Re: [Dots] New Version Notification for draft-reddy-dots-telemetry-02.txt

"Panwei (William)" <> Mon, 30 September 2019 02:33 UTC

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From: "Panwei (William)" <>
To: "Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy" <>
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Thread-Topic: New Version Notification for draft-reddy-dots-telemetry-02.txt
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Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2019 02:33:34 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Dots] New Version Notification for draft-reddy-dots-telemetry-02.txt
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Hi Tiru,

I’ve read the new version, and I have some thoughts, please see below.

In Section 2, at the end of the definition of ‘DOTS Telemetry’, it says ‘The DOTS Telemetry is an optional set of attributes that can be signaled in the DOTS signal channel protocol’, I think DOTS data channel protocol is also a suitable candidate for conveying DOTS Telemetry in some cases. For example, you can use DOTS data channel to convey the “normal traffic baseline” information during peace time. And if there is an out-of-band link between DOTS agents, you can use DOTS data channel without problems like packet loss.

About the “normal traffic baseline”, in Section 3, it describes learning the normal behavior by using the machine learning approaches and distinguishing the anomaly behavior deviated from the normal behavior. I assume the normal traffic pattern needs many characteristics to be profiled so that machine learning techniques are needed, but for now in the draft, the normal traffic baseline attributes are only 10%/50%/90% percentile and peak value of the whole traffic to the target, are those values enough for the anomaly detection? Does the traffic baseline need to be categorized by protocol type? Does some other attributes are needed, like the average and variance of the packet length?
I think conveying normal baseline from the DOTS client to the DOTS server is used for the case that the DOTS server can proactively detect the attack in case it fails receiving the Mitigation Request. That is, when the DOTS server fails to receive the Mitigation Request sent by the DOTS client because the link is saturated by the attack traffic, but the DOTS server can still detect the attack by using this normal traffic baseline information sent by the DOTS client during peace time.
Based on this purpose, I think sending the alarm threshold is also a reasonable and optional way to achieve this purpose, and it can be more direct for using. The DOTS client can continuously and automatically calculate the alarm threshold by using the machine learning techniques, then it can send this alarm threshold to the DOTS server periodically or after the threshold changes. When the attack occurs and the DOTS server fails receiving the Mitigation Request, it can still recognize the attack if the traffic to the target exceeds the threshold for a period of time. The alarm threshold also can be protocol specific, so that it can be more accurate.

About the ‘Total Attack Traffic’ and ‘Total Traffic’, for now the draft requires them to be statistical attributes. I think the statistical values are fine but shouldn’t be mandatory. For the case that the DOTS client immediately sends the Mitigation Request and the Pre-mitigation Telemetry together to the DOTS server once it realizes an attack has occurred, it can send the instantaneous ‘Total Attack Traffic’ and ‘Total Traffic’ without waiting some time to do the statistics. So I suggest making the statistical values and current values all available and optional, to let different DOTS clients choose what to send.

Section 4.1.5, Total Connections Characteristics, is designed for the resource-based DDoS attacks. But compared to the volume-based DDoS attacks, I think some other kinds of attribute are also needed.
The DOTS Telemetry attributes used for volume-based DDoS attacks can be categorized for 3 types: 1) The normal baseline (or the alarm threshold), which now is Section 4.1.1; 2) The capability information, which now is Section 4.1.2; 3) The current situation, which now is Section 4.1.3 and 4.1.4. But for the resource-based attacks, the ‘Total Connections Characteristics’ is just the capability information, I think the baseline information and the current situation can also be defined.

For the attributes now in the ‘Total Connections Characteristics’, I think the ‘per client’ attributes should also support protocol specific, this support can be optional for the DOTS clients. Besides, what are the ‘partial requests’?

Regards & Thanks!
潘伟 Wei Pan
华为技术有限公司 Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.

From: Dots [] On Behalf Of Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy
Sent: Thursday, September 12, 2019 12:55 PM
Subject: [Dots] FW: New Version Notification for draft-reddy-dots-telemetry-02.txt

This revision addresses comments from Kaname, Jon, Wei Pan and Yuuhei Hayashi.

Major changes are listed below:

a.  Added path-suffix ‘telemetry’ to from the URI to signal DOTS telemetry
b.  Added attributes useful to detect resource-based DDoS attacks
c.  Attack details can be signaled from the DOTS client to server and vice-versa.
d.  Added several new attributes for attack details including top talkers.

Comments and suggestions are welcome.


---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: <<>>
Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2019 at 09:58
Subject: New Version Notification for draft-reddy-dots-telemetry-02.txt
To: Tirumaleswar Reddy <<>>, Ehud Doron <<>>, Mohamed Boucadair <<>>

A new version of I-D, draft-reddy-dots-telemetry-02.txt
has been successfully submitted by Tirumaleswar Reddy and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:           draft-reddy-dots-telemetry
Revision:       02
Title:          Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Telemetry
Document date:  2019-09-12
Group:          Individual Submission
Pages:          16

   This document aims to enrich DOTS signal channel protocol with
   various telemetry attributes allowing optimal DDoS attack mitigation.
   This document specifies the normal traffic baseline and attack
   traffic telemetry attributes a DOTS client can convey to its DOTS
   server in the mitigation request, the mitigation status telemetry
   attributes a DOTS server can communicate to a DOTS client, and the
   mitigation efficacy telemetry attributes a DOTS client can
   communicate to a DOTS server.  The telemetry attributes can assist
   the mitigator to choose the DDoS mitigation techniques and perform
   optimal DDoS attack mitigation.

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