[Atoca] On broadcasting and authentication/authorization (was Re: Requirement D2: "Large Audience")

Igor Faynberg <igor.faynberg@alcatel-lucent.com> Tue, 18 January 2011 01:06 UTC

Return-Path: <igor.faynberg@alcatel-lucent.com>
X-Original-To: earlywarning@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: earlywarning@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 35B5828C222 for <earlywarning@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 17 Jan 2011 17:06:37 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.099
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.099 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.500, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id SJRCfbBv3A5H for <earlywarning@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 17 Jan 2011 17:06:36 -0800 (PST)
Received: from ihemail4.lucent.com (ihemail4.lucent.com [135.245.0.39]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5CBFB28C16B for <earlywarning@ietf.org>; Mon, 17 Jan 2011 17:06:36 -0800 (PST)
Received: from umail.lucent.com (h135-3-40-63.lucent.com [135.3.40.63]) by ihemail4.lucent.com (8.13.8/IER-o) with ESMTP id p0I196mW026647 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 17 Jan 2011 19:09:06 -0600 (CST)
Received: from [135.244.8.247] (faynberg.lra.lucent.com [135.244.8.247]) by umail.lucent.com (8.13.8/TPES) with ESMTP id p0I195ZR011517; Mon, 17 Jan 2011 19:09:05 -0600 (CST)
Message-ID: <4D34E831.2050402@alcatel-lucent.com>
Date: Mon, 17 Jan 2011 20:09:05 -0500
From: Igor Faynberg <igor.faynberg@alcatel-lucent.com>
Organization: Alcatel-Lucent
User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.24 (Windows/20100228)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: earlywarning@ietf.org
References: <AC859123-98E0-4188-8898-0CBBDA567FBC@gmx.net>
In-Reply-To: <AC859123-98E0-4188-8898-0CBBDA567FBC@gmx.net>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.57 on 135.245.2.39
Subject: [Atoca] On broadcasting and authentication/authorization (was Re: Requirement D2: "Large Audience")
X-BeenThere: earlywarning@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
Reply-To: igor.faynberg@alcatel-lucent.com
List-Id: "Discussion list for the IETF Authority-to-Citizen Alert \(atoca\) working group." <earlywarning.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/earlywarning>, <mailto:earlywarning-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/earlywarning>
List-Post: <mailto:earlywarning@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:earlywarning-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/earlywarning>, <mailto:earlywarning-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2011 01:06:37 -0000

With many thanks to Hannes for a thorough follow-up on my humble 
questions, I just wanted to clarify that my question about "large 
audience" arose only because I was trained to test, and the word "large" 
is not something that any test can verify. Since the requirements has a 
MUST in it, it ought to be verifiable. (And I remember Scott echoed this 
by pointing to the word "simultaneously" as potentially problematic, too.

To this end, I am happy with the proposal to  use the term "broadcast."  
How about re-writing Req-D2 as follows:  

>
>       The protocol solution MUST allow broadcast delivery of messages
>        to the targeted audience.
>
>   
In this case, we avoid specification of the size of the audience as well 
as the issues of verifying simultaneity (broadcast takes care of  it).

On the issue of authentication/authorization, I actually meant exactly 
what Brian had said a while ago: The broadcaster has to be authenticated 
(lest a rogue entity creates panic or disrupts the network or both), and 
the network will deal with the authorization.  Indeed, TLS with client 
authentication (preferably, PKI-based) is a solution that I think perfect.

Igor