Re: [Gen-art] Gen-art LC review of draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning-19

[Chris Palmer <[e-mail]>]

On Thu, Jul 31, 2014 at 6:05 AM, Elwyn Davies <[e-mail]> wrote:

>>     Note that the UA MUST perform Pin Validation when setting up the TLS
>>     session, before beginning an HTTP conversation over the TLS channel.
>
> I suspect I am confused: If a UA is making its first connection to a host
> for which it doesn't
> have a preconfigured Pin, then it won't get the Pin(s) from the host until
> it has set up the
> TLS connection and received the response to the request at the HTTP protocol
> level.  In that case
> Pin validation will pass by default (subject to local policy perhaps) since
> the cache doesn't have
> entries for the host.  Presumably the UA should then perform Pin validation
> if it has passed by
> default during TLS setup (assuming that this is possible given the layering)
> or does the UA have to
> terminate the session and restart it so that Pin validation can be
> performed?  The second case may
> give scope for a DoS attack.  Or is it the case that Pin validation is not
> needed on the first
> connection... I don't see why this shouldn't be done but I may not
> understand the problem.  I think
> some clarification about the startup of the process is needed.

https://code.google.com/p/key-pinning-draft/source/detail?r=f2bd6a1d33c25a201041cebb35b02b5a60446f44

The various other improvements you suggest are visible at:

https://code.google.com/p/key-pinning-draft/source/list

> s5, para 1: Is it really "HSTS or HPKP"?  I thought it would be "HSTS
> combined with HPKP".

Either HSTS or HPKP alone can be supercookies.