Re: [dsfjdssdfsd] Discussion: Malicious Entropy Attacks: Eggs, and Baskets

[=JeffH <[e-mail]>]

 > Ted noted..
 >
 > I'll note that an criteria for judging RNG's which is very popular
 > with academics who love to write papers poking (theoretical) holes
 > into random number generators is how quickly a RNG can recover from
 > state compromise.
 > ...
 > Personally, my take is that if you can compromise the state of the
 > RNG, you can probably far more damage, so I'm not convinced state
 > compromise is a very high priority threat to defend against.  But
 > there are tons and tons of academic papers which are convinced that
 > any RNG which doesn't worry about this attack is Fatally Flawed.

a recent paper that is perhaps an instance of the above class(es) of papers 
(but may be of interest in any case) is...

Dodis, Yevgeniy, Adi Shamir, Noah Stephens-Davidowitz, and Daniel Wichs. 
"How to Eat Your Entropy and Have it Too—Optimal Recovery Strategies for 
Compromised RNGs."
https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/167.pdf


=JeffH