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Re: [Emu] EAP-AKA' and Re: WG adoption call for draft-arkko-eap-aka-pfs

Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Wed, 03 April 2019 17:50 UTC

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From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
To: John Mattsson <john.mattsson@ericsson.com>
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Date: Wed, 03 Apr 2019 13:50:13 -0400
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Subject: Re: [Emu] EAP-AKA' and Re: WG adoption call for draft-arkko-eap-aka-pfs
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John Mattsson <john.mattsson@ericsson.com> wrote:
    >> I was always very sad that AKA did not get more uptake as it authenticates
    >> the network to the phone, and therefore would have (as I understand things)
    >> defended against "Stingray" like equipment used without judicial review,
    >> requiring interceptors to significantly involve telco in such things, and
    >> limiting who they would actually "catch".  ... I've heard other claims too.

    > Several independent things here, first there are 4 different form
    > factors for removable UICCs (aka "SIM cards")
    > 1FF ("Full-size") = ID-1
    > 2FF ("Mini-SIM") = ID-000
    > 3FF ("Micro-SIM") = Mini-UICC
    > 4FF ("Nano-SIM")

Yes, I knew that the original AKA form factor was different, and that this
was a limitation on why we still had "SIM" cards, but then I thought that
when we went to mini, that the form factors "converged", and you confirm that:

    > On the UICC, there are either a SIM application (2G), an USIM
    > application (3G) or both. If you live in a country that have 4G and do
    > not use a very old SIM-card, your SIM-card have USIM and can do AKA
    > with network authentication. Authentication to a 4G/LTE network
    > requires a USIM and always use AKA with network authentication.

Good to know, thanks for this explanation.

    > - the other is active false base stations. Many operators around the
    > world has already turned off their 2G/GSM networks. The only reason
    > this attack still works is that your phone happily connects to false 2G
    > network is offers the best signal. Neither iOS (Apple) nor Android
    > (Google) allows you to even manually turn off 2G. They both allow you
    > to turn off 4G for battery savings but not 2G for security reasons. Ask
    > the company that made your phone ;)

Sad to know.  Thanks for explaining this.

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-

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