Re: [dtn] [EXTERNAL] Re: AD evaluation of draft-ietf-dtn-bpbis-13
"Burleigh, Scott C (312B)" <scott.c.burleigh@jpl.nasa.gov> Mon, 15 July 2019 23:01 UTC
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From: "Burleigh, Scott C (312B)" <scott.c.burleigh@jpl.nasa.gov>
To: DTN WG <dtn@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [EXTERNAL] Re: [dtn] AD evaluation of draft-ietf-dtn-bpbis-13
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Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2019 23:01:54 +0000
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Subject: Re: [dtn] [EXTERNAL] Re: AD evaluation of draft-ietf-dtn-bpbis-13
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Toward reaching that consensus: my own opinion from reading USPTO #7930379 is that Intel seems to have patented TierStore and named it "delay tolerant networking." I would think that the IEEE Communications article on DTN published in June 2003 is prior art that invalidates the patent, since the patent is dated 30 March 2007, but I am no lawyer. The earliest published paper I can find on TierStore is dated January 2008, so maybe a patent that limits its claims to what TierStore does can be defended, but the DTN architecture goes far beyond TierStore. Scott -----Original Message----- From: dtn <dtn-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of R. Atkinson Sent: Monday, July 15, 2019 8:11 AM To: DTN WG <dtn@ietf.org> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [dtn] AD evaluation of draft-ietf-dtn-bpbis-13 Fred, Kevin Fall’s note of June 17th means that the WG needs to consider the question of whether it wants to standardize these documents despite the existence of a (possibly related or possibly not related) IPR claim (reportedly USPTO # 7,930,379). I have not read that USPTO filing. So I take no position on whether that IPR claim is applicable to DTN or even whether it is a valid claim. Regardless, from an IETF process perspective, the WG needs to make an explicit decision on whether to proceed with standardization given the existence of USPTO 7,930,379. I noted this process issue earlier on-list, but I haven’t seen any discussion and I haven’t seen the WG Chairs pose the question. Is perhaps the plan to discuss this next week in person and then confirm the in-person consensus (whatever that might be) on the mailing list afterwards ? :-) Cheers, Ran > On Jul 15, 2019, at 08:48, Magnus Westerlund <magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com> wrote: > > On Sat, 2019-07-13 at 00:29 +0000, Templin (US), Fred L wrote: >> HI Magnus, >> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: dtn [mailto:dtn-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Magnus >>> Westerlund >>> Sent: Monday, July 08, 2019 12:05 AM >>> To: draft-ietf-dtn-bpbis@ietf.org; dtn@ietf.org >>> Subject: Re: [dtn] AD evaluation of draft-ietf-dtn-bpbis-13 >>> >>> WG, >>> >>> >>> To clarify, I will not progress this document until the WG has >>> established a consensus on what to do, if any, about the IPR. >> >> Thank you for your review efforts. Regarding IPR, as part of my >> document shepherd's writeup I polled the authors and no relevant IPRs >> were reported. >> Can you say more about your concern? > > I was talking about whole set of documents, and at least for the TCP > CLv4 document there was a potential raised. I want the WG chairs to > conlcude if there will be an IPR disclosure and if in that case what > the WG action if any will be. > > Regarding the BPbis document, the shepherds write up ( > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dtn-bpbis/shepherdwriteup/ > ) , question 7 and 8, says N/A on the question about if the authors > have confirmed and if there are any IPR disclosures, rather than "It > has been confirmed" and "No". If you as shepherd have done the > confirmation, can you please have the writeup updated. > > There appear to be more questions that should be updated with actual > answers: 5, 12, 13, 14, and 15. > > And yes IESG members do read them, even if this AD apparently missed > to read this one properly when doint my AD reveiw. > > Cheers > > Magnus > >> >> Regards - Fred >> >>> Cheers >>> >>> Magnus >>> >>> >>> >>> On Fri, 2019-07-05 at 14:06 +0000, Magnus Westerlund wrote: >>>> Hi, >>>> >>>> I have now reviewed this document. Consider that there are a number >>>> of issues that likely need WG discussion I thought I should send >>>> out this, despite that I have not yet reviewed the BPSEC document >>>> that appears to be highly relevant and may result in additional >>>> changes needed in this document. But BPSEC is next in a my review >>>> pile. >>>> >>>> Also as this area is new, I read the architecture a long time ago >>>> so don’t hesitate to clarify if it appears that I am missing >>>> things. >>>> >>>> >>>> 1. Section 4.1.5.1 and 10 : >>>> >>>> As this document uses the "dtn" URI scheme and the "dtn" scheme was >>>> only provisional registered by RFC 5050 I think this document >>>> should formally register the DTN URI scheme and thus a new >>>> subsection in Section 10 is needed. >>>> >>>> Also, maybe similar effort to move "ipn" to permeant is needed? >>>> >>>> 2. Section 4.1.6: >>>> >>>> I think the format and definition of this field are insufficient. >>>> It >>>> is lacking a reference or a normative description of what "Unix >>>> Epoch Time" in an unsigned int format actually is. Is the intention >>>> here to simply measure the number of seconds since the start of >>>> year 2000? >>>> Which Unix epoch time is not due to leap seconds. And I become >>>> uncertain as UTC time scale is something else than Unix Epoch time >>>> at least when it comes to leap seconds handling. Due to that Unix >>>> Time have discontinuities in the time scale at leap seconds I would >>>> recommend strongly against using it. Select UTC or TAI depending on >>>> where you want the leap second handling pain to exist. >>>> >>>> Also, you specified only CBOR unsinged integer which is a >>>> representation that can use 64-bit and thus not have the issues >>>> with 32-bit signed integer seconds epochs that regular unix time >>>> has, but that should probably be made explicit that it is expected >>>> to handle that. Even if the first wrap of this unsigned 32-bit >>>> format will not occur until 2136. >>>> >>>> And please provide necessary normative references, not informative >>>> ones. >>>> >>>> >>>> 3. Section 4.2.2: >>>> >>>> The Lifetime field appears problematic if the creating node doesn't >>>> have a reliable clock and uses timestamp 0 for all bundles. I think >>>> that special case needs to be discussed. Which it is later done, >>>> but there is missing reference to that. >>>> >>>> 4. Section 4.2.2: Report-to EID >>>> >>>> Is this field set by bundle creator and never changed? It is not >>>> clear and appear to have implications on how this field should be >>>> treated. Primarily considering integrity options over these fields. >>>> >>>> 5. Section 4.3.3. >>>> Maximum Hop count upper limit? Can I insert a max UiNT64 here and >>>> expect that to be acceptable? >>>> >>>> 6. Section 5.1: >>>> Under some circumstances, the requesting of status reports could >>>> result in an unacceptable increase in the bundle traffic in the >>>> network. For this reason, the generation of status reports MUST >>>> be >>>> disabled by default and enabled only when the risk of excessive >>>> network traffic is deemed acceptable. >>>> >>>> I find the above paragraph rather unclear. First of all what are >>>> the circumstances. Secondly, shouldn't the type of status report >>>> requested be discussed. What I can see the different types results >>>> in at most 1, N-1 or N times the number of sent bundles with the >>>> status report set depending on type, where N is the number of nodes >>>> on the path including receiving endpoint. >>>> >>>> So are there any recommendations to when it might be acceptable to >>>> request status delivery. To me it appears the trace route like >>>> options, like forwarding status report should only be used on a >>>> small number of bundles sent for debuging or monitoring purposes. >>>> >>>> Use of the bundle deletion status report appear to have other >>>> motivations for its use. I assume that this is fine for cases when >>>> it occurs for a small fraction of the bundles for some reasons, but >>>> when you have real failures on next hop links it appears that this >>>> may cause high volumes of deletion. Thus a rate limitation makes >>>> sense. I assume that this is one of the not specified reasons the >>>> below paragraph indicates: >>>> >>>> When the generation of status reports is enabled, the decision on >>>> whether or not to generate a requested status report is left to >>>> the >>>> discretion of the bundle protocol agent. Mechanisms that could >>>> assist in making such decisions, such as pre-placed agreements >>>> authorizing the generation of status reports under specified >>>> circumstances, are beyond the scope of this specification. >>>> >>>> 7. Section 5.3: >>>> >>>> Step 1: If the bundle's destination endpoint is an endpoint of >>>> which >>>> the node is a member, the bundle delivery procedure defined in >>>> Section 5.7 MUST be followed and for the purposes of all >>>> subsequent >>>> processing of this bundle at this node the node's membership in >>>> the >>>> bundle's destination endpoint SHALL be disavowed. >>>> >>>> I don't understand why and what implications the disavowing has for >>>> a local bundle being dispatched from a member node part of the >>>> destination. >>>> >>>> 8. Section 5.4 >>>> >>>> Step 3: If forwarding of the bundle is determined to be >>>> contraindicated for any of the reasons listed in Figure 4, then >>>> the >>>> Forwarding Contraindicated procedure defined in Section 5.4.1 >>>> MUST >>>> be followed; the remaining steps of Section 5 are skipped at this >>>> time. >>>> >>>> Should that last Section 5 be Section 5.4? >>>> >>>> 9. Section 6.1.1 >>>> What does Destination endpoint ID unintelligible actually mean? >>>> Same with Block unintelligible. >>>> >>>> Are these the combination for corrupted blocks or EIDs? Are there a >>>> point of separating out the case where the CRC indicate a >>>> corruption? >>>> >>>> 10. Section 7.2 >>>> >>>> So the service description appears very high level. How is the >>>> actual interface working when it comes to dealing with that there >>>> is either possibility to send, as well as rate control in the API. >>>> When can more data be accepted and when is the convergence layer >>>> not ready. >>>> Also don't the Bundle Agent need a signal when this side thinks it >>>> has delivered as a signal of when the forwarding has completed? >>>> >>>> I was expecting this section to actually be explicit about what >>>> functionalities the Bundle Agent really need from the convergence >>>> layer. >>>> >>>> 11. Section 9 >>>> >>>> I think this section needs to be more explicit about mandating >>>> implementation support for BPSEC. The IETF do not publish a >>>> protocol today that doesn't have a mandatory to implement security >>>> solutions for the protocol's major properties. In this case >>>> communication security, i.e. confidentiality, integrity and >>>> authentication of the data communicated is very relevant. I have >>>> not yet read BPSEC so I may have additional concerns about that >>>> issues are not handled in the combined protocol. I hope the BPSEC >>>> has some discussion of the privacy properties of the protocol. >>>> >>>> 12. Section 9: >>>> Additionally, convergence-layer protocols that ensure >>>> authenticity >>>> of communication between adjacent nodes in BP network topology >>>> SHOULD be used where available, to minimize the ability of >>>> unauthenticated nodes to introduce inauthentic traffic into the >>>> network. >>>> >>>> In this context wouldn't it be reasonable to also recommend using >>>> encryption on the convergence layer to avoid eavsedropping on the >>>> part that is in clear and prevent traffic analysis by third >>>> parties? >>>> >>>> 13. Section 9. >>>> >>>> Note that the generation of bundle status reports is disabled by >>>> default because malicious initiation of bundle status reporting >>>> could result in the transmission of extremely large numbers of >>>> bundle, effecting a denial of service attack. >>>> >>>> I think there is a clear lack of mitigations proposed for this >>>> issue. >>>> As I mentioned in Issue 6 I think one both needs to consider amount >>>> of generated traffic versus utility for the sender. Also I will >>>> have to read BPSec to understand what integrity and source >>>> authentication there is of the request for status reports. Next is >>>> the issue of rate limiting and prioritization of status reports >>>> versus other bundles. >>>> Also due to the multi-hop store and forward nature of this protocol >>>> the actual bottle neck may only occur several hops towards the >>>> receiver. What can be said about dropping status reports versus >>>> other bundles when there is a resource contention, either in >>>> storage or in convergence layers capability of forwarding messages >>>> within time. >>>> >>>> 14. Section 6 >>>> I fail to see any discussion of how the sender of a status report >>>> should set the lifetime and max hop. Can it actually take that >>>> information from the Bundle it is reporting on? >>>> >>>> 15. Section 10. >>>> >>>> I think this section needs to be clearer. Several improvements that >>>> can be made. >>>> >>>> · I recommend individual sub-sections per registry >>>> operation >>>> · Can you be clearer in references to point to specific >>>> sections of definitions that makes it simpler to find the relevant >>>> from the IANA registry? >>>> >>>> More specific parts. >>>> >>>> This document defines the following additional Bundle Protocol >>>> block >>>> types, for which values are to be assigned from the Bundle >>>> Administrative Record Types namespace [RFC6255]: >>>> >>>> First of all according to the registry, this registry is actually >>>> created by RFC 7116. >>>> >>>> This and the observation that the things you attempt to register in >>>> this registry you are actual called Bundle Block Types in your >>>> document. Thus, I have to ask are you actually addressing the right >>>> registry, or is the issue that you actually need per version >>>> specific registries for example Bundle Block Types? If it is the >>>> later, then lets define new registries. Possibly there should be a >>>> new major page for BPv7. Not having read all the old documents, you >>>> likely have to consider which registries are version specific and >>>> which are not. >>>> >>>> 16. Section 10: >>>> >>>> For the new registry, do you have any requirements for >>>> registrations that should be written out. And in addition any >>>> criteria you want the expert to consider when approving or >>>> rejecting registries? And is this registry version 7 specific or >>>> not? >>>> >>>> 17. Section 4.1.1: >>>> >>>> The CRCs are lacking proper normative references. Needed for both >>>> 1 >>>> and 2. Note that you have [CRC] that is currently unused. >>>> >>>> 18. Section 11.2: >>>> [BPSEC] is a normative reference. >>>> [RFC6255] is normatively referenced for their registration >>>> procedures. >>>> >>>> 19. Section 13, Section 4.2.2 >>>> >>>> This Section 13 item was something I wondered over: >>>> >>>> . Restructure primary block, making it immutable. Add optional >>>> CRC. >>>> >>>> Did I simply miss where that is said in the context of Section >>>> 4.2.2? >>>> >>>> 20. Optional CRCs >>>> >>>> Why are the primary block CRC optional? I assume the intention with >>>> it is to do a verification that the primarily block with the >>>> addressing information hasn't become corrupted in the transmission >>>> between nodes, similar to the checksums we have in other protocols. >>>> Under which conditions will not using it be a reasonable idea? >>>> Are >>>> you expecting other mechanisms to cover for it, or are you >>>> reasoning that having corrupted bundles being delivered to the >>>> wrong places is not an issue? As the primarily block is the main >>>> addressing part, I would think the considerations that went into >>>> discussion of the >>>> (almost) always usage of the UDP checksum for IPv6 applies here. >>>> Also >>>> the implications for corruptions and cost in some DTNs for stray >>>> data appears quite high. >>>> >>>> >>>> Cheers >>>> >>>> Magnus Westerlund >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> dtn mailing list >>>> dtn@ietf.org >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dtn >>> >>> -- >>> Cheers >>> >>> Magnus Westerlund >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------------------------------------------- >>> ----- >>> Network Architecture & Protocols, Ericsson Research >>> ----------------------------------------------------------------- >>> ----- >>> Ericsson AB | Phone +46 10 7148287 >>> Torshamnsgatan 23 | Mobile +46 73 0949079 >>> SE-164 80 Stockholm, Sweden | mailto: >>> magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com >>> ----------------------------------------------------------------- >>> ----- >>> >> >> > -- > Cheers > > Magnus Westerlund > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > Network Architecture & Protocols, Ericsson Research > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > Ericsson AB | Phone +46 10 7148287 > Torshamnsgatan 23 | Mobile +46 73 0949079 > SE-164 80 Stockholm, Sweden | mailto: magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > _______________________________________________ > dtn mailing list > dtn@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dtn _______________________________________________ dtn mailing list dtn@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dtn
- [dtn] AD evaluation of draft-ietf-dtn-bpbis-13 Magnus Westerlund
- Re: [dtn] AD evaluation of draft-ietf-dtn-bpbis-13 R. Atkinson
- Re: [dtn] AD evaluation of draft-ietf-dtn-bpbis-13 Magnus Westerlund
- Re: [dtn] AD evaluation of draft-ietf-dtn-bpbis-13 Magnus Westerlund
- Re: [dtn] AD evaluation of draft-ietf-dtn-bpbis-13 Templin (US), Fred L
- Re: [dtn] AD evaluation of draft-ietf-dtn-bpbis-13 Magnus Westerlund
- Re: [dtn] AD evaluation of draft-ietf-dtn-bpbis-13 R. Atkinson
- Re: [dtn] [EXTERNAL] Re: AD evaluation of draft-i… Burleigh, Scott C (312B)
- Re: [dtn] AD evaluation of draft-ietf-dtn-bpbis-13 Burleigh, Scott C (US 312B)
- Re: [dtn] AD evaluation of draft-ietf-dtn-bpbis-13 Magnus Westerlund
- Re: [dtn] AD evaluation of draft-ietf-dtn-bpbis-13 Magnus Westerlund
- Re: [dtn] AD evaluation of draft-ietf-dtn-bpbis-13 Burleigh, Scott C (US 312B)