Re: [Dots] AD review of draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-17
kaname nishizuka <kaname@nttv6.jp> Fri, 05 July 2019 07:21 UTC
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To: Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com>, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Cc: draft-ietf-dots-use-cases.all@ietf.org, dots <dots@ietf.org>
References: <20190702223654.GF13810@kduck.mit.edu> <CADZyTk=odGB8n=B3RWU1i_xumH3TRo+Rn5v6NsFVRZzUKdpaRA@mail.gmail.com>
From: kaname nishizuka <kaname@nttv6.jp>
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Date: Fri, 05 Jul 2019 16:21:41 +0900
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Subject: Re: [Dots] AD review of draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-17
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Hi Daniel, Thank you for the correction and clarification. > WG, co-authors, please review section 3.3 by Friday EOB. I've reviewed it. DOTS client/server involved was clarified and how the DDoS Orchestration usecase work is described as it was originally intended. nit: (Line 539, 540) The orchestrator implements a DOTS Client while the DDoS mitigation systems implement a DOTS Server. Client->client, Server->server thanks! Kaname Nishizuka On 2019/07/05 5:13, Daniel Migault wrote: > Hi, > > Thank you for the review. Please find my response in line as well as on the git repo [1]. WG, co-authors, please review section 3.3 by Friday EOB. > > In summary we addressed all comments, major changes are: > > a) Figure 2 with a channel from DOTS client and DOTS server with th eaddition of the following text: > """ > In some cases the communication between the enterprise DOTS client and > the DOTS server of the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider may go through > the ITP carrying the DDoS attack, which would affect the > communication. On the other hand, the communication between the DOTS > client and DOTS server may take a path that is not undergoing a DDoS > attack. > """ > > b) telemetry > > We clarified DOTS client/server involved. > > c) it was unclear to me how to address the following comment. > > > The communication between a network administrator and the > orchestrator is also performed using DOTS. The network administrator > via its web interfaces implements a DOTS client, while the > Orchestrator implements a DOTS server. > > nit: as written, this is saying that the network administrator has a > web interface. I think "its" is supposed to refer to something else. > > <mglt> > What we are trying to say is that the network administrator sees its web interface, and instruct the DOTS client from that interface. I have not made any change to address that concern, as I do not clearly see what is confusing. > </mglt> > > > Yours, > Daniel > > [1] https://github.com/dotswg/dots-use-cases/commit/e251fb8abb51ba0c68471e847037daf2e81d38aa > > > On Tue, Jul 2, 2019 at 6:37 PM Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu <mailto:kaduk@mit.edu>> wrote: > > First off, a few housekeeping items: > > (1) This document lists seven authors, and per RFC 7322 I/the IESG needs > to specially consider this and essentially make an exception to have > more than five authors. Can you please confirm that all listed authors > have made substantial contributions, so that I can take that to the IESG > and get it approved? > > (2) The shepherd writeup indicates that three authors (Stefan, Bob, and > Nik) have not indicated conformance with BCPs 78 and 79. I don't think > I can issue the IETF LC until that gets straightened out, so please > confirm that we're all squared away! > > (3) Recently the IESG has been trying to exert some gentle backpressure > against publishing Informational use-cases/requirements drafts, when they > serve only as input to future protocol specifications and do not have > lasting archival value on their own. I do see in the shepherd writeup that > the working group did reach consensus to publish this document and think > there's enough value in it to be worth publishing; I just mention this so > that people aren't surprised if the IESG evaluation comes back with > questions about whether we should be publishing the document at all. > > Other than those, the document is generally in good shape; there's just > a few substantive questions buried in the editorial nits. > > On to the section-by-section comments: > > Section 2 > > o DDoS Mitigation Service: designates a DDoS mitigation service > provided to a customer and which is scoped to mitigate DDoS > attacks. [...] > > I don't really think that using the lowercase-'s' version to define the > uppercase-'S' version of the term is going to help anyone. > > <mglt> > The text has been replaced by the following: > > * DDoS Mitigation Service: designates a service provided to a > customer to mitigate DDoS attacks. Services usually involve Service > Level Agreement (SLA) that have to be met. It is the responsibility of > the DDoS Service provider to instantiate the DDoS Mitigation System to > meet these SLAs. > > </mglt> > > > Section 3.1 > > It's a little surprising that we have the two bullet points near the top > about the enterprise DMS acting as a DOTS client for the first kind of > service but as a DOTS server for the second kind, but then we never seem > to talk about that second kind of service again in the document. > Perhaps we should just explicitly say that it's similar to the first > kind and not covered further? > > <mglt> > I agree that could be mentioned explicitly. Here is the proposed text to address that concern. > > The two scenarios, thought different, have similar interactions between > the DOTS client and server. For the sake of simplicity, only the first > scenario will be detailed in this section. > </mglt> > > When the enterprise DMS detects an inbound DDoS attack targeting its > resources ( e.g. servers, hosts or applications), it immediately > begins a DDoS Mitigation. > > I'd consider clarifying that this mitigation is entirely local within > the enterprise, so that contacting the ITP in the next step is a clear > escalation. > > <mglt> > To address the concern we specify that the mitigation is handled locally as well as we explicitly indicate the escalation procedure. I believe the following text address your concern: > > When the enterprise DMS locally detects an inbound DDoS attack targeting > its resources ( e.g. servers, hosts or applications), it immediately > begins a DDoS Mitigation. > > During the course of the attack, the inbound traffic volume exceeds the > 50% threshold and the enterprise DMS escalates the DDoS mitigation. The > enterprise DMS DOTS client signals the DOTS server on the upstream ITP > to initiate DDoS Mitigation. The DOTS server signals the DOTS client > that it can serve this request, and mitigation is initiated on the ITP > network by the ITP DMS. > </mglt> > > related information. Once the DDoS attack has ended, or decreased to > the certain level that the DOTS client can handle by itself, the DOTS > server signals the enterprise DMS DOTS client that the attack has > subsided. > > I think it's the enterprise DMS that is handling the attack, not the > DOTS client directly... > > <mglt> > This is correct. This has been corrected as follows: > > Over the course of the attack, the DOTS server of the ITP periodically > informs the DOTS client on the enterprise DMS mitigation status, > statistics related to DDoS attack traffic mitigation, and related > information. Once the DDoS attack has ended, or decreased to the certain > level that the enterprise DMS can handle by itself, the DOTS server > signals the enterprise DMS DOTS client that the attack has subsided. > </mglt> > > The enterprise DMS then requests the ITP to terminate the DDoS > Mitigation. The DOTS server on the ITP receives this request and > > .... but this one is the DOTS client. > > <mglt> > > Yes we sometime probably abused metonymy, but I agree the more specific > the better. I believe the following text is clarifying. > > The DOTS client on the enterprise DMS then requests the ITP to terminate > the DDoS Mitigation. The DOTS server on the ITP receives this request > and once the mitigation has ended, confirms the end of upstream DDoS > Mitigation to the enterprise DMS DOTS client. > > </mglt> > > o (a) A DDoS attack is initiated against resources of a network > organization which has deployed a DOTS-capable DMS - typically a > DOTS client. > > We probably want to reiterate in a parenthetical "network organization > (here, the enterprise)" the terminology we're using. > > <mglt> > Here is the current text: > > * (a) A DDoS attack is initiated against resources of a > network organization (here, the enterprise) which has deployed a > DOTS-capable DMS - typically a DOTS client. > </mglt> > > o (d) The DOTS server which receives the DOTS Mitigation request > determines that it has been configured to honor requests from the > requesting DOTS client, and honored its DDoS Mitigation by > orchestrating its DMS. > > nit: I think s/honored/honors/ to stay in the present tense. > > <mglt> > I agree. here is the proposed text: > > * (d) The DOTS server which receives the DOTS Mitigation request > determines that it has been configured to honor requests from the > requesting DOTS client, and honors its DDoS Mitigation by orchestrating > its DMS. > > </mglt> > > o (e) While the DDoS Mitigation is active, DOTS server regularly > transmits DOTS DDoS Mitigation status updates to the DOTS client. > > nit: "the DOTS server" or "servers regularly transmit". > > <mglt> > I agree, here is the corrected text: > * (e) While the DDoS Mitigation is active, the DOTS server > regularly transmits DOTS DDoS Mitigation status updates to the DOTS > client. > </mglt> > > Section 3.2 > > As such, this use case likely to match large enterprises or large > data centers, but not exclusively. [...] > > nit: "is likely" > > <mglt> > This has been added as follows: > > As such, this use case is > likely to match large enterprises or large data centers, but not > exclusively. > </mglt> > > In this scenario, an Enterprise Network has entered into a pre- > arranged DDoS mitigation assistance agreement with one or more other > DDoS Mitigation Service Providers in order to ensure that sufficient > DDoS mitigation capacity and/or capabilities may be activated in the > event that a given DDoS attack threatens to overwhelm the ability of > a given DMS to mitigate the attack on its own. > > We could perhaps say "overwhelm the ability of the enterprise's or any > other given DMS" since in most cases the enterprise DMS is the one at > risk of first being overwhelmed. > > <mglt> > I agree that is better. Here is the modified text: > > In this scenario, an Enterprise Network has entered into a pre-arranged > DDoS mitigation assistance agreement with one or more other DDoS > Mitigation Service Providers in order to ensure that sufficient DDoS > mitigation capacity and/or capabilities may be activated in the event > that a given DDoS attack threatens to overwhelm the ability of the > enterprise's or any other given DMS to mitigate the attack on its own. > </mglt> > > Is the fact that the C<-->S DOTS traffic does not go through the ITP in > Figure 3 an intentional change from Figure 2 (in that they are expected > to be communicating "out of band" or not through the enterprise's normal > transit)? Some readers might see this and get confused if this > communication is still supposed to be going along the regular transit > path. > > <mglt> > The intention was to indicate the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider is not the upstream ITP and thus communication MAY have to transit through the ITP. I understand from your comment that it might be interpreted as the communication MUST go through the ITP. > > I propose to have the DMS communicating directly via a distinct channel and mention explicitly that the DOTS channel MAY transit via the ITP or may use a dedicated path. > > Here is the updated figure and the additional text: > > +------------------+ +------------------+ > | Enterprise | | Upstream | > | Network | | Internet Transit | > | | | Provider | > | +--------+ | | DDoS Attack > | | DDoS | | <================================= > | | Target | | <================================= > | +--------+ | | | > | | | | > | | +------------------+ > | | > | | +------------------+ > | | | DDoS Mitigation | > | | | Service Provider | > | | | | > | +------------+ | | +------------+ | > | | DDoS |<------------>| DDoS | | > | | Mitigation |C | | S| Mitigation | | > | | System | | | | System | | > | +------------+ | | +------------+ | > +------------------+ +------------------+ > > * C is for DOTS client functionality > * S is for DOTS server functionality > > Figure 2: DDoS Mitigation between an Enterprise Network and Third > Party DDoS Mitigation Service Provider > > [...] > > In some cases the communication between the enterprise DOTS client and > the DOTS server of the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider may go through > the ITP carrying the DDoS attack, which would affect the > communication. On the other hand, the communication between the DOTS > client and DOTS server may take a path that is not undergoing a DDoS > attack. > </mglt> > > Section 3.3 > > In this use case, one or more DDoS telemetry systems or monitoring > devices monitor a network - typically an ISP network, an Enterprise > network, or a data center. Upon detection of a DDoS attack, these > DDoS telemetry systems alert an orchestrator in charge of > coordinating the various DMS within the domain. [...] > > nit: do we have a standard plural form for "DMS"? (Is it just "DMS"?) > > <mglt> > Seems that DMS's is more appropriated. This has been changed. > > Upon detection of a DDoS attack, these DDoS > telemetry systems alert an orchestrator in charge of coordinating the > various DMS's within the domain. > > </mglt> > > ITP. DDoS Mitigation System selection and DDoS Mitigation technique > may depends on the type of DDoS attack. In some case, a manual > > nit: "techniques" plural > > <mglt> > Corrected: > > DDoS Mitigation System selection and DDoS Mitigation techniques may > depends on the type of DDoS attack. > </mglt> > > The communication between a network administrator and the > orchestrator is also performed using DOTS. The network administrator > via its web interfaces implements a DOTS client, while the > Orchestrator implements a DOTS server. > > nit: as written, this is saying that the network administrator has a > web interface. I think "its" is supposed to refer to something else. > > <mglt> > What we are trying to say is that the network administrator sees its web interface, and instruct the DOTS client from that interface. I have not made any change to address that concern, as I do not clearly see what is confusing. > </mglt> > > nit: Figure 4 lists "DDoS mitigation systems" in both the interprise and > the ITP, but only the enterprise side has a "stack" of boxes to indicate > there is more than one. > > <mglt> > Both have two DMS's now. > > > </mglt> > > > These systems are configured so that when an event or some > measurement indicators reach a predefined level to send DOTS > mitigation request to the orchestrator. The DOTS mitigation request > > nit: the grammar here is a bit off; I think s/to send DOTS mitigation > request/they send a DOTS mitigation request/ would fix it. > > <mglt> > Thanks. This has been corrected accordingly: > > These systems are configured so that when an event or some measurement > indicators reach a predefined level they send a DOTS mitigation request > to the orchestrator. > > </mglt> > > Upon receipt of the DOTS mitigation request from the DDoS telemetry > system, the orchestrator responds with an acknowledgment, to avoid > retransmission of the request for mitigation. The orchestrator may > begin collecting additional fined grain and specific information from > > nit: "fine-grained" > > and provide an analysis of the event. Eventually, the orchestrator > may ask additional information to the DDoS telemetry system, however, > the collection of these information is out of scope. > > nit: s/ask additional information to/ask for additional information > from/ > nit: semicolon before "however" instead of comma > nit: "this information" > > <mglt> > Thanks for the nits. All have been addressed in the text below: > > The orchestrator may > begin collecting additional fine-grained and specific information from > various DDoS telemetry systems in order to correlate the measurements > and provide an analysis of the event. Eventually, the orchestrator may > ask for additional information from the DDoS telemetry system; however, > the collection of this information is out of scope. > > </mglt> > > Upon receiving a request to mitigate a DDoS attack performed over a > target, the orchestrator, may evaluate the volumetry of the attack as > > nit: no comma after "the orchestrator" > > well as the value that represent the target. The orchestrator may > > nit: "the value that the target represents" > > <mglt> > The text has been corrected as follows: > Upon receiving a request to mitigate a DDoS attack performed over a > target, the orchestrator may evaluate the volumetry of the attack as > well as the value that the target represents. > </mglt> > > When DDoS Mitigation is requested, the status > indicates the DDoS Mitigation is starting while not effective. The > DOTS client of the orchestrator will later be notified that the DDoS > Mitigation is effective. > > I'm not entirely sure what this last sentence is trying to say. > > <mglt> > Initially, I believe we wanted to distinguish between accepting the mitigation and having the mitigation effective. I do not think that necessary here as such details are provided in section 3.1. > > The orchestrator requests a DDoS Mitigation to the selected > DDoS mitigation systems via its DOTS client, as described in Section > 3.1. > </mglt> > > Orchestration of the DDoS mitigation systems works similarly as > described in Section 3.1. The orchestrator indicates with its status > whether the DDoS Mitigation is effective. > > Is this intended to specifically refer to the external (ITP) DMS? > > <mglt> > We did not see any differences between the DMS. I believe that the text above clarify the DMS is the one selected by the orchestrator. > </mglt> > > Also, my understanding is that for this interaction the orchestrator is > acting as a DOTS client, but the rest of the document only has status > messages being generated by the DOTS server. Am I confused? > > <mglt> > The orchestrator got DOTS client and DOTS servers. I updated the section to clarify which entity is involved in term of DOTS. I believe that clarifies the concern. > > </mglt> > > Section 4 > > It feels incomplete to list three primary attacks but only discuss > mitigations for two of them. Perhaps "preconfigured mitigation steps to > take on the loss of keepalive traffic can partially mitigate signal > blocking, but in general it is impossible to comprehensively defend > against an attacker that can selectively block any or all traffic". > > <mglt> > Just added this sentence. > </mglt> > > Section 6 > > Is Med's name spelled correctly? > > <mglt> > Now it is spelt correctly! Thanks. > </mglt> > > > Thanks, > > Ben > > _______________________________________________ > Dots mailing list > Dots@ietf.org <mailto:Dots@ietf.org> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dots >
- [Dots] AD review of draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-17 Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [Dots] AD review of draft-ietf-dots-use-cases… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [Dots] AD review of draft-ietf-dots-use-cases… mohamed.boucadair
- Re: [Dots] AD review of draft-ietf-dots-use-cases… Nik Teague
- Re: [Dots] AD review of draft-ietf-dots-use-cases… Nik Teague
- Re: [Dots] AD review of draft-ietf-dots-use-cases… Daniel Migault
- Re: [Dots] AD review of draft-ietf-dots-use-cases… mohamed.boucadair
- Re: [Dots] AD review of draft-ietf-dots-use-cases… kaname nishizuka
- Re: [Dots] AD review of draft-ietf-dots-use-cases… Daniel Migault
- Re: [Dots] AD review of draft-ietf-dots-use-cases… Daniel Migault
- Re: [Dots] AD review of draft-ietf-dots-use-cases… Robert Moskowitz
- Re: [Dots] AD review of draft-ietf-dots-use-cases… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [Dots] AD review of draft-ietf-dots-use-cases… Daniel Migault
- Re: [Dots] AD review of draft-ietf-dots-use-cases… Daniel Migault