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Re: [Endymail] Off we go...

Tom Ritter <tom@ritter.vg> Wed, 27 August 2014 02:20 UTC

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From: Tom Ritter <tom@ritter.vg>
Date: Tue, 26 Aug 2014 21:20:25 -0500
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Subject: Re: [Endymail] Off we go...
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On 26 August 2014 17:34, Pete Resnick <presnick@qti.qualcomm.com> wrote:
> So off we go... What projects are folks working on

Prior to Snowden's revelations, a friend and I had given some
thought[0] to a system that supported provider-to-provider encryption,
where the end could be extended on either side to end-to-provider or
end-to-end encryption.  Along the way we thought about distributing
keys over HTTPS vs DNS[1], authenticity[2], a report-only deployment
mode[3], and other stuff.  We shelved our proposal, but published our
thoughts in a document that we hoped would add some thoughts and
context to future discussions.  Full spec is at
https://github.com/tomrittervg/uee

I can't claim to be working on this, but I'm excited about
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane/

I'm also tangentially involved (through my job) with NCC Group's
.trust initiative[4].  There are a lot of policy controls, but also
technical ones. Some of the guarantees you will have when
communicating with a domain in the .trust gTLD will be that the domain
will have valid TLS certificates for StartTLS, will have StartTLS
available, will use DNSSEC, DKIM, and a host of other technical
requirements.

-tom


[0] https://ritter.vg/blog-uee_email_encryption.html
[1] https://github.com/tomrittervg/uee/blob/master/appendix-key-distro-choice.md
[2] https://github.com/tomrittervg/uee/blob/master/proposal.md#key-authenticity
[3] https://github.com/tomrittervg/uee/blob/master/proposal.md#report-only-mode
[4] https://www.nccgroup.com/media/112014/trust-faq.pdf

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