[Dots] Benjamin Kaduk's Yes on draft-ietf-dots-data-channel-28: (with COMMENT)

Benjamin Kaduk via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> Tue, 02 April 2019 22:00 UTC

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Date: Tue, 02 Apr 2019 15:00:33 -0700
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Subject: [Dots] Benjamin Kaduk's Yes on draft-ietf-dots-data-channel-28: (with COMMENT)
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Benjamin Kaduk has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-dots-data-channel-28: Yes

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As in the signal-channel document, there are a couple of nits in the text about
using FQDNs as mitigation targets:

Section 10

   When FQDNs are used as targets, the DOTS server MUST rely upon DNS
   privacy enabling protocols (e.g., DNS over TLS [RFC7858], DoH
   [RFC8484]) to prevent eavesdroppers from possibly identifying the
   target resources protected by the DDoS mitigation service and means
   to ensure the target FQDN resolution is authentic (e.g., DNSSEC

nits: "DNS over TLS or DoH" ("or" instead of comma, but keep the
references as-is); comma before "and means to ensure", since the DOTS
server has to do both of those (as opposed to the DOTS server using DoT/DoH
which provides both eavesdropping protection and data authenticity, which
is what the current text says).