Re: [Endymail] We're not done yet

[Paul Wouters <[e-mail]>]

On Mon, 17 Nov 2014, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:

> The client does not know whether these are safely treated as the
> same address, so should only query for the address it is sending
> to as-is.  Any variant equivalent lookup keys should be created at
> the receving domain.  So there's only one lookup.

Well, that's a nice theory. Now in practise what happens is that SMTP
servers really don't have different accounts for LHS that are only
different in case. And we have the issue of too many phone input boxes
and webforms automatically capitalizing names. I just happened to me
today on my phone, so it send email to [e-mail].

If those are different people those people are going to end up with each
others email already. So the problem will not be worse.

> Users likely also need to store old private keys forever so that
> old mail can still be read.  The complete architecture for encrypted
> email has many parts we're not making explicit, but all have a
> bearing on key management requirements for MUAs.

I'd call that out of scope. I think of OPENPGKEY as a transport plus
data in rest protection while in-transit. Once the final enduser gets
the email, I expect their email client to decrypt it and store it
locally, so it remains searchable, indexable, etc. I also expect them
to use full disk encryption to protect all their email. This method
does not require keeping old private keys.

Paul