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Re: [Emu] POST WGLC Comments draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13

Alan DeKok <aland@deployingradius.com> Wed, 18 September 2019 13:21 UTC

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Subject: Re: [Emu] POST WGLC Comments draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13
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  Just re-reading the text on PSK, I noticed a few things.  The text in Section 2.1.2 talks about PSK, the session ticket, and a "key_share" extension.   The accompanying diagram doesn't include any of those.  I suggest updating the diagram to include them.

  As a related note, if the PSK *is* in the resumption cache, but the key is wrong, the cache entry should not be discarded.  Otherwise an attacker can disable caching for *all* users.  This issue could be clearer in this document.

  Perhaps it would be useful to add a short note in Section 5 about security of resumption.  It should reference RFC 8446 Section 8.1, and 8.2, which discuss this issue.  Also, Section 4.2.11 of that document has an "Implementor's note:" which is important.

  Alan DeKok.

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