Re: [Emu] Working Group Last Call for draft-ietf-emu-tls-eap-types

Alan DeKok <aland@deployingradius.com> Mon, 04 July 2022 20:37 UTC

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From: Alan DeKok <aland@deployingradius.com>
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Date: Mon, 4 Jul 2022 16:36:57 -0400
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To: Mohit Sethi <mohit@iki.fi>
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Subject: Re: [Emu] Working Group Last Call for draft-ietf-emu-tls-eap-types
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On Jul 4, 2022, at 4:04 PM, Mohit Sethi <mohit@iki.fi> wrote:
> You don't have to use resumption. You just need to send NewSessionTicket as a protected success indication.

  That's reasonable.

> I thought the reason for for forbidding use of client certificates without phase 2 authentication was lack of protected success indication. Perhaps there is some other reason? This is why I wrote in my original comment: "I think it would make sense to add an explanation on why this was done? ".

  The draft explains why that behavior is forbidden.  If you're doing client certs without phase 2 authentication, that's just EAP-TLS.  There's no reason to have multiple methods of implementing EAP-TLS.  People should just use EAP-TLS.

> One-time password was only an example. Perhaps a wrong one. I just wanted to highlight that we were forbidding TTLS/PEAP and now TEAP deployments from using client certificates without phase 2 authentication. But there can be deployments where some peers use client certificates without phase 2 authentication while other peers use client certificates with additional phase 2 authentication (password, etc.).

  I see no benefit to using client certificates without phase 2 authentication.  Why not just use EAP-TLS?

  I'd like to understand the reasons why someone would use TTLS / PEAP / TEAP like that.  Do you have use-cases where this behavior is different from EAP-TLS, and better than EAP-TLS?

> The draft currently says that inner identity should not have a realm. However, the example above, and many other guidance documents I have seen do use a realm in the inner identity.

  Section 3.1 mentions this explicitly:

   However, if the inner identity does contain an NAI realm, the inner
   realm SHOULD be either an exact copy of the outer realm, or be a
   subdomain of the outer realm.  The inner realm SHOULD NOT be from a
   different realm than the outer realm.  There are very few reasons for
   those realms to be different.

  Alan DeKok.