Re: [Driu] [Doh] [DNSOP] Resolverless DNS Side Meeting in Montreal

Tony Finch <dot@dotat.at> Tue, 10 July 2018 18:13 UTC

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Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2018 19:13:29 +0100
From: Tony Finch <dot@dotat.at>
To: Dave Lawrence <tale@dd.org>
cc: Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org>, DoH WG <doh@ietf.org>, driu@ietf.org, Ben Schwartz <bemasc@google.com>, dnsop <dnsop@ietf.org>, Patrick McManus <pmcmanus@mozilla.com>, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@aclu.org>, HTTP Working Group <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
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Subject: Re: [Driu] [Doh] [DNSOP] Resolverless DNS Side Meeting in Montreal
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Dave Lawrence <tale@dd.org> wrote:
>
> In the large I agree with you, but I think there's more to it than
> that.  If it pushed me DNSSEC records that I could verify myself from
> my own configured trust anchor, why can't I trust them then?

I've been idly wondering about this from the point of view of RFC 2181
trust ranking: to what extent does it make sense to promote the rank of
data (e.g. additional records) that has been validated?

The risk, I think, is replaying stale data - there shouldn't be any worse
consequences. So it should amount to a DoS attack (and there are easier
ways to achieve one of those).

Tony.
-- 
f.anthony.n.finch  <dot@dotat.at>  http://dotat.at/
Shannon: Northerly 3 or 4, occasionally 5 in east. Moderate. Mainly fair.
Good.