Re: [dtn-security] Including fragment offset in the correlator doesn't prevent all fragment collisions.

"Ivancic, William D. (GRC-RHN0)" <william.d.ivancic@nasa.gov> Thu, 21 March 2013 04:19 UTC

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From: "Ivancic, William D. (GRC-RHN0)" <william.d.ivancic@nasa.gov>
To: Amy Alford <aloomis@sarn.org>, Peter Lovell <plovell@mac.com>
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2013 23:19:58 -0500
Thread-Topic: [dtn-security] Including fragment offset in the correlator doesn't prevent all fragment collisions.
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Subject: Re: [dtn-security] Including fragment offset in the correlator doesn't prevent all fragment collisions.
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A 5 GB bundle come forms Mr. Bad.  You don’t want to store anything from Mr. Bad, but you cannot confirm the source  using PIB until you receive the entire bundle thus eating up 5 GB of resources.

It is broken.

-- Will


________________________________
From: Amy Alford <aloomis@sarn.org>
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2013 18:36:32 -0500
To: Peter Lovell <plovell@mac.com>
Cc: dtn-security <dtn-security@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [dtn-security] Including fragment offset in the correlator doesn't prevent all fragment collisions.

A 100 byte bundle is created.  Different nodes independently fragment it into 50 byte fragments.  A subsequent node adds PIB and PCB (so we have correlated PCB blocks) to each fragment with a security destination of the bundle destination.   The correlators can collide. (In DTN2, they will collide.)

If the fragments are reassembled before the destination, the destination has no way to distinguish the PCB blocks that should correlate with each other.

Alternatively, if we assume reassembly only happens at the destination (which 5050 doesn't guarantee), we still have a problem if we use a two block PIB ciphersuite where one block comes before the payload and one comes after.

A node creates a 100 byte bundle.  It's independently fragmented into 50 byte bundles.  A subsequent node adds a PIB ciphersuite with a correlated block trailing the payload.  Again, the correlators collide.  Now, each 50 byte fragment is fragmented again.  So, we have fragments:

(I'm numbering the PIB instances so that we can distinguish them in the discussion.  The numbers don't correspond to anything identifiable in the blocks themselves.)

PIB 1 with correlator x -> 0-25
25-50 -> PIB 1 with correlator x
PIB 2 with correlator y -> 50-75
75-100 -> PIB 2 with correlator y

PIB 3 with correlator x -> 0-25
25-50 -> PIB 3 with correlator x
PIB 4 with correlator y -> 50-75
75-100 -> PIB 4 with correlator y

The receiving node has no way to realize that that pre-payload PIB 1 with correlator x doesn't match up to the post-payload PIB 3 with correlator x.

- Amy

On Tue, Mar 19, 2013 at 9:11 PM, Peter Lovell <plovell@mac.com> wrote:
Amy Alford <aloomis@sarn.org> wrote:

>A bundle can be fragmented multiple times independently, so a node may
>receive multiple fragments with the same offset and length that have
>traveled different paths (and accumulated different BSP blocks along the
>way).  Collisions in the correlator values once the bundle is reassembled
>are inevitable.
>- Amy

Hi Amy,

my thought is that we have covered the problem of multiple-fragmentation and multi-path, but perhaps not.

Can you describe a bundle scenario that exemplifies the issue you see, so we can think about it.

Thanks.....Peter