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Re: [dsfjdssdfsd] Discussion: Malicious Entropy Attacks: Eggs, and Baskets

Krisztián Pintér <pinterkr@gmail.com> Sat, 15 March 2014 15:50 UTC

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Date: Sat, 15 Mar 2014 16:50:37 +0100
From: Krisztián Pintér <pinterkr@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [dsfjdssdfsd] Discussion: Malicious Entropy Attacks: Eggs, and Baskets
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Arnold Reinhold (at Friday, March 14, 2014, 5:20:56 PM):
> Here are some scenarios where recovery from a state compromise would be important:
> o A bug in system software that exposes PRNG state only rarely
> o An attack that that exposes PRNG state in a system that is well
> guarded against covert channels, limiting undetected outbound messages to very low bit rate
[...]

and these are the attacks about which djb says: your system is broken.
don't patch it, fix it. if such attacks could be carried out, session
keys or long term keys might have been compromised. recovering your
prng won't help that, the damage has been done.

it is not the way to reduce the chance of any attack by a small
factor, let the factor be a 100, or even a million, it is still small.
what we want is systems that are reliable and safe. and if our system
is safe, we don't need reseeding.

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