[Dots] Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-22: (with COMMENT)

Roman Danyliw via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> Thu, 03 February 2022 15:06 UTC

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Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2022 07:06:40 -0800
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Subject: [Dots] Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-22: (with COMMENT)
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Roman Danyliw has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-22: No Objection

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COMMENT:
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Authors: thank you for the clarifying language in Section 4.4 explaining how
the design of mapping YANG into CBOR

Thank you for addressing my DISCUSS and select COMMENTs

** Section 8.1.6.  An attack type appears to be characterized by a vendor-id,
vendor-name, last-updated, attack-id and attack-description.  Would an
additional field of attack-id-revision (or attack-id-version) be beneficial
too?  I’m imagining a workflow where a vendor’s definition of an attack (and
the associated detection rule/logic) changes overtime and it might be useful to
version that – akin to the snort/suricata’s “rev:” field.  A vendor could of
course assign a new attack-id but this might impact down-stream analysis.