Re: [drinks] Stephen Farrell's Discuss on draft-ietf-drinks-spp-protocol-over-soap-07: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

[Stephen Farrell <[e-mail]>]

Hiya,

On 19/03/15 16:21, Richard Barnes wrote:
> Authors: Any response to Stephen on this?
> 
> For my part: Stephen, are you seeing some risk associated with a MUST for
> Digest?  

I'd have to go re-read, but no I think I just wanted to check
in case that triggered a light bulb moment I think. (And of
course because digest is a POS;-)

S.

> It doesn't preclude implementations from *also* using TLS client
> authentication, and it seems to agree with the general direction of having
> a required minimum level of security.
> 
> --Richard
> 
> 
> 
> On Thu, Feb 5, 2015 at 9:33 AM, Stephen Farrell <[e-mail]>
> wrote:
> 
>> Stephen Farrell has entered the following ballot position for
>> draft-ietf-drinks-spp-protocol-over-soap-07: Discuss
>>
>> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
>> email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
>> introductory paragraph, however.)
>>
>>
>> Please refer to http://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
>> for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
>>
>>
>> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
>> http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-drinks-spp-protocol-over-soap/
>>
>>
>>
>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>> DISCUSS:
>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>>
>> I just want to check one thing...
>>
>> Section 5: why is there a MUST for Digest auth?  What'd be
>> wrong with TLS client auth here?  I do wish the WG had
>> considered some alternative to passwords, which don't make so
>> much sense in this use-case.  (BTW: You could chose HOBA here
>> I guess, but that's still in the RFC editor queue and not
>> supported by libraries so perhaps doesn't suit. But it'd work.
>> I'm an author of the HOBA spec though, so I'm biased:-) Anyway
>> - can you tell me if the WG considered dropping passwords
>> entirely and mandating TLS client auth be implemented?  If the
>> WG seriously considered TLS client auth already, I'll just
>> clear.
>>
>>
>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>> COMMENT:
>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>>
>> - General: why would one want to ever run this protocol
>> without TLS? Did the WG consider saying that TLS MUST be used?
>> Again, if you tell me you thought about it, I'll just clear.
>>
>> - 7.1.2: The framework uses "Identifier" but here you use
>> "Identity" - it'd be better to be consistent I think and
>> "Identifier" is a lot better.
>>
>> - section 11 is weaker than the corresponding section in the
>> framework draft. Two things: 1) why not point back to the
>> framework here? 2) shouldn't you say which of the
>> vulns/mitigations called out in the framework are relevant or
>> mitigated here?
>>
>>
>>
>