clarification questions from the hackathon
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Some additional questions.

I saw somewhere a probably outdated spec with a version ned URL
/.well-known/dots/v1/mitigate
This was however dropped from the draft:
/.well-known/dots/mitigate

Why is this? Wouldn't it be a good idea to allow versioning somewhere,
either in the request path or the request body?

Was there any consideration about PKI and/or key distribution? Or
should implementors and users solve this?

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