Re: [Endymail] Hashes of key as addresses

Steffen Nurpmeso <sdaoden@yandex.com> Fri, 05 September 2014 18:27 UTC

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Date: Fri, 05 Sep 2014 20:27:12 +0200
From: Steffen Nurpmeso <sdaoden@yandex.com>
To: endymail@ietf.org
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References: <CAMm+LwimhUi5uZAgm9erYtMJ9-o6+x__344TwKH4-Pa_-mckfg@mail.gmail.com> <20140829091133.GA25723@yeono.kjorling.se> <CAMm+LwhSYm7e4WevDKqewGuOk=O_Zd7dKa1ctfvBzyF3jz4jtg@mail.gmail.com> <20140904132955.GN603@yeono.kjorling.se>
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Subject: Re: [Endymail] Hashes of key as addresses
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 |As it stands, with SMTP, assuming transport security (_proper_
 |STARTTLS, for example)

I don't know how many messages are sent over SMTP each day, but it
would be interesting to know how much energy all those useless
roundtrip packets consume which are necessary to get upgrade
a SMTP session via STARTTLS, and how many percent of those
connections could also instantiate a non-existent SMTPS instead,
not requiring these upgrades.
Imagine all those billion indic kids treadle the dynamos to
produce the necessary electricity; granted it improves the
quality of their organs, too, so win-win here.

And in my world there was no support for DNSSEC, but omnipresent
support for TLS over TCP.  It would take a day to extend the
resolver, with fewest additional code, based on external
crypto / ssl/tls libraries which get used trillion times each day.
And with a caching resolver and/or a local DNS cache that
additional cost on the DNS side would be balanced out by the
savings of the much more often occurring SMTPS connections.
Oh well, it is much too late for this nagging, of course.
And there are really some domains which use DNSSEC today; my bank
does not however, and unfortunately ;-))  But of course their
website is protected via https, after so much phishing, ..say.
I wonder wether that sorts out the problem.

--steffen