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Re: [dsfjdssdfsd] Any plans for drafts or discussions on here?

Francis Dupont <Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr> Wed, 22 January 2014 23:55 UTC

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From: Francis Dupont <Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr>
To: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
In-reply-to: Your message of Wed, 22 Jan 2014 08:28:41 PST. <F6B381C1-089D-4723-9A2C-7937C6C74EFB@vpnc.org>
Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2014 00:55:41 +0100
Sender: Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr
Cc: dsfjdssdfsd@ietf.org, Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org>
Subject: Re: [dsfjdssdfsd] Any plans for drafts or discussions on here?
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 In your previous mail you wrote:

>  >  "Ask your OS" is putting faith in the guy that wrote the relevant code
>  > in your OS.
>  
>  Yes, exactly.
>  
>  > It might be a reasonable leap but it's a leap nevertheless.
>  
>  We put faith in the (~85%) guy for all the other crypto code as well,
>  so I don't see the leap.

=> another argument is the kernel has access to more resources/entropy
sources than a user mode code. So I tend to agree with Paul: if you have
to trust something the OS is not the worst choice.

Regards

Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr

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