[eppext] Genart Telechat review draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-11

Robert Sparks <rjsparks@nostrum.com> Mon, 14 December 2015 19:37 UTC

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From: Robert Sparks <rjsparks@nostrum.com>
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Date: Mon, 14 Dec 2015 13:37:28 -0600
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Subject: [eppext] Genart Telechat review draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-11
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I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area
Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed
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Document: draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-11
Reviewer: Robert Sparks
Review Date: 14Dec2015
IETF LC End Date: 4Dec2015
IESG Telechat date: 17Dec2015

Summary: (Still) ready for publication as Proposed Standard

Thanks for addressing most of my nits.

I think it's a problem (not for this document, but for the overall work) 
that draft-koch-dnsop-operator-change isn't moving forward. I think the 
group should spend energy on how to capture what it was saying.

I also still think you would have a stronger document if it discussed 
the SHOULD NOT in the security section as I suggest below. I think you 
read that to be me suggesting you change it to MUST NOT. That was not 
the intent. I was asking you to add to the document _why_ it wasn't MUST 
NOT.

On 11/25/15 3:45 PM, Robert Sparks wrote:
> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area
> Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed
> by the IESG for the IETF Chair.  Please treat these comments just
> like any other last call comments.
>
> For more information, please see the FAQ at
>
> <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
>
> Document: draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-10
> Reviewer: Robert Sparks
> Review Date: 25Nov2015
> IETF LC End Date: 4Dec2015
> IESG Telechat date: (not yet scheduled)
>
> Summary: Ready for publication as Proposed Standard with nits
>
> This is a small nit, but please consider changing the document to 
> address it. The motivation for this extension leans on improving the 
> security of transferring information between registrars. It should be 
> recast as providing better automation and reliability instead. In 
> practice (and I think in specification), it hinges on passing a 
> password from the registrar of record to the gaining registrar through 
> some unspecified means (though typically through the registrant). That 
> password is required to be placed in the create by the gaining 
> registrar as specified in this document in order for that create to 
> succeed at the registry. While it would be impractical and 
> error-prone, the same channel that was used to hand this password 
> around _could_ be used to pass the keying material this extension 
> addresses.
>
> Reading draft-koch-dnsop-operator-change (an informational reference 
> currently) helped greatly with understanding this document. That draft 
> expired in 2014. Please be sure it advances, and consider making it a 
> normative reference.
> If it is not going to move forward, consider pulling some of the 
> transfer mechanic recommendations and the definitions of 
> losing/gaining entities into this draft, unless they've already made 
> it into the RFC series somewhere else?
>
> The security considerations document says a server SHOULD NOT perform 
> any transformation on data under server management when processing a 
> <keyrelay:create> command. Can this point to more detailed discussion 
> somewhere? Why is this not a MUST NOT? (What are the conditions where 
> violating the SHOULD NOT is the right thing to do? What are the risks 
> a server takes if it performs such a transformation?)
>
> Micro-nit : In section 2.1 where you say "The <expiry> element MUST 
> contain one of the following", consider saying "The <expiry> element 
> MUST contain exactly one of the following".
>
> RjS
>
>