Re: [Dots] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-dots-signal-channel-30

<mohamed.boucadair@orange.com> Fri, 15 March 2019 07:39 UTC

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From: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com
To: "Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy" <TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com>, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, "secdir@ietf.org" <secdir@ietf.org>
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Thread-Topic: Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-dots-signal-channel-30
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Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2019 07:39:22 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Dots] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-dots-signal-channel-30
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Hi Tiru, 

Please see inline. 

Cheers,
Med

> -----Message d'origine-----
> De : Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy [mailto:TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com]
> Envoyé : vendredi 15 mars 2019 05:30
> À : BOUCADAIR Mohamed TGI/OLN; Stephen Farrell; secdir@ietf.org
> Cc : draft-ietf-dots-signal-channel.all@ietf.org; ietf@ietf.org;
> dots@ietf.org
> Objet : RE: Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-dots-signal-channel-30
> 
> Please see inline
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Dots <dots-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of
> > mohamed.boucadair@orange.com
> > Sent: Thursday, March 14, 2019 9:47 PM
> > To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>; secdir@ietf.org
> > Cc: draft-ietf-dots-signal-channel.all@ietf.org; ietf@ietf.org;
> dots@ietf.org
> > Subject: Re: [Dots] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-dots-signal-
> channel-30
> >
> > This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links
> or
> > open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is
> > safe.
> >
> > Hi Stephen,
> >
> > Thank you for the review.
> >
> > Please see inline.
> >
> > Cheers,
> > Med
> >
> > > -----Message d'origine-----
> > > De : Stephen Farrell via Datatracker [mailto:noreply@ietf.org] Envoyé
> > > : jeudi 14 mars 2019 16:34 À : secdir@ietf.org Cc :
> > > draft-ietf-dots-signal-channel.all@ietf.org; ietf@ietf.org;
> > > dots@ietf.org Objet : Secdir last call review of
> > > draft-ietf-dots-signal-channel-30
> > >
> > > Reviewer: Stephen Farrell
> > > Review result: Has Issues
> > >
> > >
> > > I think there's one issue with this draft that'd be well worth
> > > discussion and/or fixing:
> > >
> > > - p12: Why does the cuid need to be so static? I would have thought
> > > that an identifier that can change more often than a key pair would
> > > have been better, esp if this could be used in a CPE. (Creating a new
> > > long-lived identifier for a CPE seems like a bad plan if it's not
> > > really needed.) For example, one could use both the SPKI and a
> > > timestamp as input for a recommended way to generate a cuid and that
> > > should be as unique, but much more easily changed.  That could also
> > > mitigate the possible TLS1.2 client-cert snooping issue mentioned on
> > > p90.
> >
> > [Med] cuid is used for avoidance detection but also as a stable key to
> > identify resources at the server side. Any change of the cuid will lead to
> a
> > failure in accessing the resources.
> > Furthermore, this identifier is used to "glue" the signal and data
> channels.
> >
> > The spec does not forbid the clients to change its cuid, but to do so, the
> > client will need to manage state migration.
> >
> > >
> > > nits:
> > >
> > > - (Not really a nit, but probably too much to ask, so...) The protocol
> > > here seems very complex. Has anyone tried to prove anything about the
> > > state machine, e.g.
> > > that's it's safe in some senses? It'd be fair to say that that is a
> > > good task to do after the initial RFC is published in this case, I
> > > guess.  OTOH, could be some of the theorem-proving tools used in the
> > > development of
> > > TLS1.3 could be useful here. (And those tools usually do turn up some
> > > issues worth fixing - I'd bet a beer they would in this case:-)
> >
> > [Med] The specification was edited following an incremental approach in
> > which new pieces are validated through at least two interoperable
> > implementations. We hope that more feedback will be received after the
> > initial RFC.
> >
> > >
> > > - p18: "Only single-valued 'cdid' are defined in this document." That
> > > confused me given the text 3 paras before about multiple cdid values.
> > > Maybe clarifying that some could be useful?
> >
> > [Med] What is meant here is the case where multiple GWs are involved in
> > the path; each inserts a cdid value.
> 
> 'cdid' is only inserted by the server-domain DOTS gateway.

[Med] I added this NEW text to clarify the comment from Stephen:

OLD:
      Only single-valued 'cdid' are defined in this document.  

NEW:
      Only single-valued 'cdid' are defined in this document.  That is,
      only the first server-domain DOTS gateway can insert a 'cdid'
      value.  This specification does not allow multiple server-domain
      DOTS gateways, whenever involved in the path, to insert a 'cdid'
      value for each.

 Figure 8 needs to
> be corrected, 'cuid' is missing in the Figure.

[Med] Figure 8 is correct.