[Dots] [Errata Held for Document Update] RFC9132 (7058)

RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org> Thu, 02 May 2024 17:43 UTC

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Subject: [Dots] [Errata Held for Document Update] RFC9132 (7058)
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The following errata report has been held for document update 
for RFC9132, "Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Specification". 

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid7058

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Status: Held for Document Update
Type: Technical

Reported by: Jan Lindblad <jlindbla@cisco.com>
Date Reported: 2022-07-29
Held by: Deb Cooley (IESG)

Section: 5.3

Original Text
-------------
              uses data-channel:target {
                when "/dots-signal/scope/conflict-information/"
                   + "conflict-cause = 'overlapping-targets'";
              }


Corrected Text
--------------
              uses data-channel:target {
                when "../conflict-cause = 'overlapping-targets'";
              }


Notes
-----
The original YANG statements make the "uses" statement apply to all "list scope" instances as soon as there is at least one "scope" instance that has "conflict-cause" set to "overlapping-targets". I suspect this is not the author's intent.

The corrected YANG statements make the "uses" statement only apply to the specific "scope" instances that have "conflict-cause" set to "overlapping-targets". There are also other ways to fix this issue.

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RFC9132 (draft-ietf-dots-rfc8782-bis-08)
--------------------------------------
Title               : Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Specification
Publication Date    : September 2021
Author(s)           : M. Boucadair, Ed., J. Shallow, T. Reddy.K
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : DDoS Open Threat Signaling
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG