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Re: [Gen-art] IETF LC Gen-ART review of draft-harkins-salted-eap-pwd-06

worley@ariadne.com (Dale R. Worley) Fri, 23 September 2016 22:22 UTC

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To: Daniel Harkins <dharkins@arubanetworks.com>
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Cc: draft-harkins-salted-eap-pwd.all@ietf.org, gen-art@ietf.org, ietf@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] IETF LC Gen-ART review of draft-harkins-salted-eap-pwd-06
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Daniel Harkins <dharkins@arubanetworks.com> writes:
>   We may be talking past each other. But the reason that note is there
> is because this is a "balanced" PAKE where both sides use an identical
> representation of a credential. In this case, the credential is not
> the password, it's the hashed password.  So if an attacker gets a copy
> of the hashed password it can impersonate the client to the server and
> the server to the client. In other uses of hashed password databases
> the client sends the password across the wire/air so if an attacker
> somehow got ahold of the hashed password it would not be able to
> impersonate the client to the server (because the server is asking for
> the password not the hashed password).

(My apologies for not replying sooner.)

I suspect that I'm being caught up by the fact that I don't know the
design space of authentication protocols very well.  In any case, this
point is certainly not a reason to hold up the draft.

Dale

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