Re: [Dots] AD review of draft-ietf-dots-rfc8782-bis-04

[[e-mail]]

Hi Ben, 

Please see inline. 

Cheers,
Med

> -----Message d'origine-----
> De : Benjamin Kaduk [mailto:[e-mail]]
> Envoyé : mercredi 3 mars 2021 04:35
> À : BOUCADAIR Mohamed TGI/OLN <[e-mail]>
> Cc : [e-mail]; [e-mail]
> Objet : Re: [Dots] AD review of draft-ietf-dots-rfc8782-bis-04
> 
> Hi Med,
> 
> On Tue, Mar 02, 2021 at 02:41:38PM +0000,
> [e-mail] wrote:
> > Hi Ben,
> >
> > Thank you for the review.
> >
> > A diff is available at
> > https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-ietf-dots-rfc8782-
> bis&url2=htt
> > ps://raw.githubusercontent.com/boucadair/rfc8782-yang-
> update/master/dr
> > aft-ietf-dots-rfc8782-bis.txt
> >
> > Also updated 7049 to 8949 (and sections).
> 
> Thanks!
> It is okay (but not required) to submit a -05 with the pending
> changes once draft submission reopens.
> 
> > Please see inline.
> >
> > Cheers,
> > Med
> >
> > > -----Message d'origine-----
> > > De : Dots [mailto:[e-mail]] De la part de Benjamin
> > > Kaduk Envoyé : lundi 1 mars 2021 23:08 À :
> > > [e-mail]
> > > Cc : [e-mail]
> > > Objet : [Dots] AD review of draft-ietf-dots-rfc8782-bis-04
> > >
> > > Hi all,
> > >
> > > Sorry to have taken so long on this one -- I opened it up a
> couple
> > > times thinking "I'll just look at the diff from 8782; it'll be
> > > easy", but then halfway in I realized I did actually want to give
> > > some careful attention to the YANG changes and ran out of time.
> > >
> > > The good news is that it's generally in good shape -- I'll
> request
> > > the IETF LC (it will be extended due to the IETF 110 overlap) and
> > > the following comments can be considered along with the last-call
> > > comments.
> > >
> > > Thanks for the good work!
> > >
> > > -Ben
> > >
> > >
> > > We'll have to bump the copyright year in the YANG because I was
> too
> > > slow at processing this :(
> > >
> > > Should we say anything about what an implementation should do if
> it
> > > receives cuid/cdid/mid/sid in the payload body (e.g., ignore it
> or
> > > check for consistency with the received URI-Path)?
> >
> > [Med] We do already have the following:
> >
> >    'cuid' and 'mid' MUST NOT appear in the PUT request message body
> >    (Figure 6).
> >
> > and
> >
> >    If the request is missing a mandatory attribute, does not
> include
> >    'cuid' or 'mid' Uri-Path options, includes multiple 'scope'
> >    parameters, or contains invalid or unknown parameters, the DOTS
> >                   ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> >    server MUST reply with 4.00 (Bad Request).
> 
> Ah, I see now.  Should this be mentioned in the backwards-
> compatibility considerations section as something that would need to
> be relaxed for an 8782bis server to accept requests from an 8782
> client?

[Med] No, for the simple reason that we had the behavior I quoted in 8782 as well. We don't change the protocol. 

> > >                list acl-list {
> > >                  when "../../conflict-cause ="
> > >                     + " 'conflict-with-acceptlist'";
> > >                  key "acl-name";
> > >                  description
> > >                    "List of conflicting ACLs as defined in the
> DOTS
> > > data
> > >                     channel.  These ACLs are uniquely defined by
> > >                     cuid and acl-name.";
> > >
> > > Now that cuid is moved out of the structure and into the Uri-Path
> > > option, we have a new opportunity for separability of payload and
> > > metadata. The security considerations should discuss what
> prevents a
> > > "slice and dice" attack that uses a given payload on a different
> > > connection or in a different context such that it is interprted
> in
> > > the context of a different cuid.  (DTLS ought to be enough,
> assuming
> > > a request or response does not get split across datagrams.)
> >
> > [Med] Not sure if there is much to add because this falls under
> this text:
> >
> >    If the 'cuid' is guessable, a misbehaving DOTS client from
> within the
> >    client's domain can use the 'cuid' of another DOTS client of the
> >    domain to delete or alter active mitigations.  For this attack
> vector
> >    to happen, the misbehaving client needs to pass the security
> >    validation checks by the DOTS server, and eventually the checks
> of a
> >    client-domain DOTS gateway.
> >
> >    A similar attack can be achieved by a compromised DOTS client
> that
> >    can sniff the TLS 1.2 handshake, use the client certificate to
> >    identify the 'cuid' used by another DOTS client.  This attack is
> not
> >    possible if algorithms such as version 4 Universally Unique
> >    IDentifiers (UUIDs) in Section 4.4 of [RFC4122] are used to
> generate
> >    the 'cuid' because such UUIDs are not a deterministic function
> of the
> >    client certificate.  Likewise, this attack is not possible with
> TLS
> >    1.3 because most of the TLS handshake is encrypted and the
> client
> >    certificate is not visible to eavesdroppers.
> 
> I am not sure that this quite covers the class of scenario I had in
> mind.

[Med] I thought you were referring to an attack where, given that the full DOTS message can't be accessed, a compromised (legitimate) client can interfere with the actions of another client of the same domain. For that one to happen, the compromised client gas to guess the cuid and so on.

> Consider an on-path attacker that wants to rewrite a legitimate
> request from a real client.  The 'cuid' in the request would be the
> valid one corresponding to the real client, but a request payload
> from a different connection would be substituted in.
> 
> My understanding is that this doesn't work because we use channel
> security, so the attacker cannot modify just part of the data payload
> or cause (part
> of) a message from one connection to be interpreted as part of the
> other connection.  I was wondering if we should say that we rely on
> the transport security to keep the Uri-Path metadata and the encoded
> YANG structure tightly bound together.  Though, now that I say that
> ... it might be a little silly to call that out explicitly.
> 

[Med] :-) 

I don't think a change is needed.

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