Re: [Endymail] Concealing the email address of the subscriber.

Natanael <natanael.l@gmail.com> Fri, 29 August 2014 15:50 UTC

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Date: Fri, 29 Aug 2014 17:50:28 +0200
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From: Natanael <natanael.l@gmail.com>
To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>
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Cc: endymail <endymail@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Endymail] Concealing the email address of the subscriber.
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Den 29 aug 2014 17:22 skrev "Phillip Hallam-Baker" <phill@hallambaker.com>om>:
>
> Problem: Allow an email sender who knows an email address to locate a
> record giving key information without disclosing address to an
> attacker.
>
> To simplify the argument we are only considering this part of the
> puzzle here and hypothesizing that there is a separate infrastructure
> whose sole purpose is matching email addresses to records.
>
> Obviously if we are using CT with this then any information that goes
> into this infrastructure has to be validated in CT but that can be via
> a hash of the data which is non-disclosing.

Bitcoin SPV clients which need servers / trusted nodes for blockchain
lookups to verify the balance at its own addresses are using bloom filters
for privacy (intentionally high false positive rate). Isn't all too costly
in most cases.