Re: [dtn] Mirja Kühlewind's Discuss on draft-ietf-dtn-bpsec-18: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

All,

I think it quite reasonable for the WG to define at least one "mandatory-to-implement" (i.e., NOT mandatory to use) set of security algorithms/modes for BPsec — and I think it quite reasonable for the IESG to require that the WG make such a choice.

The IETF has at least 30 years of experience that if at least one “mandatory-to-implement” security profile is NOT required/specified, then non-interoperability is the actual result.  In this case, non-interoperability would mean that two different systems who DO wish to use BPsec between themselves actually cannot use it — because of disjoint algorithms/modes having been implemented in the different implementations.

I’m not terribly particular about which algorithms/modes the WG picks, although choosing algorithms/modes readily available in open-source libraries (for example: the OpenSSL library) does simplify life for implementers.

Yours,

Ran

> On Feb 11, 2020, at 11:37, Mehmet Adalier <madalier@antarateknik.com> wrote:
> 
> While it is possible to find such a minimal requirement, I do not believe that one is required at the BPsec protocol level.
> I'd also like to recommend that the BPsec RFC does not specify a "minimum" interoperability context.
> 
> Depending on the use-case, interoperable contexts can be defined as other specifications. 
> 
> An example is appropriate CCSDS books which indicate interoperable contexts. . Another example is the International Communication System Interoperability Standards (ICSIS).
> 
> Mehmet
> 
> 
> On 2/11/20, 4:04 AM, "dtn on behalf of Mirja Kuehlewind" <dtn-bounces@ietf.org on behalf of ietf@kuehlewind.net> wrote:
> 
>    Hi Ed,
> 
>    Thanks for the new text section 9.1. Reading this text I would to confirm one more thing: I understand that the best choice for the security context can be very different, however, the point of interoperability is to have at least one available, that might not be optimal but it better than none. Having one common security context required would also simply mean that each implementation would need to support that and therefore it becomes much easier for people to reply BPSec if the provided one is suitable. Is it not possible to find such a minimal requirement?
> 
>    Mirja
> 
> 
> 
>> On 8. Feb 2020, at 01:23, Birrane, Edward J. <Edward.Birrane@jhuapl.edu> wrote:
>> 
>> Mirja,
>> 
>> Thank you for the review. I have updated a new version of BPSEC  (BPSEC20) which attempts to address your DISCUSS and COMMENTS below.
>> 
>> Specific comments are in-line below.  I have enumerated the Discuss items as **D# and the comment items as **C# to aid in referencing these points going forward.
>> 
>> -Ed
>> 
>> ---
>> Edward J. Birrane, III, Ph.D.
>> Embedded Applications Group Supervisor
>> Space Exploration Sector
>> Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory
>> (W) 443-778-7423 / (F) 443-228-3839
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: Mirja Kühlewind via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org>
>>> Sent: Monday, February 03, 2020 6:17 AM
>>> To: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
>>> Cc: draft-ietf-dtn-bpsec@ietf.org; Scott Burleigh
>>> <Scott.C.Burleigh@jpl.nasa.gov>; dtn-chairs@ietf.org;
>>> Scott.C.Burleigh@jpl.nasa.gov; dtn@ietf.org
>>> Subject: [EXT] Mirja Kühlewind's Discuss on draft-ietf-dtn-bpsec-18: (with
>>> DISCUSS and COMMENT)
>>> 
>>> APL external email warning: Verify sender noreply@ietf.org before clicking
>>> links or attachments
>>> 
>>> Mirja Kühlewind has entered the following ballot position for
>>> draft-ietf-dtn-bpsec-18: Discuss
>>> 
>>> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all email
>>> addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this introductory
>>> paragraph, however.)
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
>>> for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dtn-bpsec/
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> DISCUSS:
>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> 
>>> Sec 1.2 says:
>>> "A sample security
>>>  context has been defined ([I-D.ietf-dtn-bpsec-interop-sc]) to support
>>>  interoperability testing and serve as an exemplar for how security
>>>  contexts should be defined for this specification."
>>> However I don't really understand how interoperability can be reached if
>>> there is not at least one security context that is mandatory to implement in
>>> this draft (especially as ietf-dtn-bpsec-interop-sc is expired for more than
>>> half a year already)...?
>> 
>> **D1: I have added a new Section 9.1 to BPSEC20 which describes the desired approach to BPSec and security contexts.  I have also updated ietf-dtn-bpsec-interop-sc which should be going into WG last call.
>> 
>>> 
>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> COMMENT:
>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> 
>>> Please use the updated disclaimer in rfc8174.
>>> 
>> 
>> **C1: Agreed. The disclaimer has been updated in BPSEC20.
>> 
>> -Ed
>> 
> 
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