[Atoca] On broadcasting and authentication/authorization (was Re: Requirement D2: "Large Audience")

Igor Faynberg <igor.faynberg@alcatel-lucent.com> Tue, 18 January 2011 01:06 UTC

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Date: Mon, 17 Jan 2011 20:09:05 -0500
From: Igor Faynberg <igor.faynberg@alcatel-lucent.com>
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Subject: [Atoca] On broadcasting and authentication/authorization (was Re: Requirement D2: "Large Audience")
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With many thanks to Hannes for a thorough follow-up on my humble 
questions, I just wanted to clarify that my question about "large 
audience" arose only because I was trained to test, and the word "large" 
is not something that any test can verify. Since the requirements has a 
MUST in it, it ought to be verifiable. (And I remember Scott echoed this 
by pointing to the word "simultaneously" as potentially problematic, too.

To this end, I am happy with the proposal to  use the term "broadcast."  
How about re-writing Req-D2 as follows:  

>       The protocol solution MUST allow broadcast delivery of messages
>        to the targeted audience.
In this case, we avoid specification of the size of the audience as well 
as the issues of verifying simultaneity (broadcast takes care of  it).

On the issue of authentication/authorization, I actually meant exactly 
what Brian had said a while ago: The broadcaster has to be authenticated 
(lest a rogue entity creates panic or disrupts the network or both), and 
the network will deal with the authorization.  Indeed, TLS with client 
authentication (preferably, PKI-based) is a solution that I think perfect.