Re: [Ecrit] planned-changes: two questions

"Caron, Guy" <g.caron@bell.ca> Wed, 08 September 2021 19:44 UTC

Return-Path: <prvs=878ca7489=g.caron@bell.ca>
X-Original-To: ecrit@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ecrit@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C71053A34F3 for <ecrit@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 8 Sep 2021 12:44:03 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.098
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.098 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=bell.ca
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id yoCiT0T7Mw8I for <ecrit@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 8 Sep 2021 12:43:58 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from ESA3-Dor.bell.ca (esa3-dor.bell.ca [204.101.223.60]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 483883A34F1 for <ecrit@ietf.org>; Wed, 8 Sep 2021 12:43:58 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=bell.ca; i=@bell.ca; q=dns/txt; s=ESAcorp; t=1631130238; x=1662666238; h=from:to:cc:date:message-id:references:in-reply-to: mime-version:subject; bh=Um62IlKOVMcfIu7hna3ow2XpKJw5302dHN1Ime0VA44=; b=FAS+kRyS/UMe42nCqvWx2pBRww0nq9IYK5v3/HRPm/GiaPW0QoW4F947 oTaDW27eWN3gq0I/j93Rd8o5cgat2wZz2vl4hiMHpN17gFS7RXEHLiy0A PoN8Hjrpc4ey49WQygKI4KKLVaMIQcvlJMZUaMJ6q8SM2LLIDyanAnUJZ N5Jpg9hgVmXm07dgY3CIJPs0yfKH+jdOiQ5XsZn4Oy7jFO99ESVXCEcRg bZ8Iu7CtLAUrCTUI+W9VpBddNsTbWJSiVhWHFgd8Do/lm/QPuxtG9NnNO ABJCl8oPedOrjafGfKAuV50OhBHSUh2ZjnMAw1YewbZQMhqLqhSenU6Y1 g==;
IronPort-SDR: wnsGuZ3HMnFwJrgEK5Q1mIYPDKYMvRMwCb1kMJwl4/595o78mkOOqO/Ma1gfqfkgIOPvA8Djh/ ajwUo8dzimEA==
Received: from dc5cmz-d00.bellca.int.bell.ca (HELO DG1MBX04-WYN.bell.corp.bce.ca) ([198.235.121.231]) by esa03corp-dor.bell.corp.bce.ca with ESMTP; 08 Sep 2021 15:43:56 -0400
Received: from DG12MBX03-WYN.bell.corp.bce.ca (142.182.18.48) by DG1MBX04-WYN.bell.corp.bce.ca (142.182.18.14) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 15.0.1497.18; Wed, 8 Sep 2021 15:43:56 -0400
Received: from DG12MBX01-WYN.bell.corp.bce.ca (142.182.18.46) by DG12MBX03-WYN.bell.corp.bce.ca (142.182.18.48) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) id 15.1.2242.10; Wed, 8 Sep 2021 15:43:56 -0400
Received: from DG12MBX01-WYN.bell.corp.bce.ca ([fe80::e0dd:6ba7:3471:98e7]) by DG12MBX01-WYN.bell.corp.bce.ca ([fe80::e0dd:6ba7:3471:98e7%4]) with mapi id 15.01.2242.010; Wed, 8 Sep 2021 15:43:56 -0400
From: "Caron, Guy" <g.caron@bell.ca>
To: Brian Rosen <br@brianrosen.net>
CC: Randall Gellens <rg+ietf@randy.pensive.org>, ECRIT <ecrit@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [EXT]Re: [Ecrit] planned-changes: two questions
Thread-Index: AQHXnbLZ8xDlKKXTXU23cWH8anqQbauNeTZQgABQ14D//8deMIAAkTMAgAACPYCAAAUMgIABYHGAgACMI4CAAJxKYIAA2BsAgAEPeICACDm7AP//v8uw
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 2021 19:43:56 +0000
Message-ID: <aaaa47a3d08645829b8987060b4b7bcf@bell.ca>
References: <A0FC259C-DF34-4496-9013-422006278DA6@randy.pensive.org> <FB2A33E8-E146-404B-B150-1496C40510EF@brianrosen.net> <5577e2e6daa4405bbe12ef61675e1f55@bell.ca> <DE195D79-5A01-48EE-95CA-6C4B82E0886D@brianrosen.net> <e6e17f501711441188119cdfbe384d3d@bell.ca> <3AD58DEC-1DC9-4BC0-B55C-4E782E4AAA74@brianrosen.net> <E20342E7-2EFB-4479-96C2-85B4B7E16989@randy.pensive.org> <A7D59E8E-A014-4CC8-A0FF-5F58E81C6D4A@brianrosen.net> <2b4abbef37be4131a87471af75b6e7da@bell.ca> <CF2E8EDC-B38D-4742-B317-F3CE3E831578@brianrosen.net> <f82108f590674341a22da9c2e4c649e0@bell.ca> <7C4F6B87-C480-4963-B582-7639A9A1B029@brianrosen.net> <89a34416a9224a3bbccb520408283373@bell.ca> <D3AA7F51-01F4-4ED6-BFC3-2B3BF5AB1536@brianrosen.net>
In-Reply-To: <D3AA7F51-01F4-4ED6-BFC3-2B3BF5AB1536@brianrosen.net>
Accept-Language: fr-CA, en-US
Content-Language: fr-FR
X-MS-Has-Attach:
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator:
x-originating-ip: [172.28.239.71]
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="_000_aaaa47a3d08645829b8987060b4b7bcfbellca_"
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ecrit/DtwnzrOLvmtNTt5QoMEXcyTddYs>
Subject: Re: [Ecrit] planned-changes: two questions
X-BeenThere: ecrit@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: Emergency Context Resolution with Internet Technologies <ecrit.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/ecrit>, <mailto:ecrit-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/ecrit/>
List-Post: <mailto:ecrit@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:ecrit-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ecrit>, <mailto:ecrit-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 08 Sep 2021 19:44:14 -0000

I think we are.

Small nit in step 7: <revalidateAsoF> should be <revalidateAsOf>

Related questions:

1.       Should it be exactly on <revalidateAsOf>?

2.       What will be the precision of that datetimestamp, hour, minute, second, sub-second (type="xs:dateTime" supports that level of granularity)?

To your question about multiple IDs in the notification (I assume this is what you meant by “more than one ID in a transaction”), I would leave it to the Server to determine. The Client should abide to the list of IDs it gets notification for but nothing precludes a Client to perform validations outside of the planned-changes mechanism. In fact, a Client may choose to revalidate its entire database periodically even if it supports planned-changes. I don’t like it but there is no text that precludes this to happen.

Guy

De : Brian Rosen <br@brianrosen.net>
Envoyé : 8 septembre 2021 15:18
À : Caron, Guy <g.caron@bell.ca>
Cc : Randall Gellens <rg+ietf@randy.pensive.org>rg>; ECRIT <ecrit@ietf.org>
Objet : [EXT]Re: [Ecrit] planned-changes: two questions

Okay, I think the three of us are converging,  Here is a restatement of your description:
1) In a validation query, a Client can request to be notified when the proffered LI should be revalidated, and provides a URI to send the notifications to;
2) In the validation response, the Server provides an ID that the Client associates with the LI it just validated.   The server may silently ignore repeated requests to store a URI where the test in 4 below fails.
3) Immediately thereafter, if the URI is new to the Server, the Server sends a ‘test’ notification to the URI, with an empty ID.
4) The recipient at the URI is expected to respond with the ID provided in step 2. If it does, the Server stores the URI for future notifications.  If it does not, the server ignores the request to store the URI.
5) Some time after, the Server notifies the Client of an upcoming planned change by sending a notification to the successfully tested URI with the location ID;
6) The client revalidates each LI in its database that matches the ID as of the date of the planned change. If no ID matches, it is a no-op at the Client. Revalidations may also result in no-op at the Client.
7) LIs at the Client that are invalidated by the planned change are modified in its database to be valid (which probably mean another revalidation cycle) with an effective date set to <revalidateAsoF> value.
8) The Server may send ’test’ notifications to the URI without any ID as a form of “keep-alive”.  Any ID provided by the Server to the client may be used as the response to the test transaction


There has been a discussion of sending more than one ID in a transaction.  I think that is a decent idea, but I worry about how big that could be.  Either we put a hard limit in the text or have something in the response to the test transaction that specifies a size limit for that client.

Brian


On Sep 7, 2021, at 8:31 PM, Caron, Guy <g.caron@bell.ca<mailto:g.caron@bell.ca>> wrote:

1) In a validation query, a Client can request to be notified when the proffered LI should be revalidated, and provides a URI to send the notifications to;
2) In the validation response, the Server provides an ID that the Client associates with the LI it just validated;
3) Immediately thereafter, the Server sends a ‘test’ notification to the URI, without any ID;\
[br[For every new ID?  Or just once?  I wanted this to be a one time registration.
[GC] Just once per offered URI.



4) The recipient at the URI is expected to respond with the ID provided in step 2. If it does, the Server stores the URI for future notifications. If it does not, the Server [let’s pick one: reject silently the URI and block the Client permanently/provides a ‘uriNotStored’ warning response to the URI {not compatible with the current proposal to test outside of LoST}/reject silently the URI and block the Client temporarily/other?];
[br]I don’t think an explicit failure is a problem.  The LoST server can limit retries if it needs to.
[GC] Ok for HTTP failures but what I’m talking about is when it fails to return the ID, like in your DoS example.




5) Some time after, the Server notifies the Client of an upcoming planned change by sending a notification to the successfully tested URI with the location ID;
6) The client revalidates each LI in its database that matches the ID as of the date of the planned change. If no ID matches, it is a no-op at the Client. Revalidations may also result in no-op at the Client.
7) LIs at the Client that are invalidated by the planned change are modified in its database to be valid (which probably mean another revalidation cycle) with an effective date set to <revalidateAsoF> value.
[br]I wanted periodic keep alives.  How would that work?
[GC] You mean at step 3? As I mentioned below, I was wondering about the necessity for periodic tests. If the group is convinced it is needed, the Server can simply redo step 3 and the Client can respond with one or many IDs it has from that Server.

________________________________
External Email: Please use caution when opening links and attachments / Courriel externe: Soyez prudent avec les liens et documents joints