Re: [Eligibility-discuss] Questions about I* bodies removing their own membership

John C Klensin <john-ietf@jck.com> Wed, 30 October 2019 12:15 UTC

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Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2019 08:15:30 -0400
From: John C Klensin <john-ietf@jck.com>
To: S Moonesamy <sm+ietf@elandsys.com>
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Subject: Re: [Eligibility-discuss] Questions about I* bodies removing their own membership
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--On Wednesday, October 30, 2019 01:32 -0700 S Moonesamy
<sm+ietf@elandsys.com> wrote:

> Hi John,
> At 11:41 AM 29-10-2019, John C Klensin wrote:
>> Hi.  I've been thinking about the idea of the I* bodies being
>> able to remove one of their own members and how to combine
>> that with adequate safeguards.  Let me make a specific
>> suggestion to see if it gets enough traction for me to draft
>> some text that could be dropped into the "equity" I-D.
>> 
>> Suppose we followed the example already set by the ombudsteam
>> and allowed those bodies, perhaps even by a simply majority
>> vote, to initiate a recall process, bypassing the petition
>> process.  The rest of the recall process would run normally
>> (modulo any changes we might make in the future).
>> 
>> Would that be sufficient and mitigate at least most of the
>> concerns?
> 
> I'll use the IETF Trust as an example as the focus has been on
> the IESG instead of all the bodies which has nomcom-appointees.
> 
> Let's say that a majority of IETF trustees vote to recall one
> of the trustees.  The  Recall Committee does not get the 3/4
> majority to recall that trustee.  This is where things can get
> awkward as you already have a majority of the trustees
> formally agreeing that one of them has to be recalled.
> 
> I'll comment about the IETF LLC.  Let's say that one of its
> directors does not attend several meetings.  As there aren't
> any attendance rules for that body, should that person be
> recalled?
> 
> An investigation is unnecessary if the starting point is a
> presumption of guilt.  That is what could happen once you
> (used in general) take a formal decision early in the process.

Subramanian,

First of all, I need to continue to make a distinction between
"dropped out" and non-performing on the one hand and malfeasance
on the other.  Maybe we need better remedies for the former,
such as (using your LLC Board example, a rule that sufficient
non-attendance or non-participation constituted an automatic
resignation unless the other members of the body voted to retain
the person.   I can remember times when the IAB might have
benefited from a rule like that. The comments below are about
attempts at removal for malfeasance, including what has been
called "inability to play well with other children" on other
contexts.

What you have said just increases the need and motivation for
members of any of those bodies to act responsibly.  First, I
wouldn't propose anything that would prevent members of those
bodies from initiation of a recall petition (rather than
bypassing it) if they thought it best -- bypass would just be
another, faster, option.   Second, as others have pointed out,
there is an intimidation factor in all of this.  Suppose people
sign a recall petition, their names become public (there
arguments far and against keeping those names secret are
complicated and we have not suggested changing the rule), and
the recall committee then decides to retain the target.  I'd
hope the I* member involved and their supporters would be
professional and mature about the situation, believe the
petitioners had acted out of sincere belief and move on.
However, human nature being what it is, some unpleasantness and
possibly even retaliation against the petitioners is to be
expected.  If the recall committee decided to remove someone but
the nomcom decided to fill the vacancy by returning them, those
bad instincts might be even stronger and might be applied to the
recall committee members as well as the petitioners.  

These things are why it is useful to consider options that
increase the odds that people will take recall initiation
seriously, even if those risks of retaliation and other negative
behavior and probably enough for anyone who cares about the IETF
and their roles in it.

But none of this is goig to go away.  I don't know whether
recall initiation by special votes of members of the I* bodies
is likely to be helpful (the "fifteen people on the IESG so they
can just use the normal process if we cut the number of
signatures down to ten" argument suggests maybe not).  But I'm
fairly confident that, if our conclusion is that we cannot do
anything to improve the equity of the petition process or, down
the line, to make some adjustments in how and how rapidly the
actual evaluation process works, then the possibly-inevitable
conclusion is that, whether we leave the recall process on the
books or not, people are appointed for the Nomcom (or whomever)
for the full duration of their terms and there is no way, short
of assassination or its moral equivalent, to remove them until
they serve out their full terms and hope that the next Nomcom
does the right thing.

best,
   john