Re: [Dots] (draft-ietf-dots-signal-filter-control) ACL Stats issue

"Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy" <TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com> Mon, 29 April 2019 12:47 UTC

Return-Path: <TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@mcafee.com>
X-Original-To: dots@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: dots@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 839B512012A for <dots@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 29 Apr 2019 05:47:02 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -4.301
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.301 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=-0.001, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=mcafee.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id pa7j7RWPRVlJ for <dots@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 29 Apr 2019 05:47:00 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from DNVWSMAILOUT1.mcafee.com (dnvwsmailout1.mcafee.com [161.69.31.173]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E2A07120025 for <dots@ietf.org>; Mon, 29 Apr 2019 05:46:59 -0700 (PDT)
X-NAI-Header: Modified by McAfee Email Gateway (5500)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=mcafee.com; s=s_mcafee; t=1556541637; h=From: To:Subject:Thread-Topic:Thread-Index:Date: Message-ID:References:In-Reply-To:Accept-Language: Content-Language:X-MS-Has-Attach:X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: dlp-product:dlp-version:dlp-reaction:authentication-results: x-originating-ip:x-ms-publictraffictype:x-ms-office365-filtering-correlation-id: x-microsoft-antispam:x-ms-traffictypediagnostic: x-ms-exchange-purlcount:x-microsoft-antispam-prvs: x-ms-oob-tlc-oobclassifiers:x-forefront-prvs: x-forefront-antispam-report:received-spf:x-ms-exchange-senderadcheck: x-microsoft-antispam-message-info:Content-Type: Content-Transfer-Encoding:MIME-Version:X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Network-Message-Id: X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-originalarrivaltime: X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-fromentityheader: X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-id:X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-mailboxtype: X-MS-Exchange-Transport-CrossTenantHeadersStamped: X-OriginatorOrg:X-NAI-Spam-Flag:X-NAI-Spam-Level: X-NAI-Spam-Threshold:X-NAI-Spam-Score:X-NAI-Spam-Version; bh=SvILIWGPoeAvanVKuwbArRzk9DfhMFNcy7xCfk q9Sa0=; b=ERmcMFr6KmXqn75DE2AELmtWM+z/8e2Uph+mn9Xg +t2XYG/qtaLfPEoa7iKV4OodYfh78ZX+iWvtTVLYcWzynFUWmC OZs+1sshGDqGJA9x1VLAMRYO0DLOb9WLmz3++NGm0dIh4oteIl OR/2aniU0bX5ZSuzP14qfy0gX5nj7Iw=
Received: from DNVEXAPP1N06.corpzone.internalzone.com (DNVEXAPP1N06.corpzone.internalzone.com [10.44.48.90]) by DNVWSMAILOUT1.mcafee.com with smtp (TLS: TLSv1/SSLv3,256bits,ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384) id 4ad5_eead_e581722b_3eac_4877_a8cf_ec02c30f44b2; Mon, 29 Apr 2019 06:40:36 -0600
Received: from DNVEXAPP1N05.corpzone.internalzone.com (10.44.48.89) by DNVEXAPP1N06.corpzone.internalzone.com (10.44.48.90) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 15.0.1395.4; Mon, 29 Apr 2019 06:46:38 -0600
Received: from DNVO365EDGE1.corpzone.internalzone.com (10.44.176.66) by DNVEXAPP1N05.corpzone.internalzone.com (10.44.48.89) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 15.0.1395.4 via Frontend Transport; Mon, 29 Apr 2019 06:46:38 -0600
Received: from NAM05-BY2-obe.outbound.protection.outlook.com (10.44.176.242) by edge.mcafee.com (10.44.176.66) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 15.0.1395.4; Mon, 29 Apr 2019 06:46:36 -0600
Received: from BYAPR16MB2790.namprd16.prod.outlook.com (20.178.233.91) by BYAPR16MB3014.namprd16.prod.outlook.com (20.178.236.12) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id 15.20.1835.13; Mon, 29 Apr 2019 12:46:36 +0000
Received: from BYAPR16MB2790.namprd16.prod.outlook.com ([fe80::4873:7200:9e57:9e62]) by BYAPR16MB2790.namprd16.prod.outlook.com ([fe80::4873:7200:9e57:9e62%5]) with mapi id 15.20.1835.018; Mon, 29 Apr 2019 12:46:36 +0000
From: "Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy" <TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com>
To: "mohamed.boucadair@orange.com" <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>, Jon Shallow <supjps-ietf@jpshallow.com>, kaname nishizuka <kaname@nttv6.jp>, "dots@ietf.org" <dots@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Dots] (draft-ietf-dots-signal-filter-control) ACL Stats issue
Thread-Index: AdT6ZmI8uG0f606MQBW+/9uvcTWn6QA3ueOAAAD5v4AAAuISAAACLWCwAASh2bAAAFNQMAAALZggAB/gx7AADZnDQAAB9k5gAAGY4eAAh04/QAAA/5ngAAUJIHAAADrVQAAAy9qAAADPe0AAAl2uEAADFwxA
Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2019 12:46:35 +0000
Message-ID: <BYAPR16MB2790D07ADECEBA6DAD156B5CEA390@BYAPR16MB2790.namprd16.prod.outlook.com>
References: <787AE7BB302AE849A7480A190F8B93302EA649B4@OPEXCAUBMA2.corporate.adroot.infra.ftgroup> <c3c9614f-908a-c132-cd35-6c627e341f2b@nttv6.jp> <012601d4fb49$3328c000$997a4000$@jpshallow.com> <BYAPR16MB279020119E24ADCB54B339E3EA3D0@BYAPR16MB2790.namprd16.prod.outlook.com> <787AE7BB302AE849A7480A190F8B93302EA6591A@OPEXCAUBMA2.corporate.adroot.infra.ftgroup> <BYAPR16MB27903D8D208FA3AC951FDEE4EA3D0@BYAPR16MB2790.namprd16.prod.outlook.com> <787AE7BB302AE849A7480A190F8B93302EA65AD6@OPEXCAUBMA2.corporate.adroot.infra.ftgroup> <BYAPR16MB279013E8029BE0294293A333EA3D0@BYAPR16MB2790.namprd16.prod.outlook.com> <787AE7BB302AE849A7480A190F8B93302EA6623D@OPEXCAUBMA2.corporate.adroot.infra.ftgroup> <BYAPR16MB2790146175B845622B2EF438EA3E0@BYAPR16MB2790.namprd16.prod.outlook.com> <787AE7BB302AE849A7480A190F8B93302EA6649C@OPEXCAUBMA2.corporate.adroot.infra.ftgroup> <BYAPR16MB27909F467FFE57F380015E94EA3E0@BYAPR16MB2790.namprd16.prod.outlook.com> <787AE7BB302AE849A7480A190F8B93302EA66FEC@OPEXCAUBMA2.corporate.adroo t.infra.ftgroup> <BYAPR16MB279071FE429E252221521470EA390@BYAPR16MB2790.namprd16.prod.outlook.com> <787AE7BB302AE849A7480A190F8B93302EA67156@OPEXCAUBMA2.corporate.adroot.infra.ftgroup> <BYAPR16MB2790D9396449CF75422C010CEA390@BYAPR16MB2790.namprd16.prod.outlook.com> <03f901d4fe6f$98f00a00$cad01e00$@jpshallow.com> <BYAPR16MB2790B418CFE55D99C282FA71EA390@BYAPR16MB2790.namprd16.prod.outlook.com> <787AE7BB302AE849A7480A190F8B93302EA6725D@OPEXCAUBMA2.corporate.adroot.infra.ftgroup>
In-Reply-To: <787AE7BB302AE849A7480A190F8B93302EA6725D@OPEXCAUBMA2.corporate.adroot.infra.ftgroup>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach:
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator:
dlp-product: dlpe-windows
dlp-version: 11.2.0.6
dlp-reaction: no-action
authentication-results: spf=none (sender IP is ) smtp.mailfrom=TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com;
x-originating-ip: [49.37.205.191]
x-ms-publictraffictype: Email
x-ms-office365-filtering-correlation-id: 2693e6c6-4b89-4a5b-e64e-08d6cca0b754
x-microsoft-antispam: BCL:0; PCL:0; RULEID:(2390118)(7020095)(4652040)(8989299)(4534185)(4627221)(201703031133081)(201702281549075)(8990200)(5600141)(711020)(4605104)(2017052603328)(7193020); SRVR:BYAPR16MB3014;
x-ms-traffictypediagnostic: BYAPR16MB3014:
x-ms-exchange-purlcount: 1
x-microsoft-antispam-prvs: <BYAPR16MB3014A23140A0BA37AED41052EA390@BYAPR16MB3014.namprd16.prod.outlook.com>
x-ms-oob-tlc-oobclassifiers: OLM:10000;
x-forefront-prvs: 0022134A87
x-forefront-antispam-report: SFV:NSPM; SFS:(10009020)(346002)(396003)(39860400002)(376002)(136003)(366004)(199004)(189003)(32952001)(13464003)(8936002)(25786009)(3846002)(7736002)(305945005)(486006)(7696005)(186003)(74316002)(76176011)(66556008)(66946007)(76116006)(229853002)(73956011)(966005)(6116002)(66066001)(53936002)(26005)(14444005)(81166006)(9686003)(97736004)(5024004)(8676002)(110136005)(256004)(6306002)(55016002)(81156014)(14454004)(66476007)(86362001)(66446008)(64756008)(478600001)(72206003)(102836004)(93886005)(6436002)(68736007)(2906002)(11346002)(71200400001)(71190400001)(99286004)(33656002)(476003)(446003)(5660300002)(52536014)(53546011)(80792005)(316002)(6506007)(2501003)(6246003)(85282002); DIR:OUT; SFP:1101; SCL:1; SRVR:BYAPR16MB3014; H:BYAPR16MB2790.namprd16.prod.outlook.com; FPR:; SPF:None; LANG:en; PTR:InfoNoRecords; A:1; MX:1;
received-spf: None (protection.outlook.com: McAfee.com does not designate permitted sender hosts)
x-ms-exchange-senderadcheck: 1
x-microsoft-antispam-message-info: 0dRSqEldOEhaRltDR//v4TuFMmky5bvWlC+xC0+plnMeo5lQEH3e28LWho+v9AgHjPBzyui+dUqZJovb6iXOFt7AQARirpqSGvNMayUW4TLMkegpCazwjuTbOVPuaMmtqTc7Vh2pv+g4nPjTRXqTl99pHKtXM1T24NP1jFaHXaH3lZe9c8Zr09Shqrwb7fYQxBxwkBJaVH1Z+dlgzuBfbDQYN7WWwcEQlA3lovcZ02r+SDyOYnTGOzs8rNBxGJsIaqYv3FzhUFWnkvCqNtNvCeNDueYPCLDC1aIlBea/3+r+Gz5MFZo0evQc1aKmLtcUyiMpQy+i+KLZhADvWmLnF7OOUa61IEXiTij4NPUmrDGsY1pKl5uHB973r7++u1nKh+UD4p/t2pDXwjyknfHgnsLxtQ/B9YCWRmrUAngreSs=
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Network-Message-Id: 2693e6c6-4b89-4a5b-e64e-08d6cca0b754
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-originalarrivaltime: 29 Apr 2019 12:46:36.0660 (UTC)
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-fromentityheader: Hosted
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-id: 4943e38c-6dd4-428c-886d-24932bc2d5de
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-mailboxtype: HOSTED
X-MS-Exchange-Transport-CrossTenantHeadersStamped: BYAPR16MB3014
X-OriginatorOrg: mcafee.com
X-NAI-Spam-Flag: NO
X-NAI-Spam-Level:
X-NAI-Spam-Threshold: 15
X-NAI-Spam-Score: 0.6
X-NAI-Spam-Version: 2.3.0.9418 : core <6534> : inlines <7062> : streams <1820068> : uri <2838479>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dots/sloo6j070OikVmXyspZG0So1lyg>
Subject: Re: [Dots] (draft-ietf-dots-signal-filter-control) ACL Stats issue
X-BeenThere: dots@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: "List for discussion of DDoS Open Threat Signaling \(DOTS\) technology and directions." <dots.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/dots>, <mailto:dots-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/dots/>
List-Post: <mailto:dots@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:dots-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dots>, <mailto:dots-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2019 12:47:03 -0000

> -----Original Message-----
> From: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com
> <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
> Sent: Monday, April 29, 2019 5:05 PM
> To: Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy
> <TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com>; Jon Shallow <supjps-
> ietf@jpshallow.com>; kaname nishizuka <kaname@nttv6.jp>; dots@ietf.org
> Subject: RE: [Dots] (draft-ietf-dots-signal-filter-control) ACL Stats issue
> 
> This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or
> open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is
> safe.
> 
> Tiru,
> 
> I agree that we are approaching the problem with two different use cases:
> 
> (1) a client domain with is basically "consuming" services. I do still think this
> use case does not need to learn about the ACL stats.

Yes. 

> 
> (2) your case in which the client domain is "providing" services: I still think
> that the impact on business can be determined also using local information
> (known patterns + rate-limit policy applied by the client). If the goal is to
> decide whether/when an alternate mitigator is to be solicited, this can
> deterministically rely upon "status" set to 4 (Attack has exceeded the
> mitigation provider capacity) or deactivate back the rate-limit ACL + local
> observation. Please remember that local observation is needed for efficacy
> update.

"Attack has exceeded" status message does not convey the details the traffic rate-limited, and the client needs to understand the attack scale to figure out suitable alternate mitigation provider.  It is a critical DOTS telemetry that needs to be conveyed in the signal channel and cannot be propagated in the data channel during an massive attack. 

Cheers,
-Tiru

> 
> Cheers,
> Med
> 
> > -----Message d'origine-----
> > De : Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy
> > [mailto:TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com]
> > Envoyé : lundi 29 avril 2019 12:18
> > À : Jon Shallow; BOUCADAIR Mohamed TGI/OLN; kaname nishizuka;
> > dots@ietf.org Objet : RE: [Dots]
> > (draft-ietf-dots-signal-filter-control) ACL Stats issue
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: Jon Shallow <supjps-ietf@jpshallow.com>
> > > Sent: Monday, April 29, 2019 3:11 PM
> > > To: Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy
> > > <TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com>;
> > > mohamed.boucadair@orange.com; kaname nishizuka
> <kaname@nttv6.jp>;
> > > dots@ietf.org
> > > Subject: RE: [Dots] (draft-ietf-dots-signal-filter-control) ACL
> > > Stats issue
> > >
> > > This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click
> > > links
> > or
> > > open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the
> > > content is safe.
> > >
> > > Hi,
> > >
> > > See inline,
> > >
> > > Regards
> > >
> > > Jon
> > >
> > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > From: Dots [mailto: dots-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Konda,
> > > > Tirumaleswar Reddy
> > > > Sent: 29 April 2019 10:22
> > > > To: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com; Jon Shallow; 'kaname nishizuka';
> > > > dots@ietf.org
> > > > Subject: Re: [Dots] (draft-ietf-dots-signal-filter-control) ACL
> > > > Stats issue
> > > >
> > > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > > From: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com
> > > > <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
> > > > > Sent: Monday, April 29, 2019 2:46 PM
> > > > > To: Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy
> > > > <TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com>;
> > > > > Jon Shallow <supjps-ietf@jpshallow.com>; 'kaname nishizuka'
> > > > > <kaname@nttv6.jp>; dots@ietf.org
> > > > > Subject: RE: [Dots] (draft-ietf-dots-signal-filter-control) ACL
> > > > > Stats issue
> > > > >
> > > > > This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not
> > > > > click links or
> > > > open
> > > > > attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content
> > > > > is
> > > safe.
> > > > >
> > > > > (Focusing on this particular point).
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > > -----Message d'origine-----
> > > > > > De : Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy
> > > > > > [mailto:TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com]
> > > > > > Envoyé : lundi 29 avril 2019 10:52 À : BOUCADAIR Mohamed
> > > > > > TGI/OLN; Jon Shallow; 'kaname nishizuka'; dots@ietf.org Objet
> > > > > > : RE: [Dots]
> > > > > > (draft-ietf-dots-signal-filter-control) ACL Stats issue
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >  ACL-specific stats and mitigation stats will give a
> > > > > > > > > clear
> > > > > > > > > > picture of the traffic rate-limited, bad traffic
> > > > > > > > > > dropped by the DDoS mitigation system, and using these
> > > > > > > > > > stats the DOTS client can heuristically determine the
> > > > > > > > > > amount of legitimate traffic dropped because of
> > > > > > > > > > rate-limit and the impact of the attack
> > > > on its
> > > > > service.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > [Med] The impact can be observed locally (e.g., bad QoS,
> > > > > > > > > inability to
> > > > > > > > access a
> > > > > > > > > service, instable connectivity, etc.). I still don’t see
> > > > > > > > > how sharing the
> > > > > > > > ACL stats
> > > > > > > > > will be helpful here.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > A DOTS client can preinstall the same rate-limit filter
> > > > > > > > > with but with
> > > > > > > > different
> > > > > > > > > policies. It can select the appropriate ACL to
> > > > > > > > > activate/deactivate based on local experience.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > I don't get how the local experience will help the client
> > > > > > > > pick an alternate mitigation provider who can handle the attack
> scale.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > [Med] Modern CPEs include automated features to assess the
> > > > > > > availability of services such as VoIP, IPTV, etc. The DOTS
> > > > > > > client can be fed with input
> > > > > > from
> > > > > > > these modules and react accordingly.
> > > > >
> > > > > [Med] s/client/server.
> > >
> > > Is this correct?
> > >
> > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I meant the target network cannot infer the amount of
> > > > > > legitimate traffic (or infer the number of users) unable to
> > > > > > use its service because of the rate- limit action.
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > [Med] The amount of traffic is not required to assess the
> > > > > availability of "nominal" services (the example above). What is
> > > > > really important is
> > > > whether
> > > > > some critical services are available. That information can be
> > > > > determined
> > > > without
> > > > > needing the ACL stats.
> > > >
> > > > I am not referring to "nominal" services or critical resources.
> > > > For instance, consider Netflix is not accessible to a large number
> > > > of users because of the rate-limit action.
> > >
> > > The DOTS server will have a limited (only because they have to be
> > previously
> > > defined) set of (possibly inactivated) ACLS on the server.  If the
> > "standard"
> > > white/black list are unable to bring the inbound pipe back to not
> > > being flooded, then a (likely global for the DOTS client's networks)
> > > Rate-Limit
> > ACL
> > > must be brought in.  Once the Inbound pipe is available, then
> > > analysis of
> > the
> > > data reaching the DOTs client will show the top users which then
> > > need their own limiting (black or rate-limit) ACL set up over the
> > > data channel.  At
> > this
> > > point the Rate-Limit ACL can removed to see if things are stable again.
> > > [I agree that the CPE may not have this top usage capability]
> > >
> > > If Netflix (or similar) has a priority when under attack, then this
> > > needs
> > to be
> > > added into a White ACL which can be done once the inbound pipe is
> > > not flooded (or be a part of the standard white lists)
> >
> > I think we are discussing two different use cases. My attack use case
> > is Netflix content provider is under volumetric DDoS attack, and if
> > the rate- limit ACL is configured using the DOTS signal channel
> > because the DDoS mitigation provider cannot handle all the attack
> > traffic. The rate-limit ACL stats will help Netflix understand the
> > scale of the attack, impact on the current business because of the
> > rate-limit action (e.g. based on the amount of traffic dropped by DMS,
> > infer the amount of good traffic dropped by the rate-limit ACL action,
> > and infer the number of users who cannot access its service), and if
> > the attack lasts for  several days/weeks help identify an alternate
> > mitigation provider capable of handling the attack (e.g. Krebs was
> > initially using Akamai and eventually got protected by Google to handle the
> massive attack).
> >
> > Cheers,
> > -Tiru
> >
> > >
> > > ~jon
> > >
> > > >
> > > > -Tiru
> > > >
> > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > Dots mailing list
> > > > Dots@ietf.org
> > > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dots