Re: [Ecrit] planned-changes: two questions

"Caron, Guy" <g.caron@bell.ca> Tue, 31 August 2021 13:01 UTC

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From: "Caron, Guy" <g.caron@bell.ca>
To: Brian Rosen <br@brianrosen.net>
CC: Randall Gellens <rg+ietf@randy.pensive.org>, ECRIT <ecrit@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [EXT]Re: [Ecrit] planned-changes: two questions
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Date: Tue, 31 Aug 2021 13:01:48 +0000
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References: <A0FC259C-DF34-4496-9013-422006278DA6@randy.pensive.org> <FB2A33E8-E146-404B-B150-1496C40510EF@brianrosen.net> <5577e2e6daa4405bbe12ef61675e1f55@bell.ca> <DE195D79-5A01-48EE-95CA-6C4B82E0886D@brianrosen.net>
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Subject: Re: [Ecrit] planned-changes: two questions
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Inline.

Guy

-----Message d'origine-----
De : Brian Rosen <br@brianrosen.net> 
Envoyé : 31 août 2021 08:11
À : Caron, Guy <g.caron@bell.ca>
Cc : Randall Gellens <rg+ietf@randy.pensive.org>rg>; ECRIT <ecrit@ietf.org>
Objet : [EXT]Re: [Ecrit] planned-changes: two questions

You delete the URI when you delete the record in the LIS.
[GC] That's fine but that was not the question Randall posed. He asked whether the URI is deleted after a notification. I agree that if the Client does not host the location anymore that the URI associated with that location in the Server should be deleted. This could be achieved with an empty <plannedChange>.

I don’t think this is covered in 5222.  The mechanism causes the LoST server to send notifications to the client, but the client is allowed to put any URI in the record, and it can add it to as many records as it wants.
[GC] I thought we agreed on using one generic URI per Client. Clients should be authenticated by the Servers.
  An evil implementation could record URIs against multiple targets that were unaware that the evil implementation did it, until they got a large number of PUSH transactions they didn’t expect or understand as a result of a large planned change.
[GC] Only authenticated Clients should be allowed to provide URIs to be stored by the Servers.

The proposed mechanism qualifies the client URI before its used in a planned change.

Brian

> On Aug 31, 2021, at 7:37 AM, Caron, Guy <g.caron@bell.ca> wrote:
> 
> Well, this is not going in the direction I thought.
> 
> What is the purpose of deleting the URIs at the Server post-validation?
> 
> Regarding opening a new DoS, I guess I'm not following. Wouldn't this case be covered by the security considerations in RFC 5222?
> 
> What you're proposing puts back significant load on the Servers (a key consideration for creating planned-changes in the first place) and complicates the mechanism.
> 
> Guy
> 
> 
> -----Message d'origine-----
> De : Ecrit <ecrit-bounces@ietf.org> De la part de Brian Rosen Envoyé : 
> 30 août 2021 11:22 À : Randall Gellens <rg+ietf@randy.pensive.org> Cc 
> : ECRIT <ecrit@ietf.org> Objet : [EXT]Re: [Ecrit] planned-changes: two 
> questions
> 
> Answer 1: yes.  Since there is going to be a revalidation, just deleting the setting seems right to me.
> Answer 2: Up to server.  If I were implementing, I would hash the real ID with the URI and some kind of predictable nonce.  
> 
> We probably have to say more about how the server identifies the client, so that replacement of the URI works.  Could we say we use the domain of the URI (the entire domain with all the dots) to identify the client, and anything can occur after it (meaning a slash and whatever)?  If we do that, then how would delete the notification?  Force there to be something other than the domain (ugly).  Explicit delete request?
> 
> Hmmm, we’ve opened a DoS attack: a rogue client stores a bunch of URIs for servers it wants to victimize.  In North America we have a real simple solution for that, because we have a PKI, so we know, for sure, who the client is, and could restrict who we allow to store URIs, but that wouldn’t be true in general.  Also, it would be nice for the client to have confidence the mechanism worked before it needed it.
> 
> So
> Let’s add a “command” to plannedChange in the findService request.  
> And, have the client have a response to the notification which is the 
> ID (json with the 200)
> 
> 
> The client starts by sending a command of “initialize”.  The domain is the identity of the client.  The response is an immediate notification to the with whatever LI was in the request and an ID.  The  response by the client (which is the notification web server) is a piece of json containing the ID.  We can say that the LI in this initialize command could be something simple like the Country Code that wouldn’t get a planned change.
> 
> Thereafter, the LoST server (notification client) periodically repeats this keepalive notification every day or week with the initialize LI.  The client has to respond with the ID.
> 
> The regular notification request is a command of “notify”.  The server ignores a request for notification from an uninitialized client.
> The notification can be deleted with a command of “delete”.  If you delete the initialize LI, then the server won’t send any more notifications to that client and deletes all URIs it was saving for that client.  The client would have to re-initialize to reset.
> 
> Brian
> 
>> On Aug 27, 2021, at 5:41 PM, Randall Gellens <rg+ietf@randy.pensive.org> wrote:
>> 
>> I think we're moving to a model where:
>> - In a query, a client can request to be notified when the location 
>> should be revalidated;
>> - In the response, the server provides an ID which the client 
>> associates with the location it just validated;
>> - The server sends a notification to the URI, containing the ID;
>> - The client revalidates each location with which that ID is associated.
>> 
>> Question 1: Does the server delete/inactivate the URI once it has sent the notification?
>> 
>> Question 2: Presumably, when the client revalidates the location(s), it will again request notification.  Does the server return the same ID as before, or a different ID?  A different ID could perhaps be useful in edge cases where the server didn't send or the client didn't get the notification, but any utility seems small.  If it's the same ID, then the answer to question 1 can be that the URI remains active until the client asks to no longer be notified (by sending an empty URI?).
>> 
>> --Randall
>> 
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