Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART Telechat Review of draft-ietf-radext-radsec-11

["Romascanu, Dan (Dan)" <[e-mail]>]

Hi,

Please use this address ([e-mail]) when you respond. 

Thanks and Reagrds,

Dan

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Dan Romascanu [mailto:[e-mail]]
> Sent: Wednesday, February 29, 2012 9:28 PM
> To: Romascanu, Dan (Dan)
> Subject: Fwd: [Gen-art] Gen-ART Telechat Review of draft-ietf-radext-
> radsec-11
> 
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: Russ Housley <[e-mail]>
> Date: Wed, Feb 29, 2012 at 9:04 PM
> Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART Telechat Review of draft-ietf-radext-
> radsec-11
> To: Pete McCann <[e-mail]>
> Cc: IETF Gen-ART <[e-mail]>, Dan Romascanu <[e-mail]>
> 
> 
> Pete:
> 
> I did not see a response to this message.  Do these changes resolve
> your concerns?
> 
> Russ
> 
> 
> On Jan 31, 2012, at 2:41 AM, Stefan Winter wrote:
> 
> > Hello,
> >
> > thanks for your review!
> >
> >> Minor issues:
> >>
> >> Section 2.4:
> >>   In TLS-X.509 with PKI infrastructure, a client is uniquely
> identified
> >>   by the serial number of the tuple (presented client
> >>   certificate;Issuer).
> >> SHOULD BE:
> >>   In TLS-X.509 with PKI infrastructure, a client is uniquely
> identified
> >>   by the tuple (serial number of presented client
> certificate;Issuer).
> >
> > Right, thanks for spotting; fixed now in my working copy.
> >
> >> Because RADIUS supports the Disconnect Request (server-to-client)
> message,
> >> it seems that there is some requirement to keep the TLS session open
> for the
> >> duration of the access that was authorized.  Otherwise, the server
> would not be
> >> able to send such a packet to the client without initiating its own
> >> TLS connection
> >> which may not be possible or desirable.  Is this aspect of the
> specification
> >> inherited from the referenced TCP specification?  It may be helpful
> to
> >> add a paragraph
> >> about this issue.
> >
> > Dynamic Authoirzation traffic is only very loosely coupled with the
> > corresponding authentication traffic. In particular, RFC5176 states
> that
> > a DynAuth Client (i.e. the one that would initiate the DM message)
> may
> > or may not be co-located with the RADIUS server which handled the
> > authentication.
> > There's a recommendation that a DynAuth client should not send its
> > traffic directly to the NAS and instead route it via the RADIUS
> server.
> > If that recommendation is followed, it may make sense to re-use the
> same
> > TLS session to send the packets indeed.
> > But it is certainly not a *requirement* that these types of traffic
> are
> > "bundled" together, or even just take the same path.
> >
> > It's true that there may be some operational hassle in setting up a
> TLS
> > session in the reverse direction if the original TLS session doesn't
> > exist any more. RADIUS/TLS shares this fate with all the other
> > transports though (in RADIUS/UDP, getting in the reverse direction
> > through a firewall, possibly combined with traversing NAT is "fun";
> same
> > goes for RADIUS/TCP). So, nothing "new" here IMHO.
> >
> >> Nits/editorial comments:
> >>
> >> Section 2.3:
> >>   x.y.z
> >> Did you mean to fill in a real section number here?
> >
> > Right, for TLS 1.2 that would be RFC6066, section 6.
> >
> > I have updated the text to state:
> >
> >          +  Implementations SHOULD indicate their trusted
> Certification
> >             Authorities.  For TLS 1.2, this is done using [RFC5246]
> >             section 7.4.4 "certificate authorities" (server side) and
> >             [RFC6066] Section 6 "Trusted CA Indication" (client
> side).
> >             See also Section 3.2.
> >
> > I'm wondering if I should also include exact pointers to the TLS 1.1
> > equivalents. After all TLS 1.1 is fading out anyway, so I could
> imagine
> > to leave that as the famous "exercise to the reader" if he wants to
> use
> > TLS 1.1 still. I wouldn't mind adding them explicitly though; just
> let
> > me know what you think is preferable.
> >
> >>   Note Section 3.4 (1) )
> >> Missing open paren?
> >
> > Right. Fixed to:
> >
> >   4.  start exchanging RADIUS datagrams (note Section 3.4 (1) ).  The
> >       shared secret to compute the (obsolete) MD5 integrity checks
> and
> >       attribute encryption MUST be "radsec" (see Section 3.4 (2) ).
> >
> > Greetings,
> >
> > Stefan Winter
> >
> > --
> > Stefan WINTER
> > Ingenieur de Recherche
> > Fondation RESTENA - Réseau Téléinformatique de l'Education Nationale
> et
> > de la Recherche
> > 6, rue Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi
> > L-1359 Luxembourg
> >
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> >
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> 
> 
> 
> --
> Dan
> http://dan.romascanu.net/