Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-manet-ibs-03

[Jari Arkko <[e-mail]>]

FWIW, I have followed this discussion.

I have to say that IBS would not necessarily be my first choice of crypto solutions, particularly in a standards track spec. But it is interesting. I do not mind the definition of a new ICV with IBS. But it does have the issues Stephen and and Martin point out.

I have balloted No-Obj.

Jari

On 30 Oct 2014, at 11:46, Dearlove, Christopher (UK) <[e-mail]> wrote:

> I have a number of problems with this (including at some points not being clear what exactly is being defined), but I'll start with the first major one. X generates a public key related to SSK. But that's useless, Y does not know it. The whole point is that X and Y can be in total ignorance of each other until Y receives a message from X. There is no secure channel from X to Y to distribute a public key (including not via A). So now how does Y validate PVT? All Y knows about X is X's identity.
> 
> So you may believe we can do better (this needs to be retaining the key properties we have here). So far I do not. I don't expect to either, but we'll see. Note that a system that distributes public keys is a different tradeoff in the space. A valid one, but not the one here. (It is neither absolutely better or worse, as each has advantages over the other.)
> 
> I think you are mistaken about the issue with RFC 6507. The issue you have is that the authority knows all. But we didn't sleepwalk into that. That's completely known, and acceptable in some cases. This is for use in those cases. The issue similarly applies to MIKEY-SAKKE (RFC 6509) that is what RFC 6507 was issued to support. (It also applies to various people offering IBE-based encryption schemes for email, but that's another story.)
> 
> And it's up front in this draft. From the Introduction
> 
>  The disadvantage referred to is that the trusted authority has
>   complete authority, even more so than a conventional certificate
>   authority.  
> 
> (and the rest of that paragraph). And it's said again in the Security Considerations section.
> 
> -- 
> Christopher Dearlove
> Senior Principal Engineer, Information Assurance Group
> Communications, Networks and Image Analysis Capability
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> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Martin Thomson [mailto:[e-mail]] 
> Sent: 29 October 2014 18:48
> To: Dearlove, Christopher (UK)
> Cc: [e-mail]; [e-mail]; [e-mail]
> Subject: Re: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-manet-ibs-03
> 
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> On 29 October 2014 03:52, Dearlove, Christopher (UK) <[e-mail]> wrote:
>> Any objection that something better can be done needs to provide that something better, not just say "asymmetric, therefore something better".
> 
> That's a totally fair comment.  I was trying for expediency, since that is fairly obvious to me.  Here's a rough sketch:
> 
> A has the same properties you describe: a secret that only it knows
> (KSAK) and a paired public value (KPAK) that it can distribute.
> 
> X generates a secret (analogous to SSK) and passes a signature over some material (optionally its identity, as you note above, plus the paired public value) to A.  A provides X with a signature over the both the public value and identity that X can subsequently use to claim that identity to others with the KPAK (analogous to PVT).  X is expected to keep that value secret also.
> 
> Then X can send message in the form (data || PVT || sig(SSK, data || PVT)), and Y can validate both sig and PVT to establish that this is valid.
> 
> I'm not saying that this is strictly better.  It is more complex; RFC
> 6507 seems to cleverly roll the identity of X into the public key it uses to sign.  But this has the property that private keys aren't shared.  That means that you can implement this using an HSM that enforces a strict containment for keys.  It also means that you can establish a parallel bases for trust to the single authority.
> 
> 
> I think that this highlights the reason we call out downrefs in the process.  As a standalone information RFC, the abstract presentation of RFC 6507 is perfectly innocuous.  But it's application to a standards track effort does open questions about suitability.
> 
> You claim that this is an improvement over the status quo, and that is quite clear.  The scheme prevents participants from impersonating each other, which might not have been possible with a system based on a shared symmetric key.  It does however, require that all trust is placed in an authority.  I believe that we can do better.
> 
> Maybe the property I'm describing here not valuable in the deployment context this is designed for and maybe this can be addressed by establishing firm expectations about applicability.  Maybe a simple applicability statement would suffice.  That is above my pay grade to decide.  I'll defer to the IESG on this one.
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