Re: [Dots] Target-Attack-type expansion: more discussion

Töma Gavrichenkov <ximaera@gmail.com> Mon, 06 May 2019 10:53 UTC

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From: Töma Gavrichenkov <ximaera@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 06 May 2019 13:52:58 +0300
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To: MeiLing Chen <chenmeiling@chinamobile.com>
Cc: dots <dots@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Dots] Target-Attack-type expansion: more discussion
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On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 1:10 PM MeiLing Chen <chenmeiling@chinamobile.com> wrote:
> Actually, It is more inclined to use TCP/IP four-layer protocol.

Which layer is QUIC then?

The Internet protocol suite is not really layered.  OSI model is, but
the IETF as a whole tends to slip away from the layered model.  To
quote Christian Huitema:

"There is also beauty in *not* having a layered architecture [..]. It
is great to see transport functions like acknowledgement or flow
control fully contained in the Quic transport. Quic is about transport
innovation, and that pretty much requires direct access to the network
API. In practice, layered implementation hide that API, so the
transport developers have to constantly negotiate with the
intermediate layer developers."

I would strongly oppose a classification based on "exploited protocol
layers".  As attractive as it is academically, it makes operational
issues more opaque.

--
Töma