[Fud] Revised Charter Text

Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net> Mon, 25 September 2017 18:07 UTC

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From: Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>
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Subject: [Fud] Revised Charter Text
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Based on the feedback following the IETF meeting in Prague I have
updated the charter text.

Ciao
Hannes

----

Firmware Updating Description (FUD)
[Alternative proposal: SUIT (Software Updates for Internet of Things).]

Vulnerabilities with Internet of Things (IoT) devices have raised the
need for a secure firmware update mechanism that is also suitable for
constrained devices. Security experts, researchers and regulators
recommend that all IoT devices are equipped with such a mechanism. While
there are many proprietary firmware update mechanisms in use today there
is a lack of a modern interoperable approach of securely updating IoT
devices.

A firmware update solution consists of several components, including
* a mechanism to transport firmware images to IoT devices,
* a manifest that provides meta-data about the firmware image
  (such as a firmware package identifier, the hardware the package
   needs to run, dependencies on other firmware packages, etc.) as
   well as cryptographic information for protecting the firmware
   image in an end-to-end fashion, and
* the firmware image itself.

With RFC 4108 the IETF standardized a manifest format that uses the
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) to protect firmware packages.

Since the publication of RFC 4108 more than 10 years have passed and
more experience with IoT deployments have lead to additional
functionality requiring the work done with RFC 4108 to be revisited. The
purpose of this group is to standardize a version 2 of RFC 4108 that
reflects best current practices. This group focuses on defining a
firmware update solution for Class 1 devices, as defined in RFC 7228,
i.e., IoT devices with ~10 KiB RAM and ~100 KiB flash. This group
will not define any transport mechanism.

In 2016 the Internet Architecture Board organized a workshop on
'Internet of Things (IoT) Software Update (IOTSU)', which took place at
Trinity College Dublin, Ireland on the 13-14 June 2016. The
main goal of the workshop was to foster a discussion on requirements,
challenges and solutions for bringing software and firmware updates to
IoT devices. This workshop also made clear that there are challenges
with lack of regulatory requirements, and misaligned incentives. It is
nevertheless seen as important to standardize the building blocks that
help interested parties to implement and deploy a solid firmware update
mechanism.

In particular this group aims to publish two documents, namely
 * an IoT firmware update architecture that includes a description of
the involved entities, security threats and assumptions, and
 * the manifest format itself.

This group does not aim to standardize a generic software update
mechanism used by rich operating systems, like Linux, but instead
focuses on software development practices in the embedded industry.
Software update solutions that aim to take the features of scripting
languages, such as JavaScript variants like JerryScript, into account
are also outside the scope of this group.

This group will aim to develop a close relationship with silicon vendors
and OEMs that develop IoT operating systems.

Milestones

Dec 2017     Submit "Architecture" document as WG item.

Dec 2017     Submit "Manifest Format" specification as WG item.

Jul 2018    Submit "Architecture" to the IESG for publication as an
Informational RFC.

Nov 2018     Submit "Manifest Format" to the IESG for publication as a
Proposed Standard.


Additional calendar items:

Mar 2018     Release initial version of the manifest creation tools as
open source.

Apr 2018     Release first version of manifest test tool suite as open
source.

Jun 2018     Release first IoT OS implementation of firmware update
mechanisms as open source.