Re: [Dyncast] edge capability feedback
Carsten Bormann <cabo@tzi.org> Fri, 12 March 2021 09:03 UTC
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From: Carsten Bormann <cabo@tzi.org>
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Date: Fri, 12 Mar 2021 10:03:51 +0100
Cc: Dirk Trossen <dirk.trossen@huawei.com>,
"Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>, dyncast <dyncast@ietf.org>
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To: Luigi IANNONE <luigi.iannone@huawei.com>
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Subject: Re: [Dyncast] edge capability feedback
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On 2021-03-12, at 09:48, Luigi IANNONE <luigi.iannone@huawei.com> wrote: > > > However, I would like to come back to Barry's point: DDoS. > > AFAIR we did not touch that much this issues, yet, it is important to consider the case of a malicious attacker trying to abuse Dyncast. I think we need to distinguish the client as an attacker and the server as an attacker. Beyond what any network user can do, the most interesting angle a dyncast client can use is resource exhaustion by creating fake state. Not creating state per client (Option 5) is probably the only realistic mitigation. I haven’t really thought about server-side attacks. Servers will be able to create state, and there needs to be some active state management (not just against attacks, but also against malfunctions such as continuously rebooting or respawning servers). > What kind of mechanism should Dyncast include? Can DOTS somehow help? (I do not know this technology so I do not have an answer) DOTS is really about the victim (or their collaterals) talking to the network to mitigate an attack that cannot be otherwise managed. Let’s try to make that unnecessary :-) > Certainly in the next version of the architectural document we should start to provide a security analysis at least from an architectural perspective ;-) Indeed! Grüße, Carsten
- [Dyncast] edge capability feedback Michael McBride
- Re: [Dyncast] edge capability feedback 刘鹏
- Re: [Dyncast] edge capability feedback Barry Greene
- Re: [Dyncast] edge capability feedback Dirk Trossen
- Re: [Dyncast] edge capability feedback Liyizhou
- Re: [Dyncast] edge capability feedback Tianji Jiang
- Re: [Dyncast] edge capability feedback Joel M. Halpern
- Re: [Dyncast] edge capability feedback Carsten Bormann
- Re: [Dyncast] edge capability feedback Milheiro Mendes, Paulo Jorge
- Re: [Dyncast] edge capability feedback Dirk Trossen
- Re: [Dyncast] edge capability feedback Luigi IANNONE
- Re: [Dyncast] edge capability feedback Carsten Bormann
- Re: [Dyncast] edge capability feedback Meiling Chen
- Re: [Dyncast] edge capability feedback Joel Halpern Direct
- Re: [Dyncast] edge capability feedback Dirk Trossen
- Re: [Dyncast] edge capability feedback Dirk Kutscher
- Re: [Dyncast] edge capability feedback Dirk Trossen
- Re: [Dyncast] edge capability feedback Tianji Jiang
- Re: [Dyncast] edge capability feedback Luigi IANNONE
- Re: [Dyncast] edge capability feedback Carsten Bormann