Re: [Dots] AD review of draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-17

kaname nishizuka <kaname@nttv6.jp> Fri, 05 July 2019 07:21 UTC

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To: Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com>, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Cc: draft-ietf-dots-use-cases.all@ietf.org, dots <dots@ietf.org>
References: <20190702223654.GF13810@kduck.mit.edu> <CADZyTk=odGB8n=B3RWU1i_xumH3TRo+Rn5v6NsFVRZzUKdpaRA@mail.gmail.com>
From: kaname nishizuka <kaname@nttv6.jp>
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Date: Fri, 5 Jul 2019 16:21:41 +0900
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Subject: Re: [Dots] AD review of draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-17
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Hi Daniel,

Thank you for the correction and clarification.

 > WG, co-authors, please review section 3.3 by Friday EOB.
I've reviewed it.
DOTS client/server involved was clarified and how the DDoS Orchestration usecase work is described as it was originally intended.

nit: (Line 539, 540)
The orchestrator implements a DOTS Client while the DDoS mitigation systems implement a DOTS Server.
Client->client, Server->server

thanks!
Kaname Nishizuka

On 2019/07/05 5:13, Daniel Migault wrote:
> Hi,
>
> Thank you for the review. Please find my response in line as well as on the git repo [1].  WG, co-authors, please review section 3.3 by Friday EOB.
>
> In summary we addressed all comments, major changes are:
>
> a) Figure 2 with a channel from DOTS client and DOTS server with th eaddition of the following text:
> """
> In some cases the communication between the enterprise DOTS client and
> the DOTS server of the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider may go through
> the ITP carrying the DDoS attack, which would affect the
> communication. On the other hand, the communication between the DOTS
> client and DOTS server may take a path that is not undergoing a DDoS
> attack.
> """
>
> b) telemetry
>
> We clarified DOTS client/server involved.
>
> c) it was unclear to me how to address the following comment.
>
>
>        The communication between a network administrator and the
>        orchestrator is also performed using DOTS.  The network administrator
>        via its web interfaces implements a DOTS client, while the
>        Orchestrator implements a DOTS server.
>
>     nit: as written, this is saying that the network administrator has a
>     web interface.  I think "its" is supposed to refer to something else.
>
> <mglt>
> What we are trying to say is that the network administrator sees its web interface, and instruct the DOTS client from that interface. I have not made any change to address that concern, as I do not clearly see what is confusing.
> </mglt>
>
>
> Yours,
> Daniel
>
> [1] https://github.com/dotswg/dots-use-cases/commit/e251fb8abb51ba0c68471e847037daf2e81d38aa
>
>
> On Tue, Jul 2, 2019 at 6:37 PM Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu <mailto:kaduk@mit.edu>> wrote:
>
>     First off, a few housekeeping items:
>
>     (1) This document lists seven authors, and per RFC 7322 I/the IESG needs
>     to specially consider this and essentially make an exception to have
>     more than five authors.  Can you please confirm that all listed authors
>     have made substantial contributions, so that I can take that to the IESG
>     and get it approved?
>
>     (2) The shepherd writeup indicates that three authors (Stefan, Bob, and
>     Nik) have not indicated conformance with BCPs 78 and 79.  I don't think
>     I can issue the IETF LC until that gets straightened out, so please
>     confirm that we're all squared away!
>
>     (3) Recently the IESG has been trying to exert some gentle backpressure
>     against publishing Informational use-cases/requirements drafts, when they
>     serve only as input to future protocol specifications and do not have
>     lasting archival value on their own.  I do see in the shepherd writeup that
>     the working group did reach consensus to publish this document and think
>     there's enough value in it to be worth publishing; I just mention this so
>     that people aren't surprised if the IESG evaluation comes back with
>     questions about whether we should be publishing the document at all.
>
>     Other than those, the document is generally in good shape; there's just
>     a few substantive questions buried in the editorial nits.
>
>     On to the section-by-section comments:
>
>     Section 2
>
>        o  DDoS Mitigation Service: designates a DDoS mitigation service
>           provided to a customer and which is scoped to mitigate DDoS
>           attacks.  [...]
>
>     I don't really think that using the lowercase-'s' version to define the
>     uppercase-'S' version of the term is going to help anyone.
>
> <mglt>
> The text has been replaced by the following:
>
> * DDoS Mitigation Service: designates a service provided to a
> customer to mitigate DDoS attacks.  Services usually involve Service
> Level Agreement (SLA) that have to be met.  It is the responsibility of
> the DDoS Service provider to instantiate the DDoS Mitigation System to
> meet these SLAs.
>
> </mglt>
>
>
>     Section 3.1
>
>     It's a little surprising that we have the two bullet points near the top
>     about the enterprise DMS acting as a DOTS client for the first kind of
>     service but as a DOTS server for the second kind, but then we never seem
>     to talk about that second kind of service again in the document.
>     Perhaps we should just explicitly say that it's similar to the first
>     kind and not covered further?
>
> <mglt>
> I agree that could be mentioned explicitly. Here is the proposed text to address that concern.
>
>  The two scenarios, thought different, have similar interactions between
> the DOTS client and server. For the sake of simplicity, only the first
> scenario will be detailed in this section.
> </mglt>
>
>        When the enterprise DMS detects an inbound DDoS attack targeting its
>        resources ( e.g. servers, hosts or applications), it immediately
>        begins a DDoS Mitigation.
>
>     I'd consider clarifying that this mitigation is entirely local within
>     the enterprise, so that contacting the ITP in the next step is a clear
>     escalation.
>
> <mglt>
> To address the concern we specify that the mitigation is handled locally as well as we explicitly indicate the escalation procedure.  I believe the following text address your concern:
>
> When the enterprise DMS locally detects an inbound DDoS attack targeting
> its resources ( e.g. servers, hosts or applications), it immediately
> begins a DDoS Mitigation.
>
> During the course of the attack, the inbound traffic volume exceeds the
> 50% threshold and the enterprise DMS escalates the DDoS mitigation.  The
> enterprise DMS DOTS client signals the DOTS server on the upstream ITP
> to initiate DDoS Mitigation. The DOTS server signals the DOTS client
> that it can serve this request, and mitigation is initiated on the ITP
> network by the ITP DMS.
> </mglt>
>
>        related information.  Once the DDoS attack has ended, or decreased to
>        the certain level that the DOTS client can handle by itself, the DOTS
>        server signals the enterprise DMS DOTS client that the attack has
>        subsided.
>
>     I think it's the enterprise DMS that is handling the attack, not the
>     DOTS client directly...
>
> <mglt>
> This is correct. This has been corrected as follows:
>
> Over the course of the attack, the DOTS server of the ITP periodically
> informs the DOTS client on the enterprise DMS mitigation status,
> statistics related to DDoS attack traffic mitigation, and related
> information. Once the DDoS attack has ended, or decreased to the certain
> level that the enterprise DMS can handle by itself, the DOTS server
> signals the enterprise DMS DOTS client that the attack has subsided.
> </mglt>
>
>        The enterprise DMS then requests the ITP to terminate the DDoS
>        Mitigation.  The DOTS server on the ITP receives this request and
>
>     .... but this one is the DOTS client.
>
> <mglt>
>
> Yes we sometime probably abused metonymy, but I agree the more specific
> the better. I believe the following text is clarifying.
>
> The DOTS client on the enterprise DMS then requests the ITP to terminate
> the DDoS Mitigation. The DOTS server on the ITP receives this request
> and once the mitigation has ended, confirms the end of upstream DDoS
> Mitigation to the enterprise DMS DOTS client.
>
> </mglt>
>
>        o  (a) A DDoS attack is initiated against resources of a network
>           organization which has deployed a DOTS-capable DMS - typically a
>           DOTS client.
>
>     We probably want to reiterate in a parenthetical "network organization
>     (here, the enterprise)" the terminology we're using.
>
> <mglt>
> Here is the current text:
>
> * (a) A DDoS attack is initiated against resources of a
> network organization (here, the enterprise) which has deployed a
> DOTS-capable DMS - typically a DOTS client.
> </mglt>
>
>        o  (d) The DOTS server which receives the DOTS Mitigation request
>           determines that it has been configured to honor requests from the
>           requesting DOTS client, and honored its DDoS Mitigation by
>           orchestrating its DMS.
>
>     nit: I think s/honored/honors/ to stay in the present tense.
>
> <mglt>
> I agree. here is the proposed text:
>
> * (d) The DOTS server which receives the DOTS Mitigation request
> determines that it has been configured to honor requests from the
> requesting DOTS client, and honors its DDoS Mitigation by orchestrating
> its DMS.
>
> </mglt>
>
>        o  (e) While the DDoS Mitigation is active, DOTS server regularly
>           transmits DOTS DDoS Mitigation status updates to the DOTS client.
>
>     nit: "the DOTS server" or "servers regularly transmit".
>
> <mglt>
> I agree, here is the corrected text:
> * (e) While the DDoS Mitigation is active, the DOTS server
> regularly transmits DOTS DDoS Mitigation status updates to the DOTS
> client.
> </mglt>
>
>     Section 3.2
>
>        As such, this use case likely to match large enterprises or large
>        data centers, but not exclusively.  [...]
>
>     nit: "is likely"
>
> <mglt>
> This has been added as follows:
>
> As such, this use case is
> likely to match large enterprises or large data centers, but not
> exclusively.
> </mglt>
>
>        In this scenario, an Enterprise Network has entered into a pre-
>        arranged DDoS mitigation assistance agreement with one or more other
>        DDoS Mitigation Service Providers in order to ensure that sufficient
>        DDoS mitigation capacity and/or capabilities may be activated in the
>        event that a given DDoS attack threatens to overwhelm the ability of
>        a given DMS to mitigate the attack on its own.
>
>     We could perhaps say "overwhelm the ability of the enterprise's or any
>     other given DMS" since in most cases the enterprise DMS is the one at
>     risk of first being overwhelmed.
>
> <mglt>
> I agree that is better. Here is the modified text:
>
> In this scenario, an Enterprise Network has entered into a pre-arranged
> DDoS mitigation assistance agreement with one or more other DDoS
> Mitigation Service Providers in order to ensure that sufficient DDoS
> mitigation capacity and/or capabilities may be activated in the event
> that a given DDoS attack threatens to overwhelm the ability of the
> enterprise's or any other given DMS to mitigate the attack on its own.
> </mglt>
>
>     Is the fact that the C<-->S DOTS traffic does not go through the ITP in
>     Figure 3 an intentional change from Figure 2 (in that they are expected
>     to be communicating "out of band" or not through the enterprise's normal
>     transit)?  Some readers might see this and get confused if this
>     communication is still supposed to be going along the regular transit
>     path.
>
> <mglt>
> The intention was to indicate the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider is not the upstream ITP and thus communication MAY have to transit through the ITP.  I understand from your comment that it might be interpreted as the communication MUST go through the ITP.
>
> I propose to have the DMS communicating directly via a distinct channel and mention explicitly that the DOTS channel MAY transit via the ITP or may use a dedicated path.
>
> Here is the updated figure and the additional text:
>
>        +------------------+        +------------------+
>        | Enterprise       |        | Upstream         |
>        | Network          |        | Internet Transit |
>        |                  |        | Provider         |
>        |      +--------+  |        |             DDoS Attack
>        |      | DDoS   |  | <=================================
>        |      | Target |  | <=================================
>        |      +--------+  |        |                  |
>        |                  |        |                  |
>        |                  |        +------------------+
>        |                  |
>        |                  |        +------------------+
>        |                  |        | DDoS Mitigation  |
>        |                  |        | Service Provider |
>        |                  |        |                  |
>        |  +------------+  |        |  +------------+  |
>        |  | DDoS       |<------------>| DDoS       |  |
>        |  | Mitigation |C |        | S| Mitigation |  |
>        |  | System     |  |        |  | System     |  |
>        |  +------------+  |        |  +------------+  |
>        +------------------+        +------------------+
>
>            * C is for DOTS client functionality
>            * S is for DOTS server functionality
>
>        Figure 2: DDoS Mitigation between an Enterprise Network and Third
>                  Party DDoS Mitigation Service Provider
>
> [...]
>
> In some cases the communication between the enterprise DOTS client and
> the DOTS server of the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider may go through
> the ITP carrying the DDoS attack, which would affect the
> communication. On the other hand, the communication between the DOTS
> client and DOTS server may take a path that is not undergoing a DDoS
> attack.
> </mglt>
>
>     Section 3.3
>
>        In this use case, one or more DDoS telemetry systems or monitoring
>        devices monitor a network - typically an ISP network, an Enterprise
>        network, or a data center.  Upon detection of a DDoS attack, these
>        DDoS telemetry systems alert an orchestrator in charge of
>        coordinating the various DMS within the domain.  [...]
>
>     nit: do we have a standard plural form for "DMS"?  (Is it just "DMS"?)
>
> <mglt>
> Seems that DMS's is more appropriated. This has been changed.
>
> Upon detection of a DDoS attack, these DDoS
> telemetry systems alert an orchestrator in charge of coordinating the
> various DMS's within the domain.
>
> </mglt>
>
>        ITP.  DDoS Mitigation System selection and DDoS Mitigation technique
>        may depends on the type of DDoS attack.  In some case, a manual
>
>     nit: "techniques" plural
>
> <mglt>
> Corrected:
>
> DDoS Mitigation System selection and DDoS Mitigation techniques may
> depends on the type of DDoS attack.
> </mglt>
>
>        The communication between a network administrator and the
>        orchestrator is also performed using DOTS.  The network administrator
>        via its web interfaces implements a DOTS client, while the
>        Orchestrator implements a DOTS server.
>
>     nit: as written, this is saying that the network administrator has a
>     web interface.  I think "its" is supposed to refer to something else.
>
> <mglt>
> What we are trying to say is that the network administrator sees its web interface, and instruct the DOTS client from that interface. I have not made any change to address that concern, as I do not clearly see what is confusing.
> </mglt>
>
>     nit: Figure 4 lists "DDoS mitigation systems" in both the interprise and
>     the ITP, but only the enterprise side has a "stack" of boxes to indicate
>     there is more than one.
>
>  <mglt>
> Both have two DMS's now.
>
>
> </mglt>
>
>
>        These systems are configured so that when an event or some
>        measurement indicators reach a predefined level to send DOTS
>        mitigation request to the orchestrator.  The DOTS mitigation request
>
>     nit: the grammar here is a bit off; I think s/to send DOTS mitigation
>     request/they send a DOTS mitigation request/ would fix it.
>
> <mglt>
> Thanks. This has been corrected accordingly:
>
> These systems are configured so that when an event or some measurement
> indicators reach a predefined level they send a DOTS mitigation request
> to the orchestrator.
>
> </mglt>
>
>        Upon receipt of the DOTS mitigation request from the DDoS telemetry
>        system, the orchestrator responds with an acknowledgment, to avoid
>        retransmission of the request for mitigation.  The orchestrator may
>        begin collecting additional fined grain and specific information from
>
>     nit: "fine-grained"
>
>        and provide an analysis of the event.  Eventually, the orchestrator
>        may ask additional information to the DDoS telemetry system, however,
>        the collection of these information is out of scope.
>
>     nit: s/ask additional information to/ask for additional information
>     from/
>     nit: semicolon before "however" instead of comma
>     nit: "this information"
>
> <mglt>
> Thanks for the nits. All have been addressed in the text below:
>
> The orchestrator may
> begin collecting additional fine-grained and specific information from
> various  DDoS telemetry systems in order to correlate the measurements
> and provide an analysis of the event. Eventually, the orchestrator may
> ask for additional information from the DDoS telemetry system; however,
> the collection of this information is out of scope.
>
> </mglt>
>
>        Upon receiving a request to mitigate a DDoS attack performed over a
>        target, the orchestrator, may evaluate the volumetry of the attack as
>
>     nit: no comma after "the orchestrator"
>
>        well as the value that represent the target.  The orchestrator may
>
>     nit: "the value that the target represents"
>
> <mglt>
> The text has been corrected as follows:
> Upon receiving a request to mitigate a DDoS attack performed over a
> target, the orchestrator may evaluate the volumetry of the attack as
> well as the value that the target represents.
> </mglt>
>
>                               When DDoS Mitigation is requested, the status
>        indicates the DDoS Mitigation is starting while not effective.  The
>        DOTS client of the orchestrator will later be notified that the DDoS
>        Mitigation is effective.
>
>     I'm not entirely sure what this last sentence is trying to say.
>
> <mglt>
> Initially, I believe we wanted to distinguish between accepting the mitigation and having the mitigation effective. I do not think that  necessary here as such details are provided in section 3.1.
>
> The orchestrator requests a DDoS Mitigation to the selected
> DDoS mitigation systems via its DOTS client, as described in Section
> 3.1.
> </mglt>
>
>        Orchestration of the DDoS mitigation systems works similarly as
>        described in Section 3.1.  The orchestrator indicates with its status
>        whether the DDoS Mitigation is effective.
>
>     Is this intended to specifically refer to the external (ITP) DMS?
>
> <mglt>
> We did not see any differences between the DMS. I believe that the text above clarify the DMS is the one selected by the orchestrator.
> </mglt>
>
>     Also, my understanding is that for this interaction the orchestrator is
>     acting as a DOTS client, but the rest of the document only has status
>     messages being generated by the DOTS server.  Am I confused?
>
> <mglt>
> The orchestrator got DOTS client and DOTS servers. I updated the section to clarify which entity is involved in term of DOTS. I believe that clarifies the concern.
>
> </mglt>
>
>     Section 4
>
>     It feels incomplete to list three primary attacks but only discuss
>     mitigations for two of them.  Perhaps "preconfigured mitigation steps to
>     take on the loss of keepalive traffic can partially mitigate signal
>     blocking, but in general it is impossible to comprehensively defend
>     against an attacker that can selectively block any or all traffic".
>
> <mglt>
> Just added this sentence.
> </mglt>
>
>     Section 6
>
>     Is Med's name spelled correctly?
>
> <mglt>
> Now it is spelt correctly! Thanks.
> </mglt>
>
>
>     Thanks,
>
>     Ben
>
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